This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.
https://registry.faa.gov/AircraftInquiry/Search/NNumberResult?nNumberTxt=N10KJ
- History of Flight:
On January 25, 2026, at about 1944 local time, a Bombardier CL-600-2B16 Challenger 650, N10KJ, registered to KTKC Challenger LLC out of Houston, TX, and being operated by the Arnold & Itkin lawfirm, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident at Bangor International Airport (BGR/KBGR), Bangor, Maine. The flight originated from Bangor, and was destined to the Vatry/Châlons-en-Champagne International Airport (XCR/LFOK), Bussy-Lettrée, France.
The two pilots and four passengers sustained fatal injuries.
Additional unconfirmed reports suggest the flight to Bangor was for a maintenance check before the France leg.
According to preliminary automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) data, at 1809 LT, the airplane landed on runway 33 at KBGR following a flight from William P. Hobby Airport (HOU/KHOU), Houston, Texas. The airplane proceeded uneventfully to the general aviation ramp and came to a stop around 1815:07. At 1854:44, the airplane was seen back on flight-coverage, possibly as it was started for the next flight. At 1900:14, the airplane was seen again at the same spot, and at 1913:52, the airplane started moving towards the de-icing area at the airport. At 1917:42, the airplane came to a stop at the de-icing area. At 1935:54, the airplane started moving from the de-icing area and towards taxiway A. At about 1943:43, the airplane exited the taxiway and towards runway 33. At roughly 1944:01, the airplane started its takeoff roll from runway 33.
Figure 1: ADS-B exchange coverage
At 1944:14, the airplane lifted off about 1700 ft down runway 33 while it was at 93 knots groundspeed (editor note: looking back, this is most likely impossible and the data was acting up). The airplane continued to accelerate down the runway, but never made it past 150 ft (over the runway). At 1944:27, the airplane was at 143 knots GS and ~3000ft down the runway with a positive rate of 700 feet per minute (fpm). At 1944:30, the airplane was seen at 210 ft, 150 knots GS, and with a positive rate of about 225 fpm (this was the lift off point, which is around V1 for this jet). The last ADS-B return was recorded at 1944:33, to the right side, and ~5900 ft down runway 33. The airplane was at 184 ft, 160 knots groundspeed, and an average rate of -800 feet per minute (fpm).
Figure 2: ADS-B data ran through Flysto
- Pilot Information:
The captain, aged 47, held an airline transport pilot certificate (last updated 5/18/2022) with a rating for airplane multi engine land, and commercial privileges for airplane single engine land. He also held a flight instructor certificate (last issued/updated 6/1/2024) with a rating for airplane single engine and multi engine and an airplane instrument rating. His first class FAA medical was issued on November 2025, with a note that he must use corrective lens(es) to meet vision standards at all required distances.
The captain held the following type ratings: A/CE-500, A/CE-560XL, A/CE-700, A/CL-65, A/CL-604, A/G-200, A/HS-125.
With a few limits:
- CL-65 CIRC. APCH. - VMC ONLY.
- CL-65 SIC PRIVILEGES ONLY.
- CE-500 SECOND IN COMMAND REQUIRED.
- Airplane Information:
- General Information:
The accident aircraft, serial number 6155, was manufactured in 2020. The Challenger is a swept wing aircraft with a T tail and conventional tricycle landing gear, powered by two turbofan General Electric 34-3B engines mounted one either side on the rear fuselage. It is constructed chiefly of aluminium alloy. Fuel is carried in wing and fuselage tanks.
- Supercritical Wing:
According to NTSB Investigation AAB-06-03 (see below "past accidents section."):
The accident airplane’s wing design uses what is known as a supercritical airfoil, which is designed to reduce drag at the airplane’s cruise airspeed. This airfoil design, when contrasted with more conventional airfoils, is characterized by a larger leading-edge radius, reduced upper-surface camber, and a concavity in the lower aft surface. These features provide a reduced drag at high airspeeds, yet the airfoil behaves much like a conventional airfoil at lower airspeeds. At lower airspeeds, the pressure distribution on the upper surface of the wing is peaked near the leading edge, and this peak increases with increasing AOA. As the AOA increases beyond the natural stall AOA, the pressure gradient in the leading-edge region reaches a critical value, and flow separation initiates. Depending on the spanwise location of the separation onset, the region of separated flow can grow rapidly to adjacent spanwise locations, eventually stalling the entire wing and resulting in a large drop in lift and an increase in drag.
According to the manufacturer, during natural aerodynamic stall of the CL-600-2A12 airplane, one wing typically stalls before the other once the natural stall angle of attack is exceeded, resulting in asymmetrical lift. Large roll rates and roll angles can then develop, depending upon pilot action.
