Aerospatiale AS332L1 Super Puma, N332N, fatal accident occurred on September 20, 2026, near Yosemite Valley, California

• Location: Yosemite Valley, CA 
• Accident Number: WPR26FA346 
• Date & Time: September 20, 2026, 13:56 Local 
• Registration: N332N 
• Aircraft: Airbus AS332 
• Injuries: 2 Fatal 
• Flight Conducted Under: Public aircraft

https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/203845/pdf

https://registry.faa.gov/AircraftInquiry/Search/NNumberResult?nNumberTxt=N332N

On September 20, 2026, at 1356 Pacific daylight time, an Airbus AS332 L1 Super Puma, N332N, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Yosemite Valley, California. The two pilots were fatally injured. The helicopter was operated as a public use firefighting flight. 

Earlier in the day, the pilots conducted a 2.9 hour firefighting flight where they dropped water from an 800-gallon Nomad bucket that was attached to a 200 ft longline. After finishing the helicopter’s fuel cycle and completing over 25 drops, they returned back to their helibase. During that flight, they had problems with the water bucket and upon landing, the mechanics tightened the bucket’s air pressure regulator and pressure checked the system. Shortly thereafter, they received a request to perform water drops on fires near helispot H-5, using Ostrander Lake as the dip site. 

A review of FAA ADS-B data, Spidertracks data, and firefighter’s cell phone videos revealed that the helicopter made three dips at the lake and the accident occurred during the helicopter’s third drop (see figure 1).

The helicopter departed the helibase about 1328 and continued toward the requested drop area, consistent with the flight crew assessing the drop site before loading water in the bucket. The pilots then flew to the dip site and coordinated with two other helicopters that were operating out of the site. After filling the bucket with a load of water that was less than full, the pilots flew about 2.25 nautical miles (nm) to drop area and then made a trailing drop at about 1345 before returning to the dip site (see figure 2).

The pilots again filled the bucket and flew to the drop site. The helicopter approached the area about 8,690 ft mean sea level (msl) and gradually descended for a concentrated, or spot, drop on a dead tree (snag). The ground crew provided a strobe light to help aid the pilots in identifying the desired drop location. The drop occurred about 1350:50, with the bucket remaining just above the approximately 80- to 125-ft tree canopy (see figure 3).

The helicopter returned to the dip site, the pilots filled the bucket and continued back to the drop area. The helicopter’s groundspeed generally decreased as the descent rate increased. The firefighting ground crew reported that the water was dropped in the same location as drop 2, which according to the ground crew, was the desired location. The water drop began about 1356:28 and the bucket was empty about 3 seconds later, which was followed by the helicopter yawing to the left about 1 second later (see figure 4 and 5). At 1356:37, the helicopter’s ground speed was 4 kts and the descent rate was about 1,344 feet per minute (fpm).  

The bucket appeared to drop almost vertically and then contacted the ground about 1356:38. The cargo hook was released about one second later which allowed the longline to fall and the helicopter appeared to move forward about 1356:40 (see figures 6 and 7). The helicopter contacted trees about 1356:43, followed by the sound of impact about one second later.

A preliminary review was conducted on the audio from some of the videos taken. The video soundtrack was used to estimate main rotor speed (NR) and engine gas-generator speed (Ng) during the accident sequence. A comparison of the frequencies recorded and those known of the helicopter’s operation indicated that NR was about 102% at 13:56:13 and about 101% near the time of the water drop. Ng was estimated at about 90% before the water drop, increased to 96.9% shortly afterward, and subsequently increased to about 101.2%. Near the end of the sequence, NR was estimated at about 96%. The soundtrack analysis also identified the acoustic event associated with blade impact at about 13:56:42. 

