Wednesday, June 17, 2026

Beechcraft C90 King Air, N249CP, registered to Angels Envy Aviation LLC and being operated by Generations Jets, fatal accident occurred on May 14, 2026, near Lincoln, New Mexico

  • Location: Lincoln, NM 
  • Accident Number: WPR26FA186 
  • Date & Time: May 14, 2026, 00:15 Local 
  • Registration: N249CP 
  • Aircraft: Beech C90 
  • Injuries: 4 Fatal 
  • Flight Conducted Under: Part 135: Air taxi & commuter - Non-scheduled
https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/202990/pdf

https://registry.faa.gov/AircraftInquiry/Search/NNumberResult?nNumberTxt=N249CP

On May 14, 2026, at 0015 mountain daylight time, a Beech C90, N249CP, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Lincoln, New Mexico. Both pilots and passengers sustained fatal injuries. The airplane was operated by Generation Jets under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 as an air ambulance flight. 

The airplane and air crew were based at Roswell Air Center (ROW), Roswell, New Mexico, for the purpose of providing unscheduled fixed-wing aeromedical services upon request. The flight was under the operational control of Generations Jets, who operated the airplane and employed the two pilots. The two passengers were flight nurses employed by Trans Aero Medical Services. 

On May 13, 2026, at 2301, the air crew received notification of a mission to fly from ROW to Sierra Blanca Regional Airport (SRR), Ruidoso, New Mexico, to pick up a patient for transport to Albuquerque, New Mexico. Dark night (0% moon illumination), visual meteorological conditions existed at the time of the accident. GPS jamming activities that encompassed the area around the accident flight were being conducted by the United States military during the time of the flight. 

The airplane was equipped with Spidertracks flight tracking equipment which reported GPS generated altitude, heading, airspeed, and position for the duration of the accident flight. Additionally, ABS-B data captured portions of the accident flight. The data from both sources were consistent with each other, except the recorded Spidertracks GPS altitude was generally about 600 ft higher than the recorded ADS-B altitudes and there were large gaps in the recorded ADS-B data. See Figure 1 for a flight path depiction and summary of key communications. 

According to the flight tracking data, the flight departed Roswell Air Center (ROW), Roswell, New Mexico, about 2352. During the departure climb, at 2354:18, the pilot contacted Albuquerque (ZAB) Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) and requested an instrument flight rules (IFR) clearance to SRR. The flight was subsequently cleared “as filed” to SRR and assigned an altitude of 12,000 ft mean sea level (MSL).

At 2358:39, ADS-B flight data, which had been recorded at 2-3 second intervals, began recording at about one minute intervals.

At 0000:26, the ARTCC controller advised the flight crew that the airplane was at 13,000 ft msl, 1,000 ft above their assigned altitude. The pilot responded that they were correcting their altitude and that the airplane had lost GPS capability. The pilot stated they would need a heading. The ARTCC controller provided an initial heading of 275° toward SRR and asked which approach they intended to fly. The pilot requested the RNAV approach to runway 24 at SRR.

At 0001:17 the ARTCC controller telephoned their operations supervisor and requested [the military] to stop jamming. 

At 0001:46, the ARTCC controller cleared the flight to the REYOK intersection and provided a heading of 350°. The pilot read back the clearance. Shortly thereafter, the airplane turned to a northernly heading that put the airplane on a path to cross the ILS 24 approach course between the initial approach fix (CEVBA) and REYOK fix. During the turn, the pilot requested the ILS approach to SRR due to the loss of GPS navigation capability. 

The airplane continued a northerly heading for about 20 nautical miles, at a GPS altitude of about 12,600 ft. During this segment of the flight, the ARTCC controller provided services to other air traffic, including three additional aircraft that reported a loss of GPS. One of those aircraft expressed difficulty identifying a directed to ground based navigation aid and required additional assistance from ARTCC. 

At 0004:43 the ARTCC controller advised the flight crew that they would provide radar vectors utilizing right turns to align the airplane for a straight-in approach over the REYOK intersection “in a couple minutes.”

About 0005 the ARTCC operations supervisor contacted [the military] to stop jamming and at 0007:34 ADS-B data recording returned to 2-3 second intervals.

