- Location: Cape Newenham, AK
- Accident Number: WPR26FA309
- Date & Time: August 20, 2026, 11:45 Local
- Registration: N128EZ
- Aircraft: Cessna 441
- Injuries: 8 Fatal
- Flight Conducted Under: Part 135: Air taxi & commuter - Non-scheduled
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/Documents/WPR26FA309%20Prelim.pdf
https://registry.faa.gov/AircraftInquiry/Search/NNumberResult?nNumberTxt=N128EZ
On August 20, 2026, at about 1145 Alaska daylight time, a Cessna 441, N128EZ, was destroyed
when it was involved in an accident near Cape Newenham, Alaska. The two pilots and six
passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal
Regulations Part 135 on-demand air taxi flight.
Radio communications between Anchorage Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) and the
flight crew indicated that, following departure from Ted Stevens Anchorage International
Airport (ANC), Anchorage, Alaska, the flight crew established communications with the ARTCC
while enroute to Cape Newenham LRRS Airport (PAEH), Cape Newenham, Alaska. At the time
of departure, the most recent METAR from PAEH reported 10 statute miles (SM) visibility and
cloud ceilings at 800 ft above ground level (agl). At about 1016, the flight crew received
weather information for PAEH and requested the RNAV Runway 15 approach. The ARTCC
subsequently cleared the flight crew to descend at their discretion to 6,000 ft mean sea level
(msl).
At 1027, the controller cleared the flight crew to cross the RNAV (GPS) Runway 15 Initial
Approach Fix (IAF), RRLND, at or above 5,000 ft msl and cleared the flight for the RNAV
Runway 15 approach. The flight crew responded that they did not want to begin the approach
at that time and requested holding instructions. The controller subsequently cleared the flight
crew to hold at RRLND with an expected further clearance (EFC) time of 1100. At 1043, the
flight crew reported entering the hold at RRLND. The controller acknowledged the report and
revised the EFC time to 1130, or earlier upon pilot request. At that time, the Automated
Weather Observing System (AWOS) at PAEH reported the wind from 280° at 7 knots 1/4-mile
visibility, patches of fog, and overcast 300 ft agl.
At 1102, the flight crew requested and was subsequently cleared by the controller for the
RNAV Runway 15 approach. At that time the PAEH AWOS reported 3 miles visibility, mist, and a
broken ceiling at 300 ft agl. At 1114, the crew reported they were executing a missed
approach, advised the controller that they were operating in visual meteorological conditions,
and canceled their IFR clearance. At 1124, the flight crew again contacted ARTCC, reported
that the weather conditions at PAEH had improved, and requested an IFR clearance for a
second RNAV Runway 15 approach. After confirming the crew could maintain terrain and
obstruction clearance to 4,500 ft msl, the controller assigned a transponder code, established
radar identification, and cleared the flight for the RNAV Runway 15 approach via IVUXE upon
reaching 4,500 ft msl.
Between 1127 and 1135, the flight crew coordinated with the controller regarding routing for a
second RNAV Runway 15 approach. After initially requesting direct routing to IVUXE, the flight
crew later requested routing via WAGEN. The controller subsequently cleared the flight crew,
upon reaching 4,500 ft msl, to proceed direct to WAGEN, then IVUXE, and direct to PAEH. After
reporting level at 4,500 ft msl and later established on the WAGEN-to-IVUXE transition, the
flight crew was cleared for the RNAV Runway 15 approach and approved to change
frequencies. At that time the PAEH AWOS reported 1/4 mile visibility, fog, and an overcast
ceiling at 300 ft agl. No further radio communications were received from the flight crew.
According to preliminary ADS-B data, the airplane departed from runway 7L at ANC at 0911:54.
After departure the airplane climbed to an altitude of about 625 ft msl and initiated a climbing
right turn to a southwest heading.
At 0924:29, the airplane climbed through an altitude of about 16,175 ft msl and entered a right
turn to a westerly heading. The data showed the airplane continued climbing to flight level 280
while proceeding west toward PAEH. When the airplane was about 123 miles northeast of the
Initial Approach Fix (IAF) RRLND, it began a descent. The airplane crossed RRLND at about
10,375 ft msl and subsequently performed a series of descending turns in the vicinity of the
GPS fix, consistent with holding.
At 1104:31, while at an altitude of about 4,400 ft msl, the airplane turned westbound toward
the Intermediate Fix (IF) IVUXE. At 1107:31, the airplane approached IVUXE at about 2,100 ft
msl and initiated a left turn toward the Final Approach Fix (FAF) KRSSS. The last recorded
altitude north of KRSSS was about 1,025 ft msl prior to ADS-B contact being lost at 1110:13.
When ADS-B resumed at 1111:16, the airplane continued on the final approach, until contact
was lost at 1111:40, the airplane was about 2.3 miles north of the Missed Approach Point
(MAP) CFKMW at an altitude of about 425 ft msl. (See figure 1.)
