Saturday, July 26, 2025

Aircraft structural failure: Wittman Buttercup, N18263, fatal accident occurred on May 28, 2023, near Lyndonville, New York

  • Location: Lyndonville, New York
  • Accident Number: CEN23FA204 
  • Date & Time: May 28, 2023, 18:15 Local 
  • Registration: N18263 
  • Aircraft: Luce Buttercup 
  • Aircraft Damage: Destroyed 
  • Defining Event: Aircraft structural failure 
  • Injuries: 2 Fatal 
  • Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General aviation - Personal
https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/192250/pdf

https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=192250

On May 28, 2023, at 1815 eastern daylight time, an experimental, amateur-built Luce Buttercup, N18263, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Lyndonville, New York. The pilot and pilot-rated passenger sustained fatal injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.


The pilot, who was the owner and builder of the experimental, amateur-built airplane, departed with a pilot-rated passenger on a 15 to 20-minute local flight. Witnesses reported that the airplane broke up in flight and descended to the ground. The debris path extended for about 1,435 ft, beginning with debris from the wings, consistent with failure related to the wing structure.

Postaccident examination of the engine and propeller revealed no mechanical anomalies that would have precluded normal operation. No preimpact flight control deficiencies were found. There was no evidence of flutter. The wing separations were consistent with upward and aft bending and/or torsional loading based on deformation signatures of the wing attachment brackets, strut brackets, and front strut attachment fittings (outboard end). Fracture surfaces of the wing attachment brackets and front strut fittings were consistent with overstress separation. No flight track information was available for the accident flight.

The pilot built the airplane based on dimensions from another airplane for which no plans had been produced. The accident airplane was issued a special airworthiness certificate about 21 years before the accident. At the time of the accident, the airplane had been modified from its original configuration with the installation of a heavier, higher horsepower engine and the installation of a different propeller. Because no maintenance records were located for the airplane, there was no information available regarding this modification, the airplane’s operational time, or its inspection/maintenance history.

The airplane’s design/build plans were not based upon a structural engineering analysis to determine a structural design envelope, structural loads, or structural performance.

Accordingly, the basis for any design safety margins and limitations are unknown. There were no regulatory design requirements for the airplane due to its experimental classification. 

Metallurgical examination revealed no conclusive evidence of pre-existing or progressive damage signatures that would have initiated the accident, and fractured structural components were consistent with overstress separation. One small area of possible fatigue fracture was observed emanating from the weld face on the lower-forward left strut end fitting at the outboard end; however, based on the amount of deformation observed in this area, it was not a likely fracture initiation point.

The pilot’s toxicological testing detected several volatile solvents; however, the volatile solvent levels measured in the pilot’s tissues cannot be used to reliably predict the route of his exposure or specific effects. Thus, whether the pilot had inhaled volatile solvents recreationally or was experiencing any impairing effects of volatile solvent exposure, could not be determined. Toxicological testing also detected ethanol in liver tissue; n-butanol (a potential indicator of postmortem microbial activity) was also detected in this specimen; however, it is likely that the detected ethanol was from sources other than alcohol consumption and did not likely contribute to the accident.

The pilot’s toxicology results also demonstrated the presence of central nervous system depressant medications, including cyclobenzaprine and gabapentin. Cyclobenzaprine use may be associated with significant performance impairment. Use of gabapentin can also increase the user’s somnolence, dizziness and fatigue, potentially impairing pilot performance. Both cyclobenzaprine and gabapentin have potential postmortem redistribution; therefore, reliably associating levels with impairing effects is not possible. Overall, whether the pilot’s use of cyclobenzaprine and gabapentin contributed to the accident cannot be determined.

The pilot-rated passenger’s mild-to-moderate coronary artery disease conveyed some increased risk of a sudden impairing or incapacitating cardiac event, including angina, arrhythmia, or heart attack. There is no autopsy evidence that such an event occurred. However, such an event does not leave reliable autopsy evidence if it occurs immediately before death. The aircraft was configured such that it could be controlled from either the left or right front seat. Thus, it is unlikely that the pilot-rated passenger’s coronary artery disease contributed to the accident.

In addition, the pilot-rated passenger’s toxicological testing indicated use of citalopram and diazepam. Citalopram and diazepam, and conditions that may be treated with these medications, can adversely affect pilot performance and judgment. However, it is unclear if the pilot-rated passenger’s performance or judgment were a factor in the outcome; whether effects of the pilot-rated passenger’s use of citalopram and diazepam or of any associated underlying conditions contributed to the accident cannot be determined.

Although the available information is consistent with an in-flight failure of the wing structure due to overload, given the lack of flight track information or recorded data from onboard the airplane, the circumstances of the in-flight breakup could not be determined. 

- Probable Cause: An in-flight breakup due to structural overload of the airplane for undetermined reasons.

