- Location: Washington, DC
- Incident Number: OPS26LA063
- Date & Time: August 4, 2026, 14:34 Local
- Registration: MILITARY - VM1
(A1); N307LH (A2)
- Aircraft:
Sikorsky VH3D (A1); YABORA
INDUSTRIA AERONAUTICA S ERJ
170-200 LR (A2)
Injuries: N/A (A1); N/A (A2)
- Flight Conducted Under: Armed Forces (A1); Part 121: Air carrier - Scheduled (A2)
https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/203529/pdf
On August 4, 2026, about 1434 eastern daylight time (EDT), Marine One (VM1) a Sikorsky VH3D, and Envoy Air flight 3742 (ENY3742), an Embraer E-170, were involved in a loss of
separation about 2 miles north of Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA),
Arlington, Virginia. There were no injuries reported to the passengers or crewmembers on
board either aircraft.
VM1 was a military Presidential transport local flight operating under the provisions of Title 14
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 from The Ellipse Park, Washington, D.C. ENY3742
was a scheduled domestic passenger flight operating under the provisions of Title 14 CFR Part
121 from DCA to Pensacola International Airport (PNS), Pensacola, Florida. At the time of the
loss of separation, VM1 had departed The Ellipse when ENY3742 was departing runway 1 and
beginning their initial climb. After the loss of separation, VM1 completed their local flight
without incident while ENY3742 completed their flight to PNS without incident. Figure 1 below
shows key locations and estimated position of both aircraft at FAA’s estimated closest
proximity.
As part of the investigative process, the NTSB invited qualified parties to participate in the
investigation. Parties to the investigation include the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
Department of the Navy (DON), and Envoy Air Inc. In accordance with the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) Annex 13, Centro de Investigação e Prevenção de Acidentes
Aeronáuticos (CENIPA) of Brazil, representing the State of Design of the Embraer 170 airplane,
was notified of the investigation.
Certified air traffic control (ATC) audio recordings and Standard Terminal Automation
Replacement System (STARS) radar data were provided by the FAA. Table 1 provides a
summary of key communications between the DCA Airport Traffic Control Tower (ATCT)
Helicopter Control (HC) and Local Control (LC) controllers and the flight crews of VM1 and
ENY3742. The two transmissions in red italics were sourced from a third-party application:
ATC – Live Air Traffic Radio. According to the disclaimer in their application, ATC audio in their
application is sourced from Enhanced Radar (a company that builds Artificial Intelligence (AI)-
driven systems to transcribe, analyze, and optimize ATC communications and airspace
operations) and processed with their Y4-small AI model. These transmissions were not
received by FAA ATC radio receivers and were unable to be heard by the DCA ATCT HC or LC
controllers. Note: The HC and LC positions operate on different frequencies and therefore, flightcrews and controllers can only hear what is being transmitted on the frequency they are
using – in this case, VM1 was on the HC frequency and ENY3742 was on the LC frequency.
A preliminary FAA estimate of the closest proximity between VM1 and ENY3742 determined
they were about .82 miles apart laterally and about 700 feet vertically, as shown in figure 2.Envoy Air Flight 3742 Flightcrew Statements
Postincident statements provided by ENY3742 flightcrew revealed the first officer (FO) was
the pilot flying and the captain was the pilot monitoring. Both crewmembers recalled that after
takeoff from runway 1, as the aircraft climbed and accelerated, the Terminal Collision
Avoidance System (TCAS) announced a traffic advisory (TA) with “Traffic, Traffic.” At no time
was the TCAS TA target acquired visually by either crewmember. The TCAS TA target symbol
remained to the right and below their own-ship symbol the entire time. Both recalled seeing
600 feet of vertical separation being displayed on TCAS as the TA target passed behind their
right wing of the own-ship symbol on the display. The captain added that at no time was the
TCAS resolution advisory (RA) displayed, announced, or commanded.