At 0008:06, while maintaining the northwest heading and about 31 mi northeast of SRR, the flight crew reported they had “a visual on Ruidoso,” but their radio transmission was stepped on by other radio traffic. The flight crew again reported they “[have] a visual on Ruidoso” at 0008:30 and that they could “go visual.” The ARTCC controller subsequently cleared the flight to SRR, cleared the flight for a visual approach, and informed them they could cancel IFR in the air above 9,000 ft msl or they could cancel their clearance via the flight service station after landing. The flight crew acknowledged the clearance and responded that they would cancel IFR “in just a couple of minutes.” There were no additional radio transmissions received from the flight crew. The airplane then began a left turn southwest toward SRR. The Capitan Mountains, extending to 10,201 ft, were located about 14 miles northeast of SRR between the airplane and the airport. 

About 0010, the ARTCC operations supervisor informed [the military] that the airplane was on a visual approach and that they could resume jamming. At 0010:27 ADS-B again began collecting data at about one-minute intervals. About the same time, the airplane began descending toward SRR followed by a slight right turn at 0013:26 and 9,820 ft Spidertrack GPS altitude.

The airplane continued to descend until about 0014:45 when the airplane climbed from about 9,400 ft Spidertrack GPS altitude until the last Spidertrack data point at 0015:26 recorded the airplane at 9,823 ft Spidertrack GPS altitude, 150 kts groundspeed, and a true heading of 250°. 

The airplane impacted terrain about 250 ft southwest of the last recorded data point at an elevation of about 9,950 ft, and about 730 ft east and 230 ft below the Capitan Mountains Summit Radio Facility, located at an elevation of about 10,180 ft. A post impact fire occurred that initiated a forest fire.

Foreflight Weather Briefing 

Review of the Foreflight Briefing and Notice to Airmen (NOTAM) Information that was provided to the flight crew revealed that it contained the following NOTAMs, which were active at the time of the accident.  

Destination (SRR)

“SRR 05/010 SRR SVC AUTOMATED WX BCST SYSTEM U/S 2605132257-2608132300 SRR 05/009 SRR SVC AUTOMATED WX BCST SYSTEM U/S 2605132256-2606182359EST” 

Enroute Navigation (ZAB) 

“GPS 05/018 ZAB NAV GPS (WSMRNM GPS 26-13)(INCLUDING WAAS, GBAS, AND ADS-B) MAY NOT BE AVBL WI A 366NM RADIUS CENTERED AT 333638N1063320W(TCS048041) FL400-UNL, 326NM RADIUS AT FL250, 240NM RADIUS AT 10000FT, 240NM RADIUS AT 4000FT AGL, 210NM RADIUS AT 50FT AGL. DLY 0300-0629 2605130300-2605140629” 

The NOTAMs informed pilots that the SRR automated weather observation system (AWOS) was out of service and that military GPS jamming was scheduled at the time of the accident flight that encompassed the area and altitudes of the accident flight. 

The Foreflight weather briefing stated “No METAR (Meteorological Aerodrome Report)” and “No TAF (Terminal Aerodrome Forecast)” for SRR. 

Destination Airport 

SRR is serviced by two instrument approaches, the ILS or LOC RWY 24 and the RNAV (GPS) RWY 24. Both instrument approach plate notes section contain the following statement: “When local altimeter setting not received, procedure NA (Not Authorized).” 

Kucera Tundrair King, N62TK, accident occurred on May 5, 2026, near Palmer, Alaska

  • Location: Palmer, AK 
  • Accident Number: ANC26LA037 
  • Date & Time: May 5, 2026, 19:50 Local 
  • Registration: N62TK 
  • Aircraft: TUNDRAIR KING 
  • Injuries: 1 Serious 
  • Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General aviation - Personal

https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/202942/pdf

https://registry.faa.gov/aircraftinquiry/Search/NNumberResult?NNumberTxt=N62TK 

On May 5, 2026, about 1950 Alaska daylight time (AKDT), an experimental Tundrair King airplane, N62TK, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Palmer, Alaska. The pilot was seriously injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.

Witnesses positioned near the east end of Picnic Strip, adjacent to Lake George and the Knik Glacier, reported that the airplane departed to the east and flew past them at low altitude. climbed over an area of rising terrain in a steep left bank, it encountered a gusting crosswind from the southeast off the glacier. The right wing lifted, the bank angle increased sharply, and the airplane descended nose-down before impacting terrain. Witnesses indicated the engine appeared to be operating at full power until impact. 