The accident site was located in the Yosemite National Park at an elevation of about 8,150 ft mean sea level (msl). The main wreckage was positioned on sloping terrain about 500 ft downslope from the relatively flat area that comprised helispot H-5. The surrounding terrain was densely forested with tall fir trees. The tree canopy was about 100 to 150 ft above ground level (agl), depending on the slope of the terrain. There were several trees in the immediate area of the wreckage that were severed consistent with the helicopter’s impact into the canopy. The main wreckage came to rest on its left side with the nose oriented upslope. A majority of the helicopter was consumed by postimpact fire. The cockpit and instrument panel were extensively fire damaged, and no meaningful data could be obtained from most of the cockpit gauges.

The bucket was located about 90 ft west-northwest from the main wreckage adjacent to an area of dirt that had the appearance of being disrupted from a water drop (see figure 8). The cargo hook was found in the locked position, consistent with a normal electronic release, rather than use of the manual release. 

The cockpit voice recorder was retained and downloaded. The wreckage is being recovered pending the fire danger in the area and is planned to be examined at a future date. 

Midair collision: Cirrus SF50 Vision Jet G2+, N442CV, incident occurred on September 14, 2024, near Austin Bergstrom International Airport (AUS/KAUS), Austin, Texas

• Location: Austin, Texas 
• Incident Number: DCA24LA328 
• Date & Time: September 14, 2024, 12:48 Local 
• Registration: N442CV 
• Aircraft: CIRRUS DESIGN CORP SF50 
• Aircraft Damage: Minor 
• Defining Event: Midair collision 
• Injuries: 1 None 
• Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General aviation - Personal 

https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/195334/pdf

https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=195334

On September 14, 2024, at 1248 central daylight time, a Cirrus SF50, N442CV, experienced an uncommanded activation of its emergency automatic landing system soon after the airplane was struck by an unknown object during approach into Austin Bergstrom International Airport (AUS), Austin, Texas. The airplane sustained minor damage due to the impact and the pilot was not injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight from Cincinnati Municipal Airport/Lunken Field (LUK), Cincinnati, Ohio to AUS.

During approach to land with the autopilot engaged, in visual meteorological conditions, the airplane struck an object while at a height of about 1,540 ft above the ground, and at a speed of about 170 knots, as the airplane began a left turn toward the final approach course. Just prior to the strike, the pilot briefly saw a white object through the right (copilot side) windscreen, which he initially surmised was a bird. He described the impact as an “extremely loud” booming noise and was like hitting a “Mack truck”. He checked the windscreen for damage and confirmed that the airframe parachute system had not deployed.

The airplane's Emergency Autoland (EA) system had activated, likely due to the collision, and he overheard repeating automated emergency radio transmissions in his headset announcing the airplane's callsign and declaring an emergency (a function of the EA). These transmissions interfered with his communications with the air traffic control tower, and his initial attempts to deactivate the EA system by pressing the autopilot disconnect button (AP DISC) several times, were unsuccessful.

He noticed damage to copilot side sun visor, the copilot side oxygen mask had fallen from its stowed position, a fire extinguishing switch was damaged, the cabin pressure dump switch had activated, and the transponder had changed to the emergency code of 7700 (another feature of the EA system). On-board recorded data indicated that the EA system was ultimately deactivated, though the pilot was unsure if or when it had. He reported that he had no difficulty controlling the airplane, which responded to his flight control inputs as well as flap and landing gear selections, when and as expected. He was able to land the airplane without further incident.

Postlanding photographs showed white, red, and blue paint transfer marks leading from the lower left edge to the upper center of the right windscreen, which was inconsistent with a bird strike. The object struck was not identified, as explained later below.

The airplane's on-board recorded data indicated that the EA system had activated twice, in succession. The data indicated neither of the autopilot modes that are a prerequisite for an automatic activation of EA were engaged either time, suggesting that the activations were initiated by the manual button in the overhead panel.

The first activation occurred nearly simultaneously (within 1 second or less) when the cabin pressure dump system activated, and likely at the same time as the equipment disturbances in and near the overhead panel. This, along with 1) post accident testing of an exemplar EA button revealed that it would activate when subjected to shock and 2) the pilot's testimony that he never pressed the EA button, suggests that the first EA activation was most likely due to a shock load to the button during the object strike.

