- Location: Pittsfield, IL
- Accident Number: CEN26FA049
- Date & Time: November 23, 2025, 21:37 Local
- Registration: N47700
- Aircraft: Piper PA-28R-201
- Injuries: 1 Fatal, 2 Serious
- Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General aviation - Personal
https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/202036/pdf
https://registry.faa.gov/AircraftInquiry/Search/NNumberResult?nNumberTxt=N47700
On November 23, 2025, about 2137 central standard time (all referenced times are CST), a Piper PA-28R-201 airplane, N47700, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Pittsfield, Illinois. The pilot was fatally injured, and the 2 passengers sustained serious injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.
According to ADS-B flight track data, the pilot flew 4 flights on the day of the accident. The first leg was a 57-minute flight from Valkaria Airport (X59), Valkaria, Florida, to Tampa Executive Airport (VDF) between 0709 and 0806. The second leg was a 53-minute flight from VDF to X59 between 0903 and 0956. The third leg was a 4.25-hour flight from X59 to Anniston Regional Airport (ANB), Anniston, Alabama, between 1035 and 1450. The accident occurred during the fourth leg on a flight from ANB to Pittsfield Penstone Municipal Airport (PPQ), Pittsfield, Illinois.
According to available flight plan and weather briefing data, at 1602, the pilot filed an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan from ANB to Quincy Regional Airport (UIN), Quincy, Illinois, with a planned alternate of Southeast Iowa Regional Airport (BRL), Burlington, Iowa, and received a Leidos Flight Service standard weather briefing.
According to fueling documentation, after landing at ANB the pilot initially requested that the airplane be fueled with 40 gallons of fuel (20 gallons per wing fuel tank) but he subsquently amended his fuel request to only 36 gallons (18 gallons per wing fuel tank). According to the employee who fueled the airplane, the fuel level in each wing tank was below the 25-gallon indicator tab after the requested 18 gallons were added to each wing fuel tank.
According to the airplane’s engine data monitor, recorded data began at 1632:20 and the pilot selected takeoff power about 1642:33. At 1646:50, ADS-B flight track data began tracking the airplane flying to the northwest and in a climb. The airplane continued to the northwest toward UIN and climbed to a cruise altitude of 8,000 ft mean sea level (msl).
According to recorded air traffic control (ATC) transmissions, at 2025:13, the pilot contacted the Kansas City Center controller and reported being at 8,000 ft msl. At 2027:18, the controller asked the pilot if he had the current weather and notices to airmen (NOTAMs) at UIN, and which instrument approach the pilot intended to fly. At 2027:26, the pilot replied, “I’ve been looking at the weather at Quincy, it sounds like it’s, ah, fog, I am thinking about diverting to, ah, Pittsfield.” The controller then told the pilot that the current weather at UIN was 1.5 miles visibility with mist. At 2027:54, the pilot replied, “Okay, um, with one and a half miles visibility, yah, we can go into Quincy then.”
At 2028:02, the controller again asked the pilot which instrument approach at UIN he intended to fly. The pilot replied that he wanted to fly the RNAV Runway 22 instrument approach at UIN. At 2028:23, the controller cleared the flight direct to ALUGE which was the initial approach fix (IAF) for the RNAV Runway 22 instrument approach at UIN. At 2033:25, the controller cleared the pilot to descend at his discretion to maintain 4,000 ft msl.
At 2040:57, the controller told the pilot to cross ALUGE at or above 3,000 ft msl and cleared the flight for the RNAV Runway 22 instrument approach at UIN. At 2041:12, the controller asked the pilot to monitor the weather conditions during the descent and relay them to the controller.
At 2049:39, as the flight approached ALUGE, the controller told the pilot to change to advisory frequency and report when canceling IFR in the air or on the ground.
At 2101:59, the pilot told the controller that he was on the missed approach for the RNAV Runway 22 instrument approach at UIN. At 2102:40, the controller provided the local altimeter setting and asked the pilot to state his intentions. At 2102:56, the pilot told the controller that he wanted to divert to PPQ. At 2103:11, the controller cleared the flight direct to PPQ and to climb and maintain 3,000 ft msl. At 2104:40, the controller asked the pilot if he had an instrument approach request for PPQ. The pilot replied, “Ah, not yet.”
At 2107:25, the pilot transmitted over another pilot’s transmission but could be heard saying “we’re having engine troubles.” At 2107:35, the controller asked the pilot “what can I do for you?” The pilot did not respond. At 2107:46, the controller asked the pilot “how do you hear?” At 2107:50, the pilot replied to the controller “I hear you, but I don’t know where to head.” At 2107:53, the controller asked the pilot if he was having engine issues or if it was the weather conditions. The pilot did not reply. At 2109:07, the controller asked the pilot again if there was anything she could do to help. At 2109:12, the pilot replied, “it was a fuel issue, we are over onto the other tank, ah, we are heading back to, ah, Pittsfield, we would like, ah, RNAV 13, I believe it is.”
At 2110:48, the controller conveyed the 2055 weather report for PPQ, which was the current weather report provided to the ATC facility. The PPQ weather report was about 16 minutes old when the controller provided it to the pilot. At 2055, the PPQ weather consisted of wind 190° at 3 knots, 5 miles surface visibility, sky clear, temperature 5°, dew point 5°, and an altimeter setting of 30.16 inHg.
At 2111:10, the pilot replied, “if it’s clear I’ll just take 13 visual.” The controller told the pilot to report when he had PPQ in sight. The controller also relayed the current NOTAMS for PPQ, which consisted of an inoperative precision approach path indicator (PAPI) for runway 13 and two unlit towers north-northwest of PPQ.
At 2112:53, the controller cleared the flight to descend at pilot’s discretion to maintain 2,500 ft msl and she could not descend the airplane below 2,500 ft msl. At 2113:00, the pilot replied, “okay, [unintelligible] won’t go below two thousand five hundred, thank you.”
Postaccident review of available weather data established that the next PPQ weather report was issued at 2115 and, at that time, the general weather conditions at PPQ consisted of a clear sky and a 3-mile surface visibility.
At 2118:54, the controller asked the pilot if he had PPQ in sight. The pilot did not immediately reply. At 2119:16, the controller again queried the pilot. At 2119:21, the pilot replied, “we are still looking for Pittsfield, I think there’s fog in the area is what the issue is.” According to ADS-B flight track data, at that time, the airplane was descending through 2,100 ft msl and was about 1.8 nm north-northwest of the runway 13 threshold.
At 2119:28, the controller told the pilot he had to climb back to 2,500 ft msl or she could not provide radar vectors for an instrument approach. At 2119:39, the pilot replied that he was climbing back to 2,500 ft msl.
At 2120:50, the pilot reported being at 2,500 ft msl and asked for radar vectors for the RNAV 13 instrument approach at PPQ. The controller told the pilot to turn left to 360°. At 2122:26, the controller cleared the flight direct to OMURE which was the IAF for the RNAV Runway 13 instrument approach at PPQ. At 2122:33, the pilot replied, “cleared direct to OMURE”.
At 2124:00, the controller told the pilot to cross OMURE at or above 2,700 ft msl and cleared the flight for the RNAV Runway 13 instrument approach at PPQ. At 2124:09, the pilot readback the crossing altitude and the instrument approach clearance.
At 2126:48, the pilot asked the controller if it would be possible to get radar vectors to GABDY which was the final approach fix (FAF) for the RNAV Runway 13 instrument approach at PPQ. At 2127:05, the controller told the pilot that the FAF was not depicted on her screen and that is why the flight was cleared to OMURE.
At 2127:24, the pilot told the controller, “I am little concerned on fuel, so, if you don’t mind if I cut the corner?” At 2127:29, the controller told the pilot, “You do whatever you think you need to do.” At 2127:33, the pilot replied, “Thank you.”
At 2128:32, the controller asked the pilot if he would like to change over to the PPQ advisory frequency or remain on the Kansas City Center frequency. At 2128:41, the pilot replied, “I would like to stay with you.”
At 2131:31, the controller told the pilot that he would have to cancel the IFR flight plan with Flight Service after he landed at PPQ. At 2131:39, the pilot replied, “Okay, we’ll do that.”
At 2134:43, the controller asked the pilot, “Is there anything that I can do to help?” At 2134:49, the pilot replied, “No, we’re, ah, lining up on final for a landing at, um, Pittsfield.” According to ADS-B flight track data, at that time, the airplane was descending through 2,975 ft msl and was about 0.9 nm northwest of the runway 13 threshold.
At 2134:56, the controller told the pilot that she still saw the flight at 3,000 ft msl over PPQ. At 2135:01, the pilot replied, “[unintelligible] losing altitude, I am at, ah, twenty six hundred.”
At 2135:15, the controller asked the pilot if he had the airport in sight. At 2135:21, the pilot replied, “Yes, we have the airport in sight.” At 2135:23, the controller approved the pilot to change to the PPQ advisory frequency and told him to cancel his IFR flight plan with Flight Service after landing. The pilot did not reply and there was no additional communication between the controller and the pilot for the remainder of the flight.
Postaccident review of available weather data revealed that the PPQ weather report issued at 2135 included a 300 ft above ground level (agl) overcast ceiling and a 0.75-mile surface visibility.
According to ADS-B flight track data, at 2135:28, the airplane crossed over PPQ midfield at about 1,935 ft msl, or about 1,234 ft agl, while it flew to the east-southeast. At that time, the airplane’s ground track was not aligned with runway 13. The airplane then turned north and flew away from PPQ.
According to engine monitor data, beginning at 2136:29, the engine power increased and remained above 95% until the end of the recorded data. At 2137:23, the last engine data was recorded with the engine running at 98% power, 2,680 rpm, 28.1 inHg manifold pressure, and 11.4 gph fuel flow. According to ADS-B flight track data, the airplane impacted an open cow pasture while in a left descending turn about 2 nm north of the runway 13 threshold at PPQ.
An onsite wreckage examination did not reveal evidence of a preimpact mechanical malfunction or failure that would have precluded normal operation of the airplane or its engine. Flight control cable continuity was confirmed from the cockpit to the respective flight control surfaces. The landing gear selector was found in the gear down position, and the flap selector handle was in the second flap detent position which corresponded to a 25° of wing flap extension.
The fuel selector was found in the right tank position. A functional check of the fuel selector valve confirmed its proper operation. The electric fuel pump switch was found in the ON position. The fuel lines were severed near each wing root during impact. About 0.5 gallon of uncontaminated 100 low lead aviation fuel was drained from the right wing fuel tank. About 1.3 pints of uncontaminated 100 low lead aviation fuel was drained from the left wing fuel tank.
The engine remained partially attached to the engine mount. Internal engine continuity and valve train continuity were confirmed while the crankshaft was rotated through the vacuum pump drive gear. Cylinder compression was confirmed by placing a finger over the open spark plug holes and feeling suction and expelled air from each cylinder while the crankshaft was rotated.
Both magnetos remained attached to the accessory housing. The magnetos drives were rotated by hand and spark was observed from all posts except one which exhibited impact-related damage to the harness wire. The sparkplugs exhibited normal wear signatures.
The fuel injection servo remained attached to the induction plenum. The throttle cable remained attached to the throttle lever, the throttle lever remained secure to the throttle arm with the serrated interface securely mated. The throttle arm was at the full throttle position. The mixture cable remained attached to the mixture lever, the mixture lever remained secure to the mixture arm with the serrated interface securely mated. The mixture arm was halfway between full rich and idle cutoff. The fuel line from the servo to the mechanical fuel flow gage was removed, and about 0.5 ounce of fuel was captured from the fuel line.
The engine driven fuel pump remained attached to the accessory housing and was safety-wired. About 0.75 ounce of fuel was present in the engine driven fuel pump. Fuel was present in the inlet to fuel pump line, but no fuel was present in the outlet to fuel injection servo line.
The flow divider remained attached to the crankcase spine with the individual fuel injection lines attached to the flow divider. Each fuel injection line remained secured to each fuel injection nozzle. The flow divider was removed from the engine, and fuel was present in the flow divider, there were no blockages observed, and the diaphragm was in a serviceable condition.
The vacuum pump remained attached to the accessory housing. Suction was observed while the vacuum pump drive was rotated by hand. The vacuum pump was disassembled, and no anomalies were observed to the internal vanes and core.
The propeller exhibited blade and hub damage that was consistent with rotation while under engine power. One propeller blade separated from the hub and exhibited a S-shaped spanwise bend, blade twisting toward low pitch, chordwise scoring of the blade face, and a fractured blade tip corner. The other propeller blade remained attached to the hub and exhibited a minor blade twist and leading-edge abrasions.
Review of the engine monitor data revealed that the airplane crashed about 4 hours and 55 minutes after it departed on the cross-country flight, the engine used about 46 gallons during the flight, and the average fuel consumption rate was about 9.3 gph. Additionally, the review of the engine monitor data did not reveal any evidence of a loss of engine power at the end of the flight.
A review of weather reports for nearby airports revealed visual meteorological conditions (VMC) existed to the east and north of PPQ at the time of the accident. Specifically, Mount Sterling Municipal Airport (I63), Mount Sterling, Illinois, located about 20 nm north of PPQ, and Jacksonville Municipal Airport (IJX), Jacksonville, Illinois, 26 nm east of PPQ, were both reporting a clear sky and 10-mile surface visibility at the time of the accident. Additionally, the airport listed as the planned alternate on the pilot’s IFR flight plan, Southeast Iowa Regional Airport (BRL), Burlington, Iowa, was also reporting a clear sky and 10-mile surface visibility at the time of the accident.
