Wednesday, April 01, 2026

Robinson R44 Raven I, N478AT, fatal accident occurred on March 23, 2026, in Boynton Beach, Florida

  • Location: Boynton Beach, FL 
  • Accident Number: ANC26FA021 
  • Date & Time: March 23, 2026, 12:21 Local 
  • Registration: N478AT 
  • Aircraft: ROBINSON HELICOPTER R44 
  • Injuries: 2 Fatal 
  • Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General aviation - Instructional 

https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/202678/pdf

https://registry.faa.gov/AircraftInquiry/Search/NNumberResult?nNumberTxt=478AT

On March 23, 2026, about 1221 eastern daylight time, a Robinson R44 Raven I helicopter, N478AT, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Boynton Beach, Florida. The flight instructor and the pilot receiving instruction were fatally injured. The helicopter was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 instructional flight.

According to the flight school, Palm Beach Helicopters, the flight instructor, who was seated in the left seat, and the pilot receiving instruction, who was seated in the right seat, departed the Palm Beach County Park Airport (LNA), Latana, Florida, at 1124. The purpose of the flight was to provide the pilot receiving instruction with a basic visual flight rules (VFR) orientation flight, which was to include going to the Downtown Fort Lauderdale Heliport (DT1) in Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and then returning to LNA. Records indicated that 23 gallons of fuel was added to the helicopter just before departure and that the total amount of fuel onboard was 46.5 gallons.

The helicopter was equipped with ADS-B, which provided helicopter position information, as well as SPOT Trace, which enabled both flight tracking and two-way text communication. According to the ADS-B data, the helicopter departed LNA and flew south along the coastline and conducted a landing at DT1.

After departing DT1, the helicopter flew northwest, then made a turn back to the east. A review of archived voice communication information from the LNA common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF) revealed that the flight instructor first reported their position to be “7 [miles] to the south, straight in for [runway] 34.” About 27 seconds later, the flight instructor made another radio call and reported to a company helicopter that “we’re going to be landing out here in one of these fields, we’ve got something going on with the helicopter.” About 12 seconds later, the company helicopter attempted to contact N478AT, but they did not respond.

Witnesses reported seeing the helicopter flying low before it suddenly entered a steep right turn with a nose-low attitude. Subsequently, the helicopter impacted the roof of a vacant warehouse about 6 miles south of LNA and came to rest inverted inside the building. During the impact sequence, the helicopter severed a water line for the building’s sprinkler system, dispersing a large amount of water on the wreckage. There was no postaccident fire.

The main rotor and main rotor gear box were found suspended within the warehouse roof structure, and the main wreckage came to rest inverted below it. The engine core was found in the main wreckage behind the cockpit with the forward engine mounts separated and the aft mount still secured to the airframe. The tailboom was found secured to the airframe, and the tailrotor and empennage were found impact separated and within the main wreckage (see figure 1). 

During the NTSB’s on-site examination of the main rotor flight controls, the upper right pushpull tube was found separated from the lower rod end (part number D173-2), which remained attached to the upper hydraulic servo piston shaft at the clevis (part number D200-1). The palnut and jam nut that secure the upper right push-pull tube to the rod end could not be rotated by hand on the rod end threads. The upper right push-pull tube was observed to be elongated at the threaded end (see figure 2). Remnants of torque stripe paint was present on the push-pull tube, palnut, and jam nut.


The palnuts and jam nuts on the left and aft lower rod ends (part number D173-2) and below the hydraulic servo clevis were found to be finger tight. Varying degrees of corrosion was observed on the palnuts and jam nuts.

Examination of the engine did not reveal any mechanical anomaly or malfunction that would have precluded normal operation.

A review of the airframe maintenance records showed that the most recent maintenance was a 100-hour inspection, which was completed on March 23, 2026, at an airframe total time of 7,486.6 hours and a tach time of 3,091.1 hours. The most recent annual inspection was completed on June 18, 2025, at an airframe total time of 7,090 hours and a tach time of 2,694.7 hours. At the time of the accident, the tach time was 3,092.08 hours, and the engine total time since overhaul was 894 hours.

The flight instructor held flight instructor and commercial pilot certificates with a rating for rotorcraft helicopters, a ground instructor certificate, and a remote pilot certificate. He held a first-class medical certificate issued April 2, 2025, without limitations. According to pilot records obtained from the flight school, the flight instructor had about 822 total hours of civilian flight experience and about 140 hours in the accident helicopter make and model.

The pilot receiving instruction held an airline transport pilot certificate with a rating for airplane single-engine land and a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land, rotorcraft helicopter, and instrument helicopter. He held a first-class medical certificate issued February 28, 2026, with the limitation, “Not valid for any class after [February 28, 2027]. Must use corrective lens(es) to meet vision standards at all required distances.” On his application for the medical certificate, the pilot reported 5,725 total hours of civilian flight experience and 225 hours in the preceding 6 months.

The three hydraulic servos, push-pull tubes, and rod ends were transported to the NTSB Materials Laboratory, Washington, D.C., for additional examination. 