Upon impact, the engine separated from the airframe, and a post-impact fire consumed most of the cockpit, fuselage, and left wing. 

Although surface winds were reported as calm, witnesses estimated gusts of approximately 20 knots above the glacial moraine at the east end of the strip.

The wreckage has been recovered, and an examination is pending.

Tuesday, June 16, 2026

Van's RV-3A, N696DB, fatal accident occurred on June 15, 2026, near Lakeland, Florida

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this writing will be corrected when the NTSB preliminary report is released.

https://registry.faa.gov/AircraftInquiry/Search/NNumberResult?nNumberTxt=N696DB

- History of Flight:
On June 15, 2026, at about 1953 local time, a privately-registered Van's RV-3A, N696DB, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Lakeland, Florida. The pilot was fatally injured. The local personal flight originated from Bartow Airport (BOW/KBOW), 
Bartow, Florida, at 1930.

The aircraft was flying in a formation with a Van's RV-8, N881PH, that departed Lakeland (KLAL), Florida, at 1925.

According to Preliminary ADS-B data, both airplanes were cruising an altitude of 2,100 ft and proceeded north. Both airplanes were observed to make circling orbits near Polk City, Florida.

Figure 1: Flightaware Tracks side-by-side review

At about 1953:30, the airplanes were now headed west and were still cruising at 2,100 ft when the RV-3 suffered an apparent inflight breakup. The data shows that the RV-3 went from a 480 feet per minute (fpm) climb to a 9000 feet per minute (fpm) descent rate. Note that after this, the ADS-B exchange tracker jumped back in direction and repeated the final seconds of the initial track.

The pilot of the RV-8 reported to local police that he "saw a piece come off the low-wing aircraft just in time to watch the plane come apart and crash straight into the ground." Another news site reported that a wing came off, and not a piece.

Figure 2: End of ADS-B exchange track, note how track went back and repeated the same sequence

Figure 3: Approx position of both aircraft when the RV-3 broke apart.

The RV-8 initiated a descending left hand turn and proceeded to circle the area of the accident for about 30 minutes before returning to Lakeland. The wreckage was eventually located in a wooded area.

Figure 4: RV-8 circling area of accident

- Pilot Information:
The pilot, aged 23, held a commercial pilot certificate with a rating for airplane single engine land and multi engine land and an instrument rating. He also held private privileges for airplane single engine sea. The pilot had a flight instructor certificate issued on 6/29/2025, and a remote pilot certificate issued within the same year. His first class FAA medical was issued on December 2025.

- Airplane Information:
The accident aircraft, serial number 11083, was manufactured in 1996. It was a single-seat, single engine, low-wing, experimental, amateur built, kit airplane sold by Van’s Aircraft, Inc. The airplane is of all metal construction, has a conventional tail and is equipped with fixed conventional landing gear. The airplane is 19 feet long, has a wingspan of 19 feet, 11 inches, and a tail height of 5 feet. The accident airplane was powered by a four-cylinder Lycoming O-320 reciprocating engine driving a 2-blade constant speed propeller.

- Wreckage and Impact Information:
Unknown.

- Weather:

(1) METARs

METAR KZPH 152335Z AUTO 30008KT 10SM CLR 30/22 A3000 RMK A02 T02970223

METAR KZPH 160015Z AUTO 28007KT 10SM CLR 29/23 A3002 RMK A02 LTG DSNT E T02910227

METAR KGIF 152253Z AUTO 24007KT 210V280 10SM CLR 31/22 A2999 RMK AO1 SLP152 T03110217

METAR KGIF 152353Z AUTO 31007KT 10SM CLR 31/21 A3000 RMK AO1 SLP158 T03060206 10339 20306 53012

METAR KISM 152256Z 28008KT 10SM CLR 31/21 A2998 RMK AO2 SLP154 T03110211 $

METAR KISM 152356Z 30007KT 10SM CLR 30/23 A3000 RMK AO2 SLP158 T03000228 10344 20300 51013 $

(2) Area Forecast Discussion:

814
FXUS62 KTBW 152330
AFDTBW

Area Forecast Discussion
National Weather Service Tampa Bay Ruskin FL
730 PM EDT Mon Jun 15 2026

...New UPDATE, AVIATION...