Figure 3: Wing airfoil design for the Challenger 604 (note that both the 604 and 650 use the same design, photo via AAIB)
- Ice Protection:According to the Challenger 650 Pilot Training Guide:
"There are four anti-iced areas on the Challenger 650:
- Wing leading edges
- Engine cowls
- Windshields and windows, and
- Air data probes
The wing leading edges and the engine intake cowls are anti-iced using engine 14th-stage bleed air. The windshields, windows, and air data probes are anti-iced using electrical power. An ice detector system provides EICAS indications of ice accumulation.
Anti-icing of the aircraft tail surfaces is not required."
The left and right wing leading edges are anti-iced using pressure-regulated 14th-stage bleed air, distributed by wing anti-ice ducting and piccolo tubes. The system is controlled by the WING ANTI-ICE switch located on the ANTI-ICE panel. The WING ANTI-ICE switch normally controls the left and right wing anti-ice valves via wing-mounted control sensors and the wing anti-ice controller. An isolation valve allows both wings to be anti-iced from a single bleed source via a crossover duct. Panel lights and EICAS messages provide indications of system status during operation.
Figure 4: Wing Anti-Ice System (via 650 Pilot Training Guide)
Bleed air taken from the 14th-stage bleed air manifold is ducted to the wing and ejected from piccolo tubes onto the inner surfaces of the leading edge. After heating the leading edges, the air is exhausted overboard through louvers located beneath each wing leading edge. The piccolo tubes extend the full length of the leading edges.
Figure 5: Wing Anti-Ice Components (via 650 Pilot Training Guide)
The left and right wing anti-ice valves are electrically controlled, pneumatically operated, pressure-regulating shutoff valves. The valves are spring-loaded to the closed position when no 14th-stage pressure is available or electrical control power is lost. The wing anti-ice system is normally operated in the NORM mode. A backup mode (STBY mode) exists should NORM mode fail.- Stall Protection System:
The stall protection system (SPS) provides the flight crew with aural, visual and tactile (stick shaker) indications of an impending stall and, if no corrective action is taken, will activate a stick pusher to prevent the aircraft from entering a full stall.
- Ice Detection System:
The ice detection system alerts the flight crew of icing conditions. The system consists of two independent ice detector/microprocessors, one installed on each side of the forward fuselage.
Figure 6: Ice Detection System (via 650 Pilot Training Guide)
- Wreckage and Impact Information:
The airplane came to rest inverted and was partially consumed by a post crash fire. Further review is unavailable due to lack of on-scene photographs.
- Airport Information:
Bangor International Airport is a public airport located about 3 miles west of Bangor, Maine. The airport field elevation was 192.1 ft. The airport features a single asphalt/groovedrunway 15/33 that is 11440 x 200 ft.
- Weather:
(1) Brief:
The reported weather at KBGR, at 1808, included: wind 080° at 4 knots, 1.5 statute miles visibility, light snow, an overcast ceiling at 2000 ft above ground level (agl), a temperature of -16° C, a dew point of -21° C, and a barometric altimeter setting of 30.43 inches of mercury.
The reported weather at KBGR, at 1853, included: wind 050° at 6 knots, 1.25 statute miles visibility, light snow, an overcast ceiling at 1600 ft above ground level (agl), a temperature of -16° C, a dew point of -19° C, and a barometric altimeter setting of 30.40 inches of mercury.
The reported weather at KBGR, at 1908, included: wind 030° at 6 knots, 0.75 statute miles visibility, light snow, an vertical visbility of 1500 ft above ground level (agl), a temperature of -16° C, a dew point of -19° C, and a barometric altimeter setting of 30.39 inches of mercury.
The reported weather at KBGR, at 1926, included: wind 040° at 6 knots, 0.75 statute miles visibility, light snow, an vertical visbility of 1200 ft above ground level (agl), a temperature of -16° C, a dew point of -19° C, and a barometric altimeter setting of 30.39 inches of mercury.
The reported weather at KBGR, at 1953, included: wind 040° at 9 knots, 0.75 statute miles visibility, light snow, an vertical visbility of 1100 ft above ground level (agl), a temperature of -17° C, a dew point of -19° C, and a barometric altimeter setting of 30.35 inches of mercury.