Fuel related: Cessna 182D Skylane, N8775X, fatal accident occurred on May 28, 2023, near Plymouth, New York

  • Location: Plymouth, New York
  • Accident Number: ERA23FA249
  • Date & Time: May 28, 2023, 14:52 Local 
  • Registration: N8775X 
  • Aircraft: Cessna 182 
  • Aircraft Damage: Substantial 
  • Defining Event: Fuel related 
  • Injuries: 1 Fatal 
  • Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General aviation - Skydiving
https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/192249/pdf

https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=192249

On May 28, 2023, about 1452 eastern daylight time, a Cessna 182D, N8775X, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Plymouth, New York. The commercial pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 skydiving flight.

The pilot departed on the third skydiving flight of the day with four skydivers on board and climbed to about 11,000 ft mean sea level (msl) when the jumpers departed the airplane. The pilot flew back to the airport and reported over the common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) that he was descending through 6,000 ft msl. The operator reported hearing the pilot make another radio call on the CTAF but the “…call did not sound like a normal one and I could not identify what he said. I thought by the sound of his voice something was off.' A witness heard the engine sputtering followed by the engine losing power and then heard the impact. The airplane impacted trees and terrain about 1 nautical mile from the center of the intended airport, coming to rest in a nose-low, tail-high attitude with the left wing separated at the wing root.

Postaccident examination of the flight controls revealed flight control continuity, and all fractures were consistent with overload. The examination of the engine revealed crankshaft, camshaft, and valvetrain continuity. The air induction, exhaust, lubrication systems, magnetos, and spark plugs revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. The carburetor heat was found in the off position.

Postaccident examination of the airframe revealed that the right-wing fuel bladder was intact and contained about 25 ounces of fuel. The left-wing fuel bladder was breached; there was no evidence of significant fuel leakage from the ruptured left-fuel tank evidenced by minimal fuel blight of the vegetation in the immediate area. There was no evidence of fuel siphoning aft of either wing-tank fuel filler cap. The fuel selector was found in the left-tank detent. No fuel was found in the left- or right-inlet fuel lines or the outlet line of the fuel selector valve. No fuel stains were noted on the interior panel below the fuel selector valve. About 5 ounces of fuel were drained from the airframe fuel strainer and about 4 ounces were found in the carburetor bowl. 

The pilot fueled the airplane the day before by adding 30.3 gallons of 100 low lead fuel. The amount of fuel in the airplane before he added the fuel is unknown. He then flew two uneventful skydiving flights that day. The operator reported that on the next day the pilot flew another skydiving flight in the morning, and when the pilot returned from the flight, he checked the fuel level with a dipstick and stated that he had 40 gallons of fuel on board. The operator reported that the pilot had enough time to refuel the airplane but chose not to. The pilot flew another skydiving flight before the accident flight, which was the fifth flight since he fueled the airplane the day before. The operator reported the airplane burned 7 to 9 gallons of fuel per skydiving flight. 

The pilot used a fuel dipstick to assist in determining the fuel level in the tanks. However, the fuel dipstick used was not made for the make and model of the accident airplane. Therefore, a fuel conversion chart was created to indicate how much fuel was actually in the tank when the dipstick was used. If the airplane had 40 gallons of fuel on board as the pilot stated, there should have been enough fuel for the intended flight. However, had the pilot misinterpreted the fuel dipstick reading, he may have believed he had about 43 gallons of fuel on board, as indicated by the dipstick, when instead there were about 24 gallons, as indicated by the conversion chart. In that case, during the next three flights, the airplane could have sustained fuel exhaustion as a result of the fuel burn and the unusable fuel in each tank. 

The nearest weather station, located about 29 miles from the accident site, indicated the temperature and dew point spread was 27°C and 8°C, respectively, which was conducive for carburetor icing at glide or cruise power. About 1443, ADS-B data indicated that the airplane began its descent from about 11,000 ft msl and 3 minutes later it descended through 6,000 ft msl, about a 1,666 ft-per-minute rate of descent. The last ADS-B radar point was about 1450, and the airplane was about 1,500 ft msl. 

While the pilot had a history of diabetes being treated with a medication and a documented history of retinopathy, it is unlikely that the pilot had symptoms of severe high or low blood glucose at the time of the accident. Minor symptoms of diabetes, such as fatigue or blurry vision, could not be entirely excluded. Due to his heart disease, the pilot was at significantly increased risk of a sudden impairing or incapacitating cardiac event, including angina, arrhythmia, or heart attack. There is no autopsy evidence that such an event occurred; however, such an event does not leave reliable autopsy evidence if it occurs immediately before death.

It is possible that the pilot's report of the fuel level using the dipstick did not account for the fuel conversion chart that would have indicated that the airplane had about 24 gallons of fuel on board, and not the reported 40 gallons. In this scenario, the pilot would have departed on the flight with substantially less fuel than anticipated, and the engine lost power due to fuel exhaustion. 

However, the evidence supports another possible scenario: the airplane was descending from about 11,000 ft msl and at a high rate of descent in atmospheric conditions that were conducive to carburetor icing in cruise and glide power. The carburetor heat was found in the off position after the accident. Had the pilot not used carburetor heat during the descent, it is also possible that the engine sustained a complete loss of engine power due to carburetor icing.

Accordingly, the definitive cause of the total loss of engine power could not be determined.

- Probable Cause: A total loss of engine power for reasons that could not be determined.