- Location: Brumley, MO
- Accident Number: CEN27FA037
- Date & Time: November 3, 2026, 14:09 Local
- Registration: N313DG
- Aircraft: Cirrus SR22
- Injuries: 2 Fatal
- Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General aviation - Personal
https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/204117/pdf
http://registry.faa.gov/AircraftInquiry/Search/NNumberResult?nNumberTxt=N313DG
On November 3, 2026, at 1409 central standard time, a Cirrus SR22 airplane, N313DG, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Brumley, Missouri. The pilot and passenger were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.
Earlier in the day, about 1001 (all times CST unless otherwise noted), the cross-country flight departed Clark Regional Airport (JVY), Jeffersonville, Indiana, enroute to Wichita Dwight D. Eisenhower National Airport (ICT), Kansas. About 1257, the flight made an intermediate stop at Lee C. Fine Memorial Airport (AIZ), Missouri. According to a preliminary review of airport closed-circuit television (CCTV) footage, at 1302, the airplane taxied onto the airport fixed-base operator (FBO) ramp. About 1305, an airport employee began fueling the airplane from the 100LL fuel truck. About 1310, the airplane fueling process was concluded. The employee who serviced the airplane reported that the pilot requested the airplane fuel tanks to be “topped off”. According to airport fueling documentation, 47 gallons of 100LL aviation fuel were dispensed to the airplane before the accident flight.
About 1407, the pilot contacted Springfield Approach to obtain an instrument flight rules (IFR) clearance from AIZ to ICT. The flight was subsequently released for departure with ATC instructions to fly a heading of 240° upon entering controlled airspace. Shortly after takeoff, about 1 minute after receiving the departure clearance, the pilot told the controller that the flight was returning to AIZ and declared an emergency. The controller requested the nature of the emergency, but only a short, distressed transmission was heard over the frequency. The controller was unable to reestablish radio communications with the pilot and radar contact was lost with the airplane. There was no FAA or commercial ADS-B track data available for the flight.
A witness reported that she was driving when she saw the airplane flying near the airport. She stated that the airplane pitched down and descended in a right turn toward the ground. She did not see the airplane impact the ground.
The airplane impacted a wooded area of Lake of the Ozarks State Park. The wreckage was located about 0.43 nautical miles southwest of the departure end of runway 22 and about 245 ft right of the extended runway centerline. A majority of the airplane's composite fuselage, wings, and empennage were destroyed by the postimpact fire. Remaining structural components exhibited extensive thermal damage, with metallic airframe components displaying melting, deformation, and heat discoloration consistent with exposure to high temperatures. The airplane tail was oriented on a 300° true heading, the cockpit on a 360° heading, and the engine on a 030° heading. Multiple surrounding trees displayed fire damage, which included scorched bark, charring, and localized burning on trunks adjacent to the main wreckage area. Three small-diameter tree branches were identified at the accident site that exhibited 45° angular cuts.
Control cable continuity for the roll, pitch, and yaw axes could not be confirmed due to impact- and fire-related damage; however, all observed cable separations were consistent with overstress, thermal separation, or cuts made to facilitate wreckage recovery. The aluminum bell cranks for the elevator and rudder and some brass turnbuckles were destroyed by the postimpact fire. The flap actuator jackscrew extension was consistent with the flaps fully retracted (flaps 0°) at impact.
The airframe fuel system could not be examined due to extensive impact and thermal damage. The fuel selector was located, but its internal components were melted and thermally damaged. The fuel system gascolator and electric fuel pump also exhibited thermal damage.
The engine remained attached to the airframe engine mounts and was found partially buried into the terrain. The engine exhibited thermal damage consistent with prolonged exposure to fire. A visual examination of the crankcase did not reveal any holes or cracks. The engine sump exhibited thermal and impact-related damage with no oil present. The oil filter separated during impact and exhibited thermal damage. Engine crankshaft continuity was established by rotating the propeller. Borescope inspection of the 6 cylinders did not reveal evidence of mechanical failure of the pistons or valves. The top spark plugs were removed and did not exhibit evidence of mechanical failure of the electrode or insulator.
The engine-driven fuel pump remained attached to the engine but exhibited extensive thermal damage. The drive coupling for the engine-driven fuel pump remained intact but exhibited evidence of thermal damage. The rear accessory gear for the engine-driven fuel pump rotated in conjunction with the propeller. The left magneto, a Surefly Partners electronic magneto, remained attached to the crankcase but exhibited thermal damage. The right magneto, a traditional mechanical Continental (Bendix) type, separated from the crankcase during impact but remained attached to its respective ignition harness. The right magneto exhibited significant thermal damage. The engine induction and fuel delivery system exhibited thermal- and impact-related damage.
The propeller hub remained attached to the engine crankshaft. The spinner dome was crushed and torn with torsional deformation opposite the direction of rotation. Two blades remained attached to the hub assembly and exhibited varying degrees of thermal damage with partially consumed blade tips. Both of these blades exhibited compound bending aft and twisting toward low pitch. One blade exhibited chordwise/rotational scoring and leading-edge gouging. The other blade exhibited chordwise/rotational scoring isolated to the leading-edge. The third propeller blade fracture-separated at the shank and was located buried under the engine. The third blade exhibited chordwise/rotational scoring on both the chamber and face sides and leading-edge gouges.
The Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) parachute enclosure cover was found about 5 ft north of the tail. The parachute was found under the horizontal stabilizer. The parachute remained packed in its deployment bag and exhibited thermal damage. The CAPS rocket was not located during the onsite examination. No CAPS straps were observed in the wreckage. The CAPS handle was found melted around the cable end with no safety pin observed. The CAPS cable continuity was established from the cockpit activation handle to the ignition switch assembly. The CAPS ignition switch was found within the shield, with the fire-pin actuator pulled down from the ignition switch.
A review of the airport's 100LL fuel truck records established that daily and weekly inspections were completed, which included an external condition inspection, tank sump, filter sump, and leak checks. The last 100LL fuel truck inspection was completed and documented earlier on the day of the accident. No discrepancies or maintenance issues were noted in the 100LL fuel truck inspection log. Postaccident fuel samples obtained from the 100LL fuel truck were blue and did not exhibit any evidence of contamination.
A review of available weather information determined that visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time and location of the accident.
The airplane's damaged primary flight display (PFD), multifunction display (MFD), digital autopilot controller, and digital navigation/communication devices were shipped to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Vehicle Recorder Laboratory for examination and possible data extraction. The remaining wreckage was recovered and transported to a secure storage facility pending further examination.