(2) METARs:
METAR KBGR 252308Z 08004KT 1 1/2SM -SN OVC020 M16/M21 A3043 RMK AO2 P0000 T11561211
METAR KBGR 252353Z 05006KT 1 1/4SM -SN OVC016 M16/M19 A3040 RMK AO2 SLP302 4/004 P0001 60001 T11611194 11144 21161 58025
METAR KBGR 260008Z 03006KT 3/4SM R15/6000VP6000FT -SN VV015 M16/M19 A3039 RMK AO2 P0000 T11611194
METAR KBGR 260026Z 04006KT 3/4SM R15/P6000FT -SN VV012 M16/M19 A3039 RMK AO2 P0001 T11611189
METAR KBGR 260053Z 04009KT 3/4SM R15/6000VP6000FT -SN VV011 M17/M19 A3035 RMK AO2 PRESFR SLP286 P0002 T11671194
(3) Area Forecast Discussion:
Area Forecast Discussion
National Weather Service Caribou ME
639 PM EST Sun Jan 25 2026
.WHAT HAS CHANGED...
- 630pm Update: Refined/sharpened onset timing of snow this
evening by sharpening PoPs thanks to higher confidence in
onset time.
- Increased confidence in snow totals of at least 12 inches over
much of Downeast Maine
- Small decrease in forecast snow totals north of Houlton
&&
.KEY MESSAGES...
1) A significant winter storm will impact the region from
tonight through Monday night with the highest snow totals of 12
inches or more over Downeast Maine
2) Colder than average temperatures continue this week
&&
.DISCUSSION...
KEY MESSAGE 1...A significant winter storm will impact the
region from tonight through Monday night with the highest snow
totals of 12 inches or more over Downeast Maine
KEY MESSAGE 1 DESCRIPTION...
A significant winter storm is expected to move northeast from
the Mid-Atlantic coast towards New England, passing south of our
area in the outer region of the Gulf of Maine tonight.
As of 630pm, snow has begun in Greenville, Bangor, and Bar
Harbor, with the leading edge advancing northeast. Snow should
be falling everywhere by just after midnight. The heaviest snow
is expected to be in the Downeast and Bangor regions tonight
where snowfall rates are likely to reach at least 1 to 2 inches
per hour. Model soundings show very favorable profiles for
efficient snowfall as much of the saturated layer between the
surface and 500mb is in the dendritic growth zone which combined
with ample lift will support very efficient production of
snowfall. Currently expecting snow to liquid ratios to max out
between 20 and 25 to 1 which will lead to very light, fluffy
snow. Cannot completely rule out the possibility of higher
ratios given how favorable the temperature profile is, but
higher winds aloft exceeding 30 kts are likely to contribute to
some crystal breakup as flakes fall.
Snow is expected to lighten in intensity or even stop early
Monday morning as the low begins to exit into the maritimes.
This period of lighter snow is expected through the early
afternoon before an upper level trough approaches and swings
through the area this evening. This feature will bring another
round of light to moderate snow through Tuesday night. There is
some uncertainty as to how robust this second round of snow will
be. Some high-resolution guidance shows an inverted trough
developing over the area which could favor several more inches.
There is also a blowing snow threat along the Downeast coast
Monday and possibly Monday night as well. Winds will be breezy
in this area and may gust to 20 to 25 kts and snow will
certainly be very light so lofting of snow is definitely a
possibility. Expect temporary visibility reductions but not
widespread, persistent whiteouts.
KEY MESSAGE 2...
Colder than average temperatures continue this week
KEY MESSAGE 2 DESCRIPTION...
With the arctic air mass still in place over the forecast area
for the week, temperatures are projected to run around 2
standard deviations below average for this time of the year
throughout the forecast area. This will result in highs in the
teens each day and lows in the single digits and hovering around
zero. With a sustained upper level trough overhead through the
week, enough wind may exist such that conditions may make a run
for cold weather advisory levels Tuesday and Wednesday nights.
For Tuesday night, wind chills overnight may fall into the teens
below zero, particularly across the north. For Wednesday night,
winds could begin to ease off in between trough axes, and should
skies begin to clear out, air temperatures could fall into the
double digits below zero under efficient surface decoupling and
radiational cooling conditions. Temperatures will begin to
rebound into the upper teens to lower 20s Friday into this
weekend. At this time a low pressures system could be passing
south of the Gulf of Maine and exiting into the Canadian
Maritimes, and the exact track of this system could have further
impacts to temperatures, wind, and precipitation chances, though
uncertainty remains great in low position for this weekend at
this time.
&&
.AVIATION /00Z MONDAY THROUGH FRIDAY/...
Tonight...As of 2330z, conditions have rapidly deteriorated to
IFR (due to visibility) at southern terminals this evening in
snow, and should get down LIFR mainly due to visibility by about
2-3z as the snow becomes heavier. Further north, the snow moves
in 5-7z from HUL north to PQI, CAR, and FVE. It won`t be as
heavy further south, with visibilities down to around 2-3 SM
rather than less than 1 mile which is expected at BHB/BGR. Winds
increase later tonight mainly BHB/BGR, with NE winds 10-15 kts
sustained with a few higher gusts especially at BHB.