.KEY MESSAGES...
Updated at 730 PM EDT Mon Jun 15 2026

- Near to slightly above normal temperatures will continue through
  the next week.

- Isolated to scattered thunderstorms will develop each afternoon
  this week, with the highest rain chances generally over the
  interior.

&&

.UPDATE...
Issued at 730 PM EDT Mon Jun 15 2026

No changes planned for the evening update. Westerly flow across
the area today has kept afternoon and early evening convection
generally confined to E FL locations with dry conditions
prevailing across the local W FL area. Mild temps overnight with
lows in the mid 70s to lower 80s with lingering mid/upper clouds.

&&

.DISCUSSION...
Issued at 214 PM EDT Mon Jun 15 2026

Strong ridging to our south will keep southwesterly flow in place
through much of our work week. This will result in storm chances
mainly over the interior and east coast of Florida. If we see any
showers on the east coast it will be during our morning hours as
storms push on the coast from the Gulf. This regime will also keep
our temperatures above average as the southwesterly flow will
keep the wind coming off the warm Gulf waters overnight. This
prevents overnight lows from dropping keeping most of us around 80
degrees when we wake up. This starts us out warmer then average
in the morning, and with no rain showers in forecast, result in
warmer afternoon high temperatures.

The best shot to see some rain for the west coast will be on Friday
as the upper level flow switches more southeasterly for one day.
However, this is short lived as winds shift southwesterly once again
for the weekend.

&&

.AVIATION...
(00Z TAFS)
Issued at 720 PM EDT Mon Jun 15 2026

VFR expected across terminals through the period with westerly
flow keeping convection generally east of terminals.

&&

.MARINE...
Issued at 214 PM EDT Mon Jun 15 2026

Not much changing through our work week. Winds will remain out of
the west to southwest around to 15 knots. Best storm chances will
be overnight and into the early morning hours along the land
breeze boundary.

&&

.FIRE WEATHER...
Issued at 214 PM EDT Mon Jun 15 2026

Summertime humidity and heat will continue however we are
expecting dry conditions for the west coast of Florida for much of
our work week.

&&

.PRELIMINARY POINT TEMPS/POPS...
TPA  81  91  81  92 /  10  30  20  10
FMY  78  92  78  94 /  10  10   0  10
GIF  77  95  76  96 /  10  30  20  20
SRQ  80  91  79  93 /  10  10  10   0
BKV  78  93  76  95 /  10  20  20  10
SPG  81  92  81  92 /  10  20  20   0

&&

Sea Breeze Thunderstorm Regime For Tuesday: 4
Sea Breeze Thunderstorm Regime For Wednesday: 5

For additional information on sea breeze regimes, go to:
     https://www.weather.gov/tbw/ThunderstormClimatology

&&

.TBW WATCHES/WARNINGS/ADVISORIES...
FL...None.
Gulf waters...None.

&&

$$

UPDATE/AVIATION...Hurt
DISCUSSION/MARINE/FIRE WEATHER...Shiveley
DECISION SUPPORT...Oglesby
UPPER AIR/CLIMATE...Wynn

- Additional Information:
A review of the Van's RV-3 NTSB records showed that:

  • On August 6, 1992, a Van's RV-3, N50WP, suffered an "overload and total failure" of the rear wing attach fittings during a loop maneuver that was described as having an abrupt pitch up motion.
  • On October 8, 1995, a Van's RV-3A, N27RV, suffered a failure of the right wing main spar during a steep banking right turn. The recording accelerometer found in the wreckage was indicating .2 G's more than the 9 G ultimate load limit published by the designer of the RV-3 aircraft plans.
  • On March 8, 1998, a Van's RV-3, N99HV, suffered an in-flight failure of the right wing spar (for an undetermined reason) as the pilot was performing aerobatic flight. The NTSB stated: "This was 1 of 3 RV-3s built by Tony Duci & the 2nd to structurally fail in flight. Acft had been modified as an RV-3A, but had not been re-certified as such. Aerobatic gross weight limit (1,050 lbs) had been exceeded by an estimated 120 lbs."
  • On August 23, 2006, a Van's RV-3, N43EM, suffered an in-flight failure of the right wing spar during aerobatic flight. According to the NTSB: "No evidence of compliance with Vans Service Bulletin (SB) 96-3-1 was observed on the accident airplane. This SB states that "Pilots should perform no aerobatic maneuvers and limit flight G loads to a maximum 4.4 G's (Utility Category). This limitation should be reflected in the Operating Limitations for the aircraft as well as the airframe logbook until such a time that appropriate modifications have been completed. Unmodified aircraft must display an "Aerobatic Limitations" placard referencing the Operating Limitations of the aircraft." No evidence of compliance with FAA Special Airworthiness Information Bulletin (SAIB) ACE-99-10 was observed on the accident airplane. In this SAIB, the FAA outlined the recommendations issued by Van's with regards to wing spar modification and performance of aerobatics. The SAIB went on to address recommended operating limitations for aircraft with and without the modifications such as airspeeds, gross weight, and G limits. An examination of the remaining airplane systems revealed no anomalies."
  • On On June 17, 2017, a Van's RV-3, N177TT, suffered an in-flight failure of the left wing due to the owner's use of improper hardware and his improper assembly of the airplane, which reduced the strength of the left wing and resulted in its subsequent failure following a sharp pullup maneuver.
According to the NTSB's report from the 2017 accident:

After a series of accidents involving RV-3 in-flight wing separations, Vans conducted extensive testing. The testing showed that the initiating failure of the RV-3 wing was the buckling of the upper spar cap and that bonding the spar caps together as a unit during assembly, which was optional, provided better resistance to buckling. The first modification to the RV-3 wing (CN-1) involved strengthening the rear spar attachment points and carry through and modifying the wing root rib. The second modification to the RV-3 wing (CN-2-I or CN-2-II) involved adding stiffening angles to the main spar. 

The RV-3 wing has a NACA 23012 airfoil. The original wing spar (referred to as Type I, circa 1973 to 1983) was mathematically stress analyzed to design and ultimate load limits of 6.0 and 9.0 Gs, respectively, at an aerobatic gross weight of 1,050 lbs (the nonaerobatic gross weight is 1,100 lbs). A test in 1982 verified that it met the 9 G ultimate load criteria. The spar consisted of .040-inch aluminum channel web with a buildup of seven 1/8-inch thick by 1-1/4 inch wide bars held together with 1/8-inch AN470 rivets to form the upper and lower caps. As an assembly option, an epoxy adhesive could be used to bond the seven aluminum bars together to form a single unit to facilitate drilling and riveting the unit to the spar web. (It was later discovered that the adhesive provided some interbar shear and column strength, but the bonding process can deteriorate, so it was not considered in the design as contributing to spar strength.)

On March 16, 1981, the FAA issued General Notice TWA 1/40 SVCB, which prohibited aerobatics in the RV-3. The action was permanent and could not be rescinded. Following this action, Vans issued Change Notice 1 (CN-1) to RV-3 owners and builders. Briefly, CN-1 modified the wing by reinforcing the rear spar attachment point and strengthening the wing root rib. FAA and Canadian Ministry of Transport reports on the RV-3 accidents suggested that these areas could have been the primary failure points. When CN-1 was drafted, it appeared that the only means of regaining aerobatic operating authorization would be for individual RV-3 owners to change the airplane's designation to RV-3A. Soon thereafter, the FAA issued another letter stating that RV-3 owners showing compliance with CN-1 could reapply for aerobatic operating limitations. Thus, the RV-3A designation was adopted by some builders but does not signify any definite main spar structural distinction.

In 1984, Vans redesigned the wing spar (referred to as Type II). It incorporated five 3/16-inch thick by 1 1/4-inch wide aluminum bars held together with 3/16-inch diameter AN470 rivets. Although the primary purpose was to simplify assembly and minimize the possibility of assembly errors, the calculated bending strength was slightly increased. Further, two additional ribs were added in the root rib area to increase torsional stiffness, and the rear spar attachment was strengthened.

Despite the changes, the suggested airspeed limitations remained relatively unchanged. Vne (never exceed speed) is 210 mph. Va (maneuvering speed) is 127 mph (down from 132 mph). Vs (stall speed, clean) is 54 mph. According to Vans, because of the high ratio between Vne and Vs, the RV-3 is more susceptible to pilot-induced overstress than most contemporary light airplanes.