However, the on-board recording system did not detect a signal from the button at that time. This was likely due to the recorder's 1 second sample rate for the EA button status. The EA button (as well as the AP DISC button) is a spring-loaded momentary contact type, which does not remain pressed or latched when pushed. A brief actuation of either of these buttons, shorter than 1 second, may not be detected by the recording system.

About 10 seconds after the first EA activation, the recording system detected a signal from the AP DISC button for a single recoding sample. However, the EA did not deactivate. Post incident research and testing by the airframe manufacturer using exemplar avionics revealed two repeatable software defects related to the AP DISC button function.

First, the AP DISC button had no effect if pressed during a certain unquantified period of time between about 8-10 seconds after the start of an EA activation. This may explain why the EA system did not deactivate in response to the (single) recorded AP DISC button press. The AP DISC button status was also recorded at a 1 second sample rate. Had the pilot pressed the AP DISC button more than once during the 'defect' period, it would likely not have deactivated EA. Further, multiple brief presses of the AP DISC button could have occurred and not been recorded due to the 1 second sample rate.

Second, the aural autopilot disconnect warning tone, which is normally sounded through the airplane's audio system whenever the autopilot is disconnected, would not sound if the AP DISC button was pressed at any time while EA was active.

The on-board recorded data indicated that first EA activation was terminated about 20 seconds after it began. This may have been in response to a press of the AP DISC button by the pilot, but if so, the press must have been too brief and between recording samples, as none were recorded. The second EA activation began about 3 seconds after the first one was terminated. At that time, the recoded data captured a signal from the EA button, indicating it had activated. Examination of the EA button assembly did not reveal any obvious damage, though the button was found to be “slightly loose” compared to an exemplar unit. As noted above, an exemplar button was found to be susceptible to activation when shocked, however no apparent source of shock was identified at the time of the 2nd activation.

The pilot was adamant in his interview that he did not press the button at any time. The investigation was unable to determine what led to the 2nd button activation. This EA activation was terminated about 20 seconds after it began, and the recording system did not detect a press of the AP DISC button. As noted above, it is possible for brief press of the AP DISC button to not be recorded, however this could not be confirmed.

The investigation was unable to identify the object that collided with the incident airplane. The potential for collision with an unmanned aircraft system (e.g. drone, model aircraft) or an experimental balloon were considered.

The strike occurred about 30 seconds after the airplane passed by a hobbyist remote control model aircraft field, which was an FAA approved location for unmanned aircraft system (UAS) operations. At the time of the strike, the airplane was 1.8 nm northwest of the model aircraft field, at an altitude of 1,540 ft above the ground. This was well outside the field's lateral dimensions, and about 1,140 ft above its 400 ft altitude restriction. Given the lateral distance from the model aircraft field, it is unlikely that a remote pilot located at the model aircraft field was operating a UAS flying at the location of the strike, with direct visual observation of the UAS (by either a remote pilot or a visual observer), as required by the FAA and the model aircraft club operating rules.

The safety officer for the model aircraft field reported that a polling of club members revealed no known conflicts with the incident airplane. Whether or not a UAS was being operated from the model aircraft field or from any other location, either without direct visual observation, or because of a lost radio communication, could not be determined from the available evidence.

While the FAA requires that some UAS be operated with a remote identification (RID) system, a representative from the FAA reported that:

1) there are no archived flights of drones or RID broadcasts

2) remote pilots do not file flight plans

3) Drones are not equipped with radar transponders

4) neither drones nor RID message elements appear on air traffic control radar displays

The Civil Air Patrol, which had previously launched some experimental balloons from various locations in and around Austin, reported that they had not conducted any launches on the day of the incident.

- Probable Cause: The unintended activation of the Emergency Autoland button on the overhead panel due to the airplane's collision with an unknown object. Contributing to the incident was the pilot's inability to initially deactivate the Emergency Autoland system due to a software malfunction.