ADS-B contact was reestablished at 1114:21 while the airplane was on a northerly heading at
about 1,300 ft msl. It continued northbound past IVUXE and approached FELTI (located about
21 miles north of IVUXE) at about 2,100 ft msl. The airplane then completed a 180° left turn to
a southerly heading toward IVUXE. At 1130:04, the airplane had climbed to an altitude of 3,925
ft msl and had initiated a right turn to the west, as it approached the WAGEN IAF. Between
1132:40 and 1135:56, there were several periods where ADS-B contact was lost. When ADS-B
contact resumed at 1135:56, the airplane was at 4,425 ft msl on an easterly heading toward
IVUXE.
At 1138:15, the airplane was at an altitude of about 2,850 ft msl when it initiated a right turn
near IVUXE. At 1141:14, the airplane crossed KRSSS at about 2,400 ft msl and continued
southbound along the approach course. At 1143:18, the airplane crossed the MAP CFKMW at
about 1,000 ft msl. The airplane continued beyond CFKMW, while it descended to about 600 ft
msl, until ADS-B contact was lost at 1143:51. At that time, the airplane was about 1.3 miles
north of the runway 15 threshold at PAEH. (See figure 2.)
A review of the RNAV (GPS) RWY 15 instrument approach plate, PAEH, dated 09 July 2026,
showed Lateral Navigation (LNAV) Minimum Descent Altitude (MDA) as 1320 ft and 3 miles
visibility. The MAP was located 2.2 miles north of the runway 15 threshold. Two cautions were
noted: “1) Rwy located on slope of 2306’ mountain. High terrain both sides and S end of rwy.”
and “2) Successful go-around improbable if initiated past the MAP.”
Technicians who were stationed at the facility near PAEH provided statements to
investigators. One technician stated that he performed a routine inspection of the runway at
about 0900 on the morning of the accident. As part of this inspection, he drove the length of
the runway to check the condition of the runway surface and to ensure there was no wildlife
within 100 yards of the runway. At that time, he did not observe any anomalies or foreign
objects on the runway and did not see any wildlife. The technician noted that he typically
performs another runway inspection to ensure the runway is clear before an airplane is
expected to land; however, he was unable to complete a runway inspection for the accident
airplane’s arrival because of thick fog that blanketed the runway.
According to the second technician, the facility featured a dedicated weather building located
about 0.3 miles west of the approach end of runway 15. The building housed an aviation radio
and terminal that displayed weather information from the AWOS equipment, which was
located near the runway. In addition, charts and photographs in the weather building provided
the distances and elevations of nearby landmarks.
At about 0800 or 0830 on the morning of the accident, the technician placed a phone call to
the operator to provide the weather conditions at PAEH. In the hours following this call, the
technician observed that the cloud ceilings and visibility had decreased.
Before the airplane began its first approach to PAEH, the technician went to the weather
building. The technician used the radio to relay the conditions indicated by the AWOS,
augmented by his observation of the visibility reference points listed on the weather building
charts. He noted that when the airplane performed its first approach, a reference point that
was 1 7/8 miles away from the weather building was obscured by fog. After the airplane
performed the missed approach, the flight crew told the technician that they were going to
attempt to land at Platinum Airport (PAPM), Platinum, Alaska, about 23 miles north of PAEH.
The technician stated that, after the airplane’s first approach, he initially could see small areas
of blue sky to the north, but the visibility at PAEH had diminished further.
Several minutes later, the flight crew reestablished radio contact with the technician, stating
that they had been unable to contact PAPM on the radio and wanted to perform a second
approach to PAEH. The technician stated that, by the time the airplane had begun its second
approach, none of visibility reference points were visible, and he could no longer see the
runway. When the flight crew reported they were two minutes out, the technician relayed the
AWOS weather reading and noted to himself that he did not have any visual references from
the weather building.
Shortly thereafter, the technician heard “normal motor sounds” as the airplane approached the
runway. He then heard the engines “throttle up,” followed by a “backfire,” after which the
sounds ceased. After unsuccessful attempts to locate the airplane on ground or to contact the flight crew by radio, the technician and other personnel from the facility began to search for
the airplane. The wreckage was located in an area of rising terrain about 0.5 miles west of the
approach end of runway 15.
Examination of the accident site revealed the first identifiable point of contact (FIPC) was an
area of disturbed rocks measuring about 6 ft by 6 ft, which exhibited evidence of fire, at an
elevation of about 610 ft mean sea level (msl). The debris path extended approximately 160 ft
on a true heading of about 250° and continued upslope onto a small, relatively level rocky area.
The main wreckage came to rest on its left side on a true heading of approximately 120°, about
160 ft from the FIPC. Wreckage distributed along the debris path included fragments of the
wings, fuselage, propeller blades, flaps, and ailerons. All major structural components of the
airplane were identified at the accident site.
The wreckage is pending recovery to a secure location for further examination.
