Loss of control in flight: Cirrus SR22 G6, N1281F, fatal accident occurred on September 28, 2026, at First Flight Airport (FFA/KFFA), Kill Devil Hills, North Carolina

• Location: Kill Devil Hills, North Carolina 
• Accident Number: ERA24FA397 
• Date & Time: September 28, 2024, 17:19 Local 
• Registration: N1281F 
• Aircraft: CIRRUS DESIGN CORP SR22 
• Aircraft Damage: Destroyed 
• Defining Event: Loss of control in flight 
• Injuries: 5 Fatal 
• Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General aviation - Personal

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On September 28, 2024, at 1719 eastern daylight time, a Cirrus Design Corp SR22 airplane, N1281F, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Kill Devil Hills, North Carolina. The private pilot and four passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 personal flight.

The pilot departed on a multi-leg flight from the airport where the airplane was based and made stops at three other airports before continuing to the destination airport. ADS-B data for the accident flight showed that, after departure from the third airport, the pilot flew the airplane 6.5 nautical miles (nm) to the destination airport and directly entered the left downwind leg of the traffic pattern for a runway with a published traffic pattern to the right.

While on the final approach, the pilot descended the airplane, flew low above the runway, then climbed the airplane. Data recovered from the airplane's recoverable data module (RDM) showed that, while the airplane was low over the runway, the stall warning tone sounded before the pilot increased the engine power and initiated the climb. The pilot subsequently used left turns to fly a return pattern back to the runway and then reestablished the airplane on the final approach.

A witness reported that, during the pilot's second approach to the runway, the airplane was high. The weather conditions reported at the airport about the time of the accident included a quartering left headwind at 6 knots, gusting to 14 knots. ADS-B and RDM data showed that, as the airplane passed the mid-point of the runway, it made a steep left turn. It then impacted the tops of 50-ft-tall trees off the left side of the runway, coming to rest in heavily wooded terrain, where a significant postimpact fire ensued. A postaccident examination of the airframe and engine did not reveal evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunction or failure that would have precluded normal operation.

The RDM data revealed that the second final approach was unstable, such that the stall warning tone sounded, and the pilot responded by increasing engine power an initiating climb with an excessive nose-up pitch control input. During that time, the airplane's nose-up pitch and its left roll continued to increase before the data ended.

Based on this information, it is likely that during the go-around attempt the pilot exceeded the airplane's critical angle of attack, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall and loss of airplane control. It is possible that, after the pilot fueled the airplane at the most recent departure airport, the airplane's loading was near its maximum gross weight. This condition, if present, could have adversely affected the control characteristics of the airplane, increasing the difficulty for the pilot in maintaining airplane control.

Toxicological testing of the pilot indicated that he had used the antidepressant medication vilazodone. Whether he was impaired by effects of vilazodone or an associated underlying condition at the time of the accident could not be determined. One laboratory detected mildly elevated carboxyhemoglobin, a marker of carbon monoxide exposure. This result could be attributed to smoke inhalation during the postimpact fire.

- Probable Cause: The pilot's exceedance of the airplane's critical angle of attack during a go-around attempt, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall and loss of airplane control.

The pilot held a commercial certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land and instrument airplane. His last logbook entry was dated September 9 with an unspecified year. The logbook reflected that, at that time, he had logged 449.2 total hours. The logbook showed a total of 14.7 hours in the accident airplane make and model, 13.5 hours of which were dual instruction received. The pilot also logged 14.3 hours in Cirrus SR20 model airplanes, 12.6 hours of which were dual instruction received. His logbook contained endorsements indicating that he satisfactorily completed the flight review required by 14 CFR 61.56 and an instrument proficiency check (IPC) required by 14 CFR 61.57(d) on September 20, 2024. 

According to the accident airplane’s registration file, the pilot purchased it new in August 2023. An interview with the director of flight operations (DFO) at a flight center where the pilot most recently trained revealed that the accident pilot began training with the flight center in June 2021 and flew with flight instructors there 20 times before he took delivery of the airplane. 

According to the DFO, the pilot began his Cirrus transition training with the flight center but completed the visual flight rules (VFR) portion of the course elsewhere with a Cirrus employee instructor following delivery of the airplane.  The DFO stated that the pilot subsequently completed the instrument flight rules portion of the training with one of the flight center’s instructors. 

The DFO stated that the flight center did not provide the pilot any further instruction for about a year, until the pilot sought instruction for his IPC for his insurance renewal. The DFO stated that he flew with the pilot on September 4, 2024, but did not sign off on the IPC because the pilot’s performance on many items was not to the flight center’s standards. (The DFO provided a record from his own logbook indicating that the flight was 1.8 hours and that he did not sign off on the pilot’s IPC.) 

The DFO stated that a training plan was put in place for the pilot to improve in the areas in which his performance was not up to standards. The pilot subsequently completed two simulator lessons followed by two flight lessons in the accident airplane. The simulator sessions and the first flight were focused on instrument flying skills to meet standards required by the IPC, and the second flight was focused on VFR maneuvers and landings. The DFO stated that the four training events took place between September 13 and 20, 2024.