Wrong surface or wrong airport: Boeing 737-79P, N7861J, incident occurred on June 25, 2026, at Portland International Jetport (PWM/KPWM), Portland, Maine

• Location: Portland, Maine 
• Incident Number: DCA24LA219 
• Date & Time: June 25, 2024, 05:43 Local 
• Registration: N7861J 
• Aircraft: Boeing 737-79P 
• Aircraft Damage: None 
• Defining Event: Wrong surface or wrong airport
• Injuries: 136 None 
• Flight Conducted Under: Part 121: Air carrier - Scheduled 

https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/194544/pdf

https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=194544

On June 25, 2024, about 0543 eastern daylight time, SWA flight 4805, a Boeing 737-79P, N7861J, departed from a closed runway at PWM, Portland, Maine. The flight continued without further incident to its intended destination, Baltimore/Washington International Thurgood Marshall Airport (BWI), Baltimore, Maryland. There was no damage to the airplane nor injuries to the 5 crewmembers and 131 passengers. The flight was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 scheduled domestic passenger flight. 

The flight crew reported that before departure they reviewed the SWA weather packet which included the runway closure notice to airmen (NOTAMs). The captain stated that he reviewed a NOTAM describing weekend runway closures and incorrectly assumed that any additional closure periods would be contained within the same notice. This led the flight crew to believe the runway was not closed at the time of their departure.

The flight crew reported that a review of applications on their electronic flight bag (EFB) indicated departures should expect runway 29, and the flight crew was able to receive takeoff performance data. The first officer stated that, under normal circumstances, takeoff performance data would not be provided for a closed runway. Additionally, airport personnel had removed the lighted runway closure “X” markers before the airplane reached the runway, in anticipation of reopening the runway. Consequently, there was no visual indication at the time of departure that the runway was closed.

SWA guidance required dispatchers to place a flight lock on affected flights, preventing the release of takeoff performance data and requiring a briefing between the dispatcher, captain, and chief pilot before departure. Due to the nightly closure of PWM runway 11/29, the SWA dispatcher was required to place a flight lock until the required coordination occurred. However, the dispatcher did not place the required Flight Lock on the incident flight, and the flight crew was able to receive takeoff performance data for runway 29 and complete the departure without the required briefing. Had the flight lock been properly implemented, it would have prompted the required discussion and prevented the departure from the closed runway.

Lastly, the flight crew used the airport universal communication (UNICOM) frequency rather than the designated common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) while operating at the uncontrolled airport. Airport operations personnel observed the airplane taxiing for departure and transmitted on CTAF that runway 29 remained closed and would reopen at 0545. Because the crew was not using the proper frequency, they did not receive or respond to this transmission.

- Probable Cause: The flight crew's inadequate review of preflight information and the flight dispatcher's noncompliance with company guidance requiring the placement of a flight lock, which resulted in the flight's departure from a closed runway. Contributing to the incident were the flight crew's use of an incorrect airport frequency and noncompliance with company predeparture briefing requirements, either of which could have identified the runway closure before departure.

Tailstrike: Airbus A321-211 (WL), N382DN, accident occurred on July 14, 2026, at LaGuardia Airport (LGA/KLGA), New York, New York

• Location: New York, New York 
• Accident Number: DCA26LA282 
• Date & Time: July 14, 2026, 21:48 UTC 
• Registration: N382DN 
• Aircraft: Airbus A321-211 
• Aircraft Damage: Substantial 
• Defining Event: Tailstrike 
• Injuries: 194 None 
• Flight Conducted Under: Part 121: Air carrier - Scheduled

https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/203395/pdf

https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=203395

Delta Air Lines flight 1181 experienced a tailstrike while attempting to land on runway 22 at Laguardia Airport (LGA), New York, New York. The scheduled domestic passenger flight was operated under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121. The airplane sustained substantial damage and there were no injuries to the 6 crew and 188 passengers onboard.

The captain, who was serving as the line check pilot (LCP), was providing operational experience (OE) training to the first officer (FO). The accident flight was their fourth leg together and the FO's third as the pilot flying.

