- Location: Miami, FL
- Accident Number: DCA26MA352
- Date & Time: September 6, 2026, 13:53 Local
- Registration: N1997A
- Aircraft: Boeing 767
- Injuries: 5 Fatal, 3 Serious, 2 Minor
- Flight Conducted Under: Part 121: Air carrier - Non-scheduled
https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/203747/pdf
http://registry.faa.gov/AircraftInquiry/Search/NNumberResult?nNumberTxt=N1997A
On September 6, 2026, about 1353 eastern daylight time (EDT), 21 Air flight 7598, a Boeing 767-33A, N1997A, overran runway 30 after landing at Miami International Airport (MIA), Miami, Florida and subsequently impacted two ground passenger vehicles. The two crewmembers aboard the airplane sustained minor injuries. Five people on the ground sustained fatal injuries and three people on the ground sustained serious injuries. The airplane sustained substantial damage to include a postcrash fire on the right wing. Flight 7598 was a domestic cargo flight operating on behalf of Amazon.com Services LLC under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 from Luis Muñoz Marín International Airport (SJU), San Juan, Puerto Rico, to MIA.
In response to the accident, the NTSB traveled to MIA on September 7, 2026, to document the accident site and collect perishable evidence to support the investigation. As part of the investigative process, the NTSB invited qualified parties to participate in the investigation. These parties included the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), The Boeing Company, General Electric (GE) Aerospace, 21 Air, Miami-Dade Aviation Department (MDAD), National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA), and 21 Air Pilots Association (TAPA).
The parties were formed into specialized investigative groups led by NTSB group chairmen in the areas of Structures, Systems, Powerplants, Air Carrier Operations and Human Performance, Air Traffic Control (ATC), Airports and Survival Factors, Hazardous Materials, and Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR). NTSB specialists for Meteorology and Aircraft Performance were on site to collect information in their respective fields. A Flight Data Recorder (FDR) specialist at the NTSB Vehicle Recorders Laboratory in Washington, DC conducted work on the FDR recovered from the accident airplane. NTSB Chairwoman Homendy was the Board Member on scene.
History of Flight
On the day of the accident, flight 7598 was the third flight for the accident airplane and the second flight for the accident flight crew. According to flight crew interviews, the captain and first officer (FO) reported for duty about 0530 EDT on the day of the accident. The accident flight crew flew the accident airplane from MIA to SJU as flight 7521, which departed MIA about 0635 EDT and landed in SJU about 0858 EDT. Flight 7521 was the first time the accident flight crew had flown together. For flight 7521, the FO was the pilot flying and the captain was the pilot monitoring.
Flight 7598 departed SJU about 1124 EDT and was scheduled to arrive into MIA about 1428 EDT. For flight 7598, the captain was the pilot flying and the FO was the pilot monitoring. Flight 7598 was cleared for landing on runway 30 from MIA airport traffic control tower (ATCT)/terminal radar approach control (TRACON) about 1349 EDT when the airplane was about 12 nautical miles from the runway 30 displaced threshold. According to Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Out and FDR data, flight 7598 was about 105 ft above ground level (agl) at a groundspeed of 177 kts as it crossed the threshold of runway 30.
The accident airplane touched down about 3,750 ft past the threshold at a groundspeed of 160 kts. The airplane continued down runway 30, crossed the departure end of the runway at 113 kts, impacted the localizer and the Medium Intensity Approach Lighting System with Runway Alignment Indicator Lights (MALSR) at the northwest end of the runway at about 100kts, and departed the paved surface and onto the grass (see figure 1). The distance between the end of the paved surface to the location the accident airplane came to rest was about 1,200 ft.
The last recorded groundspeed on the FDR was 65 kts, reached shortly after the accident airplane impacted an airport perimeter fence and traversed a public road (NW 67th Avenue). Prior to impacting the airport perimeter fence, the accident airplane impacted a Ford Econoline passenger van traveling on an airport perimeter road parallel to the perimeter fenceline (see figure 2). Of the seven occupants in the passenger van, five sustained fatal injuries and two sustained serious injuries. While traversing NW 67th avenue, the accident airplane impacted a Toyota Corolla Cross sport utility vehicle (SUV). The sole occupant in the SUV sustained serious injuries.
The accident airplane impacted a chain link fence surrounding a parking lot and came to rest about 1,200 ft from the paved surface of runway 12/30. The captain egressed the airplane out of door 1L and the FO egressed out of the right cockpit window. About 1353 EDT, MIA ATCT/TRACON activated the alert phone in response to the accident. Miami-Dade Fire Rescue at MIA responded with 5 Aircraft Rescue and Fire Fighting (ARFF) units, with additional mutual aid resources dispatched following the initial response.