In 1996, an RV-3 wing with a Type I spar was again static load tested. During the tests, the wing failed below the 9.0 G load level. A review of test data revealed that the 1982 test had been performed on a wing whose spar had been assembled with the optional epoxy bonding. The 1996 test had been performed on a wing whose spar had been assembled without the epoxy adhesive. Although the epoxy adhesive had not been calculated to add any spar bending strength, it appeared to have added compression buckling strength. As a result of further static load testing on both Type I and Type II wing spars, Vans issued Change Notice 2 (CN-2-I for Type I spars and CN-2-II for Type II spars), which recommended main spar modifications which it deemed necessary for aerobatic strength. CN-2 included a detailed history, explanation, and recommendations, and was sent to all known RV-3 and RV-3A owners and builders. Vans maintained that both CN-1 and CN-2 (I or II) were necessary to achieve the aerobatic strength of the wing. 

Cessna 402C, N499CA, accident occurred on June 15, 2026, at Provincetown Municipal Airport (PVC/KPVC), Provincetown, Massachusetts

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this writing will be corrected when the NTSB preliminary report is released.

https://registry.faa.gov/AircraftInquiry/Search/NNumberResult?nNumberTxt=N221BN

- History of Flight:
On June 15, 2026, at about 0811 local time, a Cessna 402C, N499CA, registered to Hyannis Air Service and doing business as Cape Air flight 2111, sustained substantial damage following a runway overrun at Provincetown Municipal Airport (PVC/KPVC), Provincetown, Massachusetts. The pilot and two passengers were not injured. The flight originated from Logan International Airport (BOS/KBOS), 
Boston, Massachusetts, at 0740, and was destined to KPVC.

The airplane departed the end of runway 7 during a landing attempt.

ADS-B data suggests the airplane crossed the runway threshold at 119 knots (groundspeed). The airport departed the end of the runway going about 28 knots before coming to rest.

Figure 1: ADS-B exchange data of approach

Figure 2: End of track

KPVC is an uncontrolled airport located 2 miles northwest of Provincetown, Massachusetts. The airport field elevation is 7.8 ft. The airport features a single runway 7/25 which is 3502 x 100 ft.

- Weather:

Weather conditions at 0756 included winds 190 at 8 knots, 5 miles visibility, haze, an overcast ceiling at 200 ft AGL, and an altimeter setting of 29.58 inches of mercury.

METAR KPVC 151156Z AUTO 19008KT 5SM HZ OVC002 20/ A2958 RMK AO2 SLP015 6//// 7//// T0200 10206 20194 55006 PNO $

METAR KPVC 151238Z AUTO 20010KT 10SM OVC004 21/ A2958 RMK AO2 CIG 001V007 PNO $

Monday, June 15, 2026

Loss of control in flight: Beechcraft V35 Bonanza, N47WT, fatal accident occurred on May 15, 2024, near Franklin, Tennessee


  • Location: Franklin, Tennessee
  • Accident Number: ERA24FA217
  • Date & Time: May 15, 2024, 12:02 Local
  • Registration: N47WT
  • Aircraft: Beech V35
  • Aircraft Damage: Destroyed
  • Defining Event: Loss of control in flight
  • Injuries: 3 Fatal
  • Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General aviation - Personal

https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/194264/pdf

https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=194264

On May 15, 2024, at 1202 central daylight time (CDT), a Beech V35-TC airplane, N47WT, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Franklin, Tennessee. The pilot and two passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight

The pilot and two passengers were about 380 nautical miles (nm) into a planned 550-nm, instrument flight rules (IFR) flight; the pilot was in communication with air traffic control. After flying at an altitude of about 7,000 ft mean sea level (msl) for a majority of the flight, the pilot requested to fly at 9,000 ft msl, as well as minor course deviations. The deviation requests were likely for weather avoidance although the pilot gave no explanation, and the controllers did not request the reason for the pilot’s requests.

The controller assigned a heading to the north, informing the pilot that the turn north would be temporary and to expect a turn back to the original course; the pilot acknowledged the clearance and turned north. Weather data indicated that, as the airplane was climbing through 9,400 ft msl, it likely encountered light to moderate rain showers and updrafts. 