According to the flight crew, the captain instructed the FO to hand-fly the arrival. The autopilot was disconnected at approximately 18,000 ft, and the autothrottles were disconnected at about 10,000 ft. The captain reported that the FO flew the arrival well, with no notable altitude or airspeed deviations until the final approach.

During short final, the airplane's airspeed began to decrease below the target approach speed. The FO made a thrust adjustment; however, it was insufficient to arrest the airspeed decay. After the captain called out the airspeed deviation, the FO made an additional thrust correction. The flare was initiated slightly late, resulting in a firm touchdown and subsequent bounce.

Following the bounce, the FO applied excessive aft sidestick input, and the airplane touched down a second time. The captain then assumed control of the airplane, lowered the nose, and initiated a go-around. After the go-around was established, the FO resumed control and completed a subsequent approach and landing without further incident.

The flight attendants notified the flight deck that they heard a loud scraping noise during the landing attempt. Postlanding inspection of the airplane by the flight crew revealed substantial damage to the lower fuselage consistent with its contact with the runway.

There was no reported mechanical malfunction that contributed to the excessive airplane pitch angle when the airplane touched down on the runway. The recorded flight data showed the airplane touched down at pitch angle of about 7° and a vertical acceleration of 1.91 gravitational force equivalent (g) and bounced. The airplane's pitch angle increased to 10.02° before the left sidestick inputs associated with the go-around were recorded. The airplane's longitudinal flight guidance mode changed to “Pitch GA” (pitch go-around) and the autothrust was engaged.

The operator's flight crew procedures for a bounced landing recovery include the instructions “hold or re-establish a normal landing attitude and add thrust as necessary to control the rate of descent. Thrust need not be added for a shallow bounce or skip. When a high hard bounce occurs initiate a go-around. Apply TOGA thrust and use normal go-around procedures. Do not allow the pitch attitude to increase…”

Had the FO recognized the hard-bounce condition, promptly initiated a go-around, and not allowed the pitch to increase in accordance with company procedures, or had the LCP intervened sooner and assumed control to execute the bounced-landing recovery, the excessive pitch attitude and subsequent tailstrike likely would have been avoided.

- Probable Cause: The first officer's excessive aft sidestick input following a bounced landing, and the line check pilot's delayed remedial action, which resulted in an increase in the airplane's pitch attitude and a subsequent tailstrike.

Eurocopter EC 135P2+, N313RX, fatal accident occurred on September 30, 2026, near Avalon, California

• Location: Avalon, CA 
• Accident Number: WPR26FA363 
• Date & Time: September 30, 2026, 19:46 Local 
• Registration: N313RX
• Aircraft: EUROCOPTER DEUTSCHLAND GMBH EC 135 P2+
• Injuries: 3 Fatal, 1 Serious, 1 Minor 
• Flight Conducted Under: Part 135: Air taxi & commuter - Non-scheduled - Air Medical (Medical emergency)

https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/203908/pdf

https://registry.faa.gov/AircraftInquiry/Search/NNumberResult?nNumberTxt=N313RX

On September 30, 2026, about 1946 Pacific daylight time, a Eurocopter Deutschland GMBH EC135 P2+, N313RX, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Avalon, California. The pilot, flight nurse, and patient were fatally injured; the flight paramedic was seriously injured, and the passenger sustained minor injuries. The helicopter was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 air medical flight. 

The helicopter departed Pebbly Beach Seaplane Base (L11), Avalon, California, with a planned destination of Torrance, California. 

A review of ADS-B data revealed that the helicopter climbed to a maximum altitude of about 90 ft mean sea level. Shortly thereafter, the helicopter entered a descent for several seconds before it impacted water. The last data point indicated the helicopter’s groundspeed was about 65 knots, and its descent rate was about 1,280 fpm. 

Witnesses near L11 reported that the helicopter lifted off from the seaplane base, entered a descent and then impacted water. The witnesses also noted that it was a dark, moonless night. 