Monday...Conditions may improve slightly as snow becomes lighter
allowing for better visibility. IFR expected throughout much of
the day in light snow but some periods of MVFR are possible. NE
winds 5 to 10 kts at northern terminals and 10 to 15 kts with
gusts up to 20 kts early at southern terminals. Winds decrease
through the day.
Monday night...Snow may increase in intensity early Monday night
leading to IFR/LIFR conditions. MVFR possible late Monday night
at northern terminals with VFR possible late at southern
terminals. N/NW winds 5 to 10 kts.
Tuesday: MVFR north, VFR for southern terminals, a few snow
showers possible. NW winds 5 to 10 kts.
Tuesday night: MVFR across all terminals with a few snow
showers possible, especially at northern terminals. Winds light
and variable.
Wednesday - Thursday night: VFR W winds 5 to 10 kts with a few
gusts to 20 kts possible each afternoon. Winds light and
variable overnight.
Friday: IFR/MVFR in possible snow. NW winds 10 to 15 kts with
gusts to 20 kts.
&&
.MARINE...
Gale conditions begin tonight on the coastal waters and
continue through at least Monday afternoon. Then marginal gales
through Monday night. On the intracoastal waters, SCA
conditions tonight through Monday night with a low chance of
gales. Seas peak at 8 to 12 ft Monday afternoon. Moderate
freezing spray on the intracoastal waters tonight with light
freezing spray everywhere Monday and moderate freezing spray
Monday night.
Offshore winds will be decreasing through the day on Tuesday,
falling below 25 kts by the afternoon. Seas will hang on for
longer, with seas 5 to 10 ft through Tuesday morning dropping to
3 to 7 ft by Tuesday night. Seas will finally settle around 2 to
5 ft by Wednesday morning. Winds and seas could begin to
increase towards small craft advisory levels again on Friday as
a low pressure system may approach and cross south of the Gulf
of Maine. Moderate freezing spray is likely across all waters
Tuesday morning, with light freezing spray Tuesday afternoon
through Thursday. More moderate freezing spray could threaten
once more Thursday night with the approach of another low
pressure system.
- Past Accidents:
- On January 4, 2002, a Bombardier CL-600-2B16 Challenger 604, N90AG, was destroyed when it crashed on takeoff from Birmingham International Airport, United Kingdom. Killing all five onboard. The AAIB determined the probable cause of the accident to be:
"1. The crew did not ensure that N90AG's wings were clear of frost prior to takeoff.; 2. Reduction of the wing stall angle of attack, due to the surface roughness associated with frost contamination, to below that at which the stall protection system was effective.; 3. Possible impairment of crew performance by the combined effects of a non-prescription drug, jet-lag and fatigue."
Photo: AAIB
- On November 28, 2004, about 0958 mountain standard time, a Canadair, Ltd., CL-600-2A12, N873G, registered to Hop-a-Jet, Inc., and operated by Air Castle Corporation dba Global Aviation as Glo-Air flight 73, collided with the ground during takeoff at Montrose Regional Airport (MTJ), Montrose, Colorado. The on-demand charter flight was operated under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 on an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed, and snow was falling. Of the six occupants on board, the captain, the flight attendant, and one passenger were killed, and the first officer and two passengers were seriously injured. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and post crash fire. The flight was en route to South Bend Regional Airport (SBN), South Bend, Indiana. The NTSB determined the probable cause to be:
"The flight crew's failure to ensure that the airplane’s wings were free of ice or snow contamination that accumulated while the airplane was on the ground, which resulted in an attempted takeoff with upper wing contamination that induced the subsequent stall and collision with the ground. A factor contributing to the accident was the pilots’ lack of experience flying during winter weather conditions.
Photo: NTSB
- On December 26, 2007, a German-registered Bombardier CL-600-2B16 Challenger 604, D-ARWE, was destroyed when it crashed on takeoff from Almaty Airport, Kazakhstan, killing one occupant. The Russian MAK determined the probable cause of the accident to be:
"The accident involving a CL-604 aircraft registered D-ARWE was caused by the asymmetric lift loss at takeoff which led to aircraft stall right after the liftoff, collision with the ground and obstacles, aircraft destruction and ground fire. The lift loss was most probably caused by the contamination of the wing leading edge with precipitation in the form of snow after the anti-icing which occurred as the crew did not engage the Wing Anti-Ice before the takeoff which is a mandatory requirement of the CL-604 AFM in the actual weather conditions (moderate snow, OAT minus 14° C, moisture content 92 %, dewpoint minus 15° C, dry snow on the runway, 10 mm thick). Significant violation of the CL-604 AFM/OM limitations concerning the rate of rotation (pitch rate) when taking off with contaminated wing provided it was impossible to monitor this parameter instrumentally could have contributed to the situation. The inefficiency of the availably stall protection system at takeoff due to the hypersensitive wing as to contamination of its leading edge cannot completely guarantee prevention of similar accidents in the future."
