Medical event: Beechcraft C90A King Air, N6077X, fatal *accident* occurred on October 4, 2024, near Bakersfield, California

• Location: Bakersfield, California 
• Accident Number: WPR25LA003 
• Date & Time: October 4, 2024, 13:40 Local 
• Registration: N6077X 
• Aircraft: RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT COMPANY C90A 
• Aircraft Damage: None 
• Defining Event: Medical event 
• Injuries: 1 Fatal, 1 None 
• Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General aviation - Personal

https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/195260/pdf

https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=195260

On October 4, 2024, about 1340 Pacific daylight time, a Raytheon Aircraft Company C90A airplane, N6077X, was not damaged when it was involved in an accident near Bakersfield, California. The pilot was