Crew Experience
The captain held an airline transport pilot certificate with a type rating for the Boeing 767 that he received on May 18, 2026. The captain was hired by 21 Air in April 2026. He had accrued about 7,267 total hours of flight experience, as reported in his interview with NTSB investigators, of which 150 hours were in the accident airplane make and model. The captain also had about 2,700 hours of flight experience in the Boeing 737. On September 5, 2026, the captain flew two flights comprising an outbound from MIA to El Dorado International Airport (BOG), Bogotá, Colombia, and a return flight from BOG to MIA. According to the operator’s records, the return flight departed BOG about 0441 EDT and arrived about 0902 EDT. The captain was subsequently off duty until the morning of the accident.
The FO held an airline transport pilot certificate with a type rating for the Boeing 767 that he received on April 2, 2025. The FO was hired by 21 Air in February 2025. He had accrued about 2,800 total hours of flight experience, as reported in his interview with NTSB investigators, of which 800 hours were in the accident airplane make and model. The FO also had about 400 hours of flight experience on the McDonnell Douglas DC-9. On September 3, 2026, the FO flew two flights comprising an outbound from MIA to Baltimore/Washington International Thurgood Marshall Airport (BWI), and a return flight from BWI to MIA. According to the operator’s records, the return flight departed BWI about 2209 EDT and arrived into MIA about 0033 EDT on September 4, 2026. The FO was subsequently off duty until the morning of the accident.
Airplane and Operator Information
The Boeing 767 is a two-engine widebody airplane that can be configured to carry passengers or cargo. The accident airplane was manufactured in June 1994 and was originally delivered as a passenger-carrying configuration. The airplane was subsequently converted to a freighter configuration in June 2016. The accident airplane was equipped with GE CF-6 engines. At the time of the accident, the airplane had accumulated a total time of about 110,077 flight hours and 24,505 flight cycles.
21 Air is a cargo airline with corporate headquarters in Greensboro, North Carolina, and operations based in Miami, Florida. At the time of the accident, the company operated 22 airplanes (including the accident airplane) composed of a mix of Boeing 757 and 767 airplanes.
Meteorology
An Automated Surface Observing System (ASOS) is located at MIA. The main ASOS sensors are located near the approach end of runway 9, near taxiway S1, while additional ASOS sensors are located about 600 ft southeast of the accident site. At 1313 EDT, the MIA ASOS generated a Special Report (SPECI) that reported, in part, variable wind at 3 kts, visibility of 10 statute miles or greater, thunderstorms, scattered cumulonimbus clouds at 3,000 ft agl and broken ceiling at 5,000 ft agl. At 1337 EDT, the MIA ASOS reported a wind shift with the peak hourly wind occurring at 1352 EDT from 180° at 26 kts.
At 1350 EDT, the MIA ASOS five-minute automated data reported, in part, winds at 190° at 16 kts with gusts to 24 kts. At 1353 EDT, the MIA ASOS generated an Aviation Routine Weather Report (METAR) that reported, in part, wind from 190° at 17 kts with gusts to 26 kts, visibility of 10 statute miles or greater, thunderstorms, scattered cumulonimbus clouds at 2,000 ft agl, broken ceiling at 4,800 ft agl.
Airport and ATC Information
MIA is a major international airport for passenger and cargo operations. The airport operates four runways: 8L/26R, 8R/26L, 9/27, and 12/30 (see figure 3). All of the runways are asphalt and grooved. According to the FAA airport diagram for MIA, runway 12/30 measures 150 ft wide by 9,360 ft long, the length of which includes a displaced threshold for runway 30. Blast pads that are not considered part of the runway length are present at each end of runway. An engineered materials arresting system (EMAS) was not installed at the end of runway 30.
The MIA ATCT/TRACON is a combined tower and TRACON located west of the passenger terminal, between runways 9/27 and 12/30. The MIA TRACON personnel were responsible for approach and departure radar services for MIA, Fort Lauderdale/Hollywood International Airport (FLL), and surrounding satellite airports. The MIA tower personnel were responsible for air operations within a 6-mile radius of MIA, up to 1,000 ft agl, as well as ground movements on the airport surface area.