The controller then cleared the pilot to resume his previously assigned route; however, the pilot continued on his northerly heading and remained at 9,500 ft msl. The controller made several requests to the pilot to descend as he remained above 9,000 ft msl. The airplane then turned to the northeast, flying further into a significant area of developing convective weather with rain showers and updrafts. After another request by the controller, the pilot responded, “Uh descending to nine thousand for four seven whiskey.” There were no further communications from the pilot.

A performance study based on ADS-B data indicated that, about 1 minute after the last transmission, while on a track of about 070° and at a groundspeed of 180 kts (calibrated airspeed 152 kts), the airplane entered a tightening right turn and began to descend. Initially, the descent rate did not exceed 3,000 ft per minute (fpm) but then rapidly increased to over 10,000 fpm while continuing in the right turn. Dispersal of the airplane wreckage was indicative of an inflight breakup. 

Examination of the airplane and engine revealed no evidence of a pre-accident anomaly that would have prevented normal operation. 

The area of moderate precipitation encountered by the flight was not displayed on the controller’s standard terminal automation replacement system (STARS) display. A postaccident review of the weather information available to the controller on the STARS display showed that the display was underreporting the weather intensity. Due to this underreporting, the weather intensity depiction on the controller’s display showed no available weather near the accident airplane at the time of the accident and limited the controller’s ability to accurately warn the pilot of hazardous weather along the route of flight. Further investigation indicated that the primary reason the storm was not displayed to the controller was that the developing storm was initially too small to survive the spatial smoothing processing of the facility’s radar system. 

Based on the airplane’s flight track data, it likely encountered strong updrafts while in growing areas of precipitation and instrument meteorological conditions, which ultimately resulted in the pilot’s spatial disorientation, loss of airplane control, and an in-flight breakup as aerodynamic forces on the airplane exceeded the structural integrity of the airframe. Contributing to the accident was the anomalous and intermittent display of weather intensity on the controller’s STARS display, which prevented his ability to accurately warn the pilot of hazardous weather. 

- Probable Cause: The pilot’s flight into convective weather, which resulted in a loss of control due to spatial disorientation and a subsequent inflight breakup of the airplane. Contributing to the accident was the lack of accurate weather intensity depiction on the controller’s display, which limited the controller’s ability to warn the pilot of hazardous weather along the route of flight.

Controlled flight into terr/obj (CFIT): Luscombe 8A Silvaire, N37081, fatal accident occurred on June 12, 2024, near South Lake Tahoe, California

  • Location: South Lake Tahoe, California 
  • Accident Number: WPR24FA195 
  • Date & Time: June 12, 2024, 15:25 Local 
  • Registration: N37081 
  • Aircraft: Luscombe 8A 
  • Aircraft Damage: Substantial 
  • Defining Event: Controlled flight into terr/obj (CFIT) 
  • Injuries: 2 Fatal 
  • Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General aviation - Unknown

https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/194461/pdf

https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=194461

On June 12, 2024, at 1525 Pacific daylight time, a Luscombe 8A airplane, N37081, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near South Lake Tahoe, California. The pilot and passenger were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.

The pilot and passenger were conducting a cross-country flight in the 65-horsepower, tailwheel equipped airplane to an airport located in mountainous terrain. In-flight photos taken by the passenger showed the airplane at low altitude over the mountains, heading toward higher terrain, about 1/2 mile from the accident site. Accident site signatures were consistent with a collision with trees and subsequent impact with terrain. Examination of the wreckage revealed no evidence of preaccident mechanical malfunctions or failures that would have precluded normal operation.

The calculated density altitude at the accident site was about 11,329 ft. Review of the Koch chart using the estimated conditions present at the accident site showed about an 80% decrease in the airplane’s published climb performance under these conditions, which would have resulted in a rate of climb of about 150 ft per minute. The circumstances of the accident are consistent with the pilot’s decision to conduct low-altitude flight into mountainous terrain under density altitude conditions that significantly degraded the airplane’s performance, which resulted in impact with trees and terrain.

- Probable Cause: The pilot’s decision to continue low-altitude flight toward rising mountainous terrain in high density altitude conditions, which resulted in collision with trees and terrain.