Loss of control in flight: Airmax SeaMax M-22, N154RL, accident occurred on May 17, 2025, near Dahlgren Center, Virginia

  • Location: Dahlgren Center, Virginia 
  • Accident Number: ERA25LA203 
  • Date & Time: May 17, 2025, 16:00 Local 
  • Registration: N154RL 
  • Aircraft: SEAMAX AIRCRAFT LTDA SEAMAX M-22 
  • Aircraft Damage: Substantial 
  • Defining Event: Loss of control in flight 
  • Injuries: 1 Serious 
  • Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General aviation - Personal

https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/200177/pdf

https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=200177

On May 17, 2025, about 1600 eastern daylight time, a special light sport amphibious Seamax M-22 airplane, N154RL, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Dahlgren, Virginia. The pilot sustained serious injuries. The airplane was being operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.

After three aborted upwind water takeoff attempts due to water washing over the cockpit area and obstructing the view, the pilot attempted a downwind takeoff that prevented the water from cresting over the cockpit. Video footage showed that, after what appeared to be a normal takeoff run, the airplane rotated and lifted off; however, during the initial climb the airplane appeared to struggle to ascend. The wings rocked back and forth as the airplane climbed to about 200 ft above the water surface. The pilot then made a left turn; shortly after, the left wing dropped, and the airplane abruptly descended in a left spiral until it impacted the water.

On-board engine parameter data showed normal engine operation until the moment of impact. Postaccident airframe and engine examination did not reveal any preimpact malfunction or anomaly that would preclude normal operation or performance. While taking off with a tailwind and during the subsequent climb, the pilot likely failed to maintain adequate airspeed during the turn, which resulted in the exceedance of the airplane’s critical angle of attack and an aerodynamic stall. The airplane’s low altitude prevented recovery.

- Probable Cause: The pilot’s failure to maintain adequate airspeed and his exceedance of the airplane’s critical angle of attack during the initial climb, which resulted in an aerodynamic stall. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s decision to take off with a known tailwind.

Fire/smoke (non-impact): Beechcraft V35B Bonanza, N6659L, fatal accident occurred on February 1, 2024, in Clearwater, Florida

  • Location: Clearwater, Florida 
  • Accident Number: ERA24FA104 
  • Date & Time: February 1, 2024, 19:07 Local 
  • Registration: N6659L Aircraft: Beech V35 
  • Aircraft Damage: Destroyed 
  • Defining Event: Fire/smoke (non-impact) 
  • Injuries: 3 Fatal, 1 Minor 
  • Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General aviation - Personal

https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/193737/pdf

https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=193737

On February 1, 2024, about 1907 eastern standard time, a Beech V35B airplane, N6659L, was destroyed when it impacted two residences and the ground near Clearwater, Florida. The commercial pilot and two occupants of one residence were fatally injured, and one occupant of the other residence sustained minor injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.

The pilot proceeded toward the destination airport, cancelled his instrument flight rules (IFR) clearance when about 5 nautical miles (nm) from the airport, then proceeded under visual flight rules (VFR) in night visual weather conditions. The airport, with which the pilot was unfamiliar, was non-towered, located in a densely populated area, and not equipped with a rotating beacon. After establishing contact on the airport’s common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF), the pilot announced that he was unable to locate the airport and asked repeatedly for the pilot-controlled runway lights to be turned on.

According to witnesses who were in the airport’s fixed based operator (FBO) facility and heard the CTAF communications, at the time of the pilot’s first request, the runway lights were already on medium intensity from an airplane that had just landed. One of the witnesses responded to the pilot’s request by keying the radio microphone seven times to turn the lights up to high intensity. The witnesses and pilots in a nearby airplane reported that they subsequently heard the pilot announce that he had a fire. One witness at the FBO asked the pilot to repeat what he said, but the pilot did not.

ADS-B data showed that the flight had approached the airport from the southeast headed northwest. Once it reached the airport, it proceeded northwest, parallel to and about 0.5 nm west of the runway, before continuing northwest and past the airport. It subsequently turned left (to the west, away from the airport), completed a 180° turn, then again passed the airport before continuing south.

About 2 minutes before the accident, the flight was flying about 900 ft pressure altitude, and the pilot set the transponder to emergency code 7700. The flight proceeded briefly east, then southeast. About 1 minute before the accident, the pilot reestablished contact with the air traffic controller at the facility with which he had previously canceled his IFR clearance. The pilot told the controller that he was proceeding to a different airport because he was unable to visually identify his original destination airport.

The controller advised the pilot that the flight was 1 mile south of his original destination airport then asked the pilot if he could turn to a heading 180° and maintain the present altitude. The pilot advised the controller, “I’m losing engine.” According to a sound spectrum study, at the time of this communication, the airplane’s engine was operating at 2,500 rpm. The controller asked the pilot if he could see another airport that was 3 miles ahead of his position (and closer than the alternative airport that the pilot mentioned), but the pilot did not respond. The flight continued southeast, then turned left and descended steeply until impact.