The MIA ATCT local control north (LCN) controller was responsible for arrivals and departures on runways 8L/26R and 8R/26L while the local control south (LCS) controller was responsible for arrivals and departures on runways 9/27 and 12/30. The LCS on position at the time of the accident had a total of 11 years of experience in ATC and was certified for the LCS position in November 2019. At the time of the accident, the LCS was on position for about 17 minutes. The LCS issued a landing clearance to flight 7598 but did not issue information about the wind. Per FAA Order JO 7110.65BB, titled “Air Traffic Control,” both wind direction and velocity were required to be stated when authorizing use of a runway when a tailwind component exists.
About 4 minutes prior to issuing the landing clearance to flight 7598, when asked by another flight for wind information, the LCS stated winds were from 190° at 19 kts with gusts to 22 kts. At the time of this wind advisory, flight 7598 was not on the LCS frequency.
Flight Recorders
The airplane was equipped with a CVR and a FDR, both of which were recovered from the accident airplane and transported to the NTSB Vehicle Recorders Laboratory in Washington, DC. Data from both the CVR and FDR were downloaded successfully. The CVR contained about 2 hours and 4 minutes of recorded data that included the accident flight. A summary of select events captured on the CVR during the final few minutes of the recording is provided in table 1. All times are referenced relative to the end of the CVR recording.
The FDR contained about 54 hours of data that spanned 16 flights, including the accident flight. The FDR recorded more than 400 parameters of flight data. Figure 4 shows a plot of the FDR data from 1350 EDT, when flight 7598 was about 9.8 nautical miles from the threshold of runway 30, until the end of recorded data. Figure 5 shows a plot of the FDR data from 1352:25, when flight 7598 was about 1.5 nautical miles from the threshold of runway 30, until the end of recorded data.
Left and right main landing gear tire contact marks on runway 30 were found about 3,750 ft and 3,820 ft, respectively, from the threshold of the approach end of runway 30. According to FDR data, the airplane’s groundspeed was about 160 kts at the location of these initial tire contact marks, about 13 seconds after flight 7598 crossed the runway 30 threshold. The landing gear weight-on-wheels (WOW) parameter intermittently switched between “air” to “ground” for about 7 seconds. The WOW parameter switched to ground for the remainder of the recorded data when the airplane had about 2,730 ft of runway remaining.
The FDR data showed the speed brakes remained stowed and the thrust reversers did not deploy during the landing and subsequent landing rollout. Wheel brakes were manually applied at a groundspeed of 146 kts. The brake pedals for wheel braking were subsequently released about 8 seconds later at a groundspeed of 120 kts and the throttle resolver angle for both engines increased to go-around thrust values; the airplane had about 930 ft of runway remaining.
About 4 seconds later, the throttle resolver angles for both engines reduced to idle values at a groundspeed of 117 kts, when wheel brakes were reapplied; the airplane had about 415 ft of runway remaining. The airplane departed the runway at a groundspeed of 113 kts and subsequently impacted the localizer and MALSR at the northwest end of runway 30.
FDR and other engineering data will be incorporated into an NTSB airplane performance study to refine this preliminary sequence of events and to analyze the physical state of the airplane during its approach and landing on runway 30.
Wreckage Examination
The accident airplane came to rest on an area of grass to the west of NW 67th Avenue and adjacent to a parking lot. Ground impressions consistent with the nose, right main, and left main landing gear were found along the path of the airplane departing from runway 12/30 to where the airplane came to rest (see figure 6). The nose landing gear was found displaced aft and was found underneath the belly of the airplane. The left and right main landing gear assemblies were found in an extended and locked landing configuration. Measurement of the brake wear pins on both the left and right main landing gear found all wear pins showed remaining service life for all eight wheels.
Several orange paint transfer marks were found on the fuselage, wing leading edge, and horizontal stabilizer leading edge, consistent with the airplane impacting the localizer and MALSR at the northwest end of runway 30. The inboard end of the right wing remained attached to the fuselage and exhibited varying amounts of heat damage from the postcrash fire. Portions of the right wing were thermally deformed downward with its outboard end resting on the ground.
A large section of the upper wing skin had separated from the right wing and was found in the adjacent parking lot, about 158 ft to the northwest of the airplane. The right engine was thermally damaged, partially separated from the wing pylon structure, oriented outboard of its normally installed position, and was resting on the ground.
In the cockpit, the flap lever was found in the 25° detent (see figure 7). Measurement of the left- and right-wing slat tracks and flap support rods were consistent with a flaps 25° setting. The throttle levers were found in the idle position, and the fuel control switches were found in the cut-off position. Both engine fire handles were up and rotated and the auxiliary power unit (APU) fire handle was down. The thrust reverser levers were found in the first detent position. The speed brake lever was in the down (stowed) position.
The NTSB’s investigation of 21 Air flight 7598 is ongoing.