- Additional Information:
According to the following FAA FARs:
§ 91.527 Operating in icing conditions.
(a) No pilot may take off an airplane that has frost, ice, or snow adhering to any propeller, windshield, stabilizing or control surface; to a powerplant installation; or to an airspeed, altimeter, rate of climb, or flight attitude instrument system or wing, except that takeoffs may be made with frost under the wing in the area of the fuel tanks if authorized by the FAA.
(b) No pilot may fly under IFR into known or forecast light or moderate icing conditions, or under VFR into known light or moderate icing conditions, unless—
(1) The aircraft has functioning deicing or anti-icing equipment protecting each rotor blade, propeller, windshield, wing, stabilizing or control surface, and each airspeed, altimeter, rate of climb, or flight attitude instrument system;
(2) The airplane has ice protection provisions that meet section 34 of Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 23; or
(3) The airplane meets transport category airplane type certification provisions, including the requirements for certification for flight in icing conditions.
(c) Except for an airplane that has ice protection provisions that meet the requirements in section 34 of Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 23, or those for transport category airplane type certification, no pilot may fly an airplane into known or forecast severe icing conditions.
(d) If current weather reports and briefing information relied upon by the pilot in command indicate that the forecast icing conditions that would otherwise prohibit the flight will not be encountered during the flight because of changed weather conditions since the forecast, the restrictions in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this section based on forecast conditions do not apply.
§ 135.227 Icing conditions: Operating limitations.
(a) No pilot may take off an aircraft that has frost, ice, or snow adhering to any rotor blade, propeller, windshield, stabilizing or control surface; to a powerplant installation; or to an airspeed, altimeter, rate of climb, flight attitude instrument system, or wing, except that takeoffs may be made with frost under the wing in the area of the fuel tanks if authorized by the FAA.
(b) No certificate holder may authorize an airplane to take off and no pilot may take off an airplane any time conditions are such that frost, ice, or snow may reasonably be expected to adhere to the airplane unless the pilot has completed all applicable training as required by § 135.341 and unless one of the following requirements is met:
(1) A pretakeoff contamination check, that has been established by the certificate holder and approved by the Administrator for the specific airplane type, has been completed within 5 minutes prior to beginning takeoff. A pretakeoff contamination check is a check to make sure the wings and control surfaces are free of frost, ice, or snow.
(2) The certificate holder has an approved alternative procedure and under that procedure the airplane is determined to be free of frost, ice, or snow.
(3) The certificate holder has an approved deicing/anti-icing program that complies with § 121.629(c) of this chapter and the takeoff complies with that program.
(c) No pilot may fly under IFR into known or forecast light or moderate icing conditions or under VFR into known light or moderate icing conditions, unless—
(1) The aircraft has functioning deicing or anti-icing equipment protecting each rotor blade, propeller, windshield, wing, stabilizing or control surface, and each airspeed, altimeter, rate of climb, or flight attitude instrument system;
(2) The airplane has ice protection provisions that meet section 34 of appendix A of this part; or
(3) The airplane meets transport category airplane type certification provisions, including the requirements for certification for flight in icing conditions.
(d) No pilot may fly a helicopter under IFR into known or forecast icing conditions or under VFR into known icing conditions unless it has been type certificated and appropriately equipped for operations in icing conditions.
(e) Except for an airplane that has ice protection provisions that meet section 34 of appendix A, or those for transport category airplane type certification, no pilot may fly an aircraft into known or forecast severe icing conditions.
(f) If current weather reports and briefing information relied upon by the pilot in command indicate that the forecast icing condition that would otherwise prohibit the flight will not be encountered during the flight because of changed weather conditions since the forecast, the restrictions in paragraphs (c), (d), and (e) of this section based on forecast conditions do not apply.
- Additional Figures:
Altitude Profile on Flysto
Groundspeed Profile on Flysto
- References:
- AAIB AAR 5-2004
- Challenger 650 Pilot Training Guide
- NTSB/AAB-06-03
- MAK Final Report CL-604 D-ARWE
- FAA FARs
- Airnav (airport information)