A review of surveillance video revealed that a medical helicopter operated by another organization departed L11 about 45 seconds before the accident helicopter. The video showed that the helicopter lifted off from its helipad into a hover, turned and departed to the north. Approximately 13 seconds later the helicopter entered a descent, contacted the water twice, and then entered a climb. The accident helicopter then lifted off, climbed slightly and departed on a northerly heading. Several seconds later the helicopter entered a nose low attitude and subsequently impacted the water about 8 seconds later.

The helicopter wreckage was located in the water, at a depth of about 209 ft, about 0.3 miles north of L11.

The wreckage was recovered and retained for further examination.

Magni Gyro M16 Tandem Trainer, N109MG, fatal accident occurred on September 23, 2026, near Annapolis, Missouri

• Location: Annapolis, MO 
• Accident Number: CEN26LA324 
• Date & Time: September 23, 2026, 17:55 Local 
• Registration: N109MG 
• Aircraft: Magni M16 
• Injuries: 2 Fatal 
• Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General aviation - Personal

https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/203864/pdf

https://registry.faa.gov/aircraftinquiry/Search/NNumberResult?NNumberTxt=N109MG

On September 23, 2026, about 1755 central daylight time, an experimental Magni M16 gyroplane, N109MG, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Annapolis, Missouri. The pilot and passenger were both fatally injured. The gyroplane was operated under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight. 

First responders located the gyroplane and reported it had collided with power lines and impacted terrain. A power outage in the area was also reported. 

FAA inspectors responded to the accident scene and examined the wreckage. The debris field, which began with separated sections of the pusher propeller, was about 100 yards in length. Portions of the horizontal stabilizer and rudder system were located about midway through the debris field. A ground scar consistent with ground collision was found about 10 to 15 yards north of the main wreckage, surrounded by fragments of windscreen, airframe pieces, and rotor blades. 

The gyroplane came to rest on its left side, and cyclic and rudder control continuity appeared to be continuous. Fuel was observed in the fuel tank. A power line was entangled in the main wreckage.

The gyroplane was retained for further examination.

Cessna 182T Skylane, N116D, accident occurred on January 22, 2026, near Luce County Airport (ERY/KERY), Newberry, Michigan

• Location: Newberry, MI 
• Accident Number: CEN26LA213 
• Date & Time: January 22, 2026, 18:40 Local 
• Registration: N116D 
• Aircraft: TEXTRON AVIATION INC 182T
• Injuries: 1 None 
• Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General aviation - Personal

https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/203097/pdf

https://registry.faa.gov/AircraftInquiry/Search/NNumberResult?nNumberTxt=N116D

On January 22, 2026, about 1840 eastern standard time, a Cessna 182T, N116D was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Newberry, Michigan. The pilot was not injured. The airplane was operated under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight. 

The airplane departed from Saginaw County Airport (HYX), Saginaw, Michigan, about 17:15 on an instrument flight rules flight plan, flew northwest, and climbed to 10,000 ft mean sea level (msl). About 1 hour and 20 minutes after departing HYX, the pilot informed Minneapolis Center (ZMP) that the airplane was encountering ”a little bit of ice” and requested a 30° heading change to avoid clouds. ADS-B data revealed that the airplane made a heading change of about 30° to the west-northwest. About 12 minutes later, the airplane began to descend in a spiral pattern from 10,000 ft msl. ZMP attempted to contact the pilot twice, but the pilot did not respond. About 1 minute after the airplane began the descent, the pilot told ZMP that the airplane was upside down and that he needed help. ZMP attempted to communicate with the pilot, but there was no response from him. 

About 2 minutes after the descent started, the pilot told ZMP that he was in control of the airplane and the airplane was level at 1,400 ft msl. ZMP asked the pilot to climb the airplane to 3,000 ft msl and gave him the option to land the airplane at Luce County Airport (ERY), Newberry, Michigan. The data showed that the airplane climbed to 3,000 ft msl and proceeded toward ERY. The pilot landed the airplane without further incident about 19:10 at ERY. 

A postaccident examination revealed substantial damage to both wings. The pilot reported that there were no preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures with the airplane that would have precluded normal operation.