According to a review of the available data, during the airplane’s final 20-second descent, it attained a maximum descent rate of 5,836 ft per minute (fpm) and the groundspeed increased. Per the sound spectrum study, the engine rpm decreased to about 2,053 then was estimated to about 1,907 immediately before impact. Witnesses on the ground who saw the airplane’s descent reported seeing fire on the forward portion of the airplane. Although the engine rpm decreased immediately before impact, it could not be determined what the pilot meant when he advised the controller that he was losing the engine because, at that time, it was operating at 2,500 rpm, which was slightly below the maximum continuous takeoff propeller rpm.

Postaccident examination of the flight controls and engine drivetrain, ignition, air induction, exhaust, and lubrication systems revealed no evidence of preimpact failure or malfunction. The outlet fitting of the metering valve was impact-fractured, and the b-nut of the flexible fuel hose attached to this outlet fitting was not fully tight. The throttle body and metering valve and corresponding area of the engine oil sump exhibited clean burn areas without soot deposits, though after coming to rest those areas were shielded by dirt and the upwardly crushed engine cowlings.

No discrepancy with the threads of the flexible fuel hose or of the fractured outlet fitting at the metering valve was identified, and it was possible to successfully torque the b-nut to about the minimum specified value. Further, several other fuel fittings in the engine compartment were also impact-fractured (similar to the fractured outlet fitting), but their respective hoses’ b-nuts remained tightly secured.

The engine was installed about 7.5 years before the accident, and there was no record of any maintenance done to the area of the loose b-nut since. The engine had accumulated 583 operating hours since installation, so it is unlikely that the hose was not tightly secured at that time. It is also unlikely that it was loosened by impact or the effects of the postcrash fire. It is more likely that, at some point after engine installation, undocumented maintenance occurred to the fuel hose from the metering valve to the manifold valve, and unknown maintenance personnel failed to adequately torque the fuel hose b-nut at the metering valve outlet fitting.

Based on the severity of the observed thermal damage in the area of the throttle body and metering valve, the most likely fire scenario for the accident airplane was an in-flight fire occurring due to ignition of fuel leaking from the slightly loose fuel hose at the outlet of the fuel metering valve.

The steep descent immediately before impact was the pilot’s likely response to the in-flight engine compartment fire and his initiation of an emergency descent. Though the position of the fuel selector valve was found between the left and right tank positions, and the position at impact could not be determined from the available evidence, the engine rpm about 43 seconds before impact was 2,500. Although the engine rpm had decreased immediately before impact, it is likely that the pilot did not promptly turn off the fuel selector in accordance with the “Engine Fire in Flight” checklist after recognizing and reporting a fire on the destination airport’s CTAF. Thus, had the pilot promptly secured the fuel selector valve and in conjunction with the steep descent, it is possible that the extent of the in-flight fire could have been mitigated. Further, had the pilot been able to visually locate the destination airport, it is likely that the he could have landed the airplane earlier in the accident sequence.

The pilot had negative results for carboxyhemoglobin, and no pre-existing issue was found at autopsy. Thus, it is unlikely that any medical issue resulted in the pilot’s failure to arrest the airplane’s steep rate of descent before impact with the residences.

- Probable Cause: An in-flight engine compartment fire due to a partially loose flexible fuel hose b-nut at the fuel metering unit. Contributing to the severity of the accident was the pilot’s inability to visually identify the destination airport at night, which prolonged the in-flight emergency.

Cirrus SR22T GTS G6 Arrivée, N778WT, accident occurred on March 31, 2026, at Raven's Run Airport (SC65), Mount Pleasant, South Carolina

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

https://registry.faa.gov/AircraftInquiry/Search/NNumberResult?nNumberTxt=N778WT

- History of Flight:
On March 31, 2026, at about 1946 local time, a Cirrus SR22T GTS G6 Arrivée, N778WT, registered to Sky Ventures LLC, sustained substantial damage when it was involved in an accident at Raven's Run Airport (SC65), Mount Pleasant, South Carolina. The pilot and passenger were not injured. The personal flight originated from Mount Pleasant Regional-Faison field (KLRO), 
Mount Pleasant, South Carolina, at 1833 LT.

The FAA reported: "Aircraft crashed after takeoff into a waterway for unknown reasons." According to ADS-B data, the airplane arrived at the airport at 1851 LT. The accident occurred during takeoff about 40 minutes later. 

The private airport is located in a gated community and sits at an elevation of 8 ft. It features a single turf runway 15/33 which is 2400 x 100 ft.

Figure 1: SC65 from Google Earth Pro

Weather conditions at the time included: Winds 150° at 7 knots, 8 miles visibility, no clouds under 12,000 ft (CLR), temperature 20 °C, dewpoint 18 °C, and an altimeter setting of  30.24 inches of mercury.

- Weather:

METAR KLRO 312255Z AUTO 17008KT 8SM CLR 21/18 A3024 RMK AO2

METAR KLRO 312315Z AUTO VRB05KT 8SM CLR 21/18 A3024 RMK AO2

METAR KLRO 312335Z AUTO 15007KT 8SM CLR 20/18 A3024 RMK AO2

METAR KLRO 312355Z AUTO 15007KT 9SM CLR 20/18 A3024 RMK AO2

METAR KLRO 010015Z AUTO 15003KT 9SM CLR 20/18 A3025 RMK AO2