DCA Helicopter Frequency Communications
Certified ATC audio recordings revealed that the first attempt to contact DCA ATCT was not
received at all, and the second attempt was broken and completely unreadable (to which the
controller advised on frequency). The frequency had been working normally and there were no
known outages or reports of degradation of this frequency on the day of the event, nor was there a history of problems with this frequency according to FAA. As a result of the missed
transmissions with VM1 on the day of the incident, FAA technicians from Spectrum
Engineering conducted a coverage analysis and determined that there was not adequate lineof-sight to ensure communications between the radio transmitter/receiver sight and The
Ellipse, where VM1 was temporarily operating from while construction was ongoing at the
White House.
FAA Technical Operations Personnel Interviews
Postincident interviews were conducted with personnel from FAA’s technical operations
responsible for the ATC radios used at DCA ATCT. Both technicians stated that there had been
no documented history of reported problems with the HC frequency and had been no report on
the day of the incident until after the incident had occurred. After finding the line-of-sight
deficiencies in their coverage analysis done immediately after becoming aware of the problem,
the FAA relocated the radios for the HC frequency from their location in a nearby residential
neighborhood, to the top of the DCA ATCT.
DCA ATCT Air Traffic Manager Interview
The postincident interview with the air traffic manager (ATM) also revealed that there was no
known history of problems with the HC frequency from ATC. The ATM also reported that once
the technicians had relocated the radios to the tower, ATC conducted radio checks with two
separate Marine Helicopter Squadron One (HMX-1) aircraft located at The Ellipse and in the
local vicinity and reported no deficiencies. Additionally, there were no deficiencies noted in
communication with other helicopters in communication with DCA ATCT either.
Meeting Between DCA ATCT and HMX-1
DCA ATCT and HMX-1 staff met the week preceding the incident on July 30, 2026. According
to the ATM, this was not a regularly scheduled meeting, but rather a meeting that had been
requested by HMX-1 to discuss local operations and to express the need for more training
flights within the DCA Class B airspace, and ATC wanted to discuss concern with recent
reports of their not receiving the required 3 minute to liftoff call from HMX-1 flight crews. At
that time, HMX-1 advised that communications “had been spotty,” and felt that may have been
the reason. It was agreed that they would attempt other means of reaching the tower in
situations where they were unable to reach them to provide the 3-minute call (for example,
relaying through another aircraft), and on the day of the incident evidence showed they did.
After not reaching them on their initial attempt, they had attempted to relay the 3-minute call
through the helicopter facility at Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, which was also unsuccessful.
Loss of Standard Separation
The FAA reported the preliminary estimated closest proximity between VM1 and ENY3742 as
about .82 nm laterally and 700 feet vertically. This would meet the required minimum radar
separation as set forth in FAA Order JO 7110.65BB, Air Traffic Control, paragraph 7-9-4, which
required 1.5 nm lateral or 500 feet vertical separation within Class B airspace, between a VFR
aircraft and any aircraft weighing more than 19,000 pounds or any turbojet aircraft. The NTSB
is still reviewing all sources of surveillance data to calculate and confirm closest proximity.
Additionally, in accordance with the letter of agreement (LOA) between HMX-1 and
Washington, DC area ATC facilities, aircraft operations with the President on board require
flightcrews to contact DCA ATCT on 134.35 (HC frequency) 3 minutes prior to departure, and
according to the LOA between DCA ATCT and PCT TRACON, DCA would stop all departures
once the 3-minute call was received. In this incident, after attempting to contact DCA ATCT at
least twice, they ultimately departed and were then able to reach DCA ATCT when the
helicopter reached an altitude that provided adequate line-of sight communications. Having
received no 3-minute call, the LC controller had cleared ENY3742 for takeoff and the airplane
was becoming airborne simultaneously as VM1 established communications with the tower.
The current altimeter setting and traffic advisory were provided to VM1, to which the crew
immediately reported visual contact with the traffic.
The NTSB’s incident investigation is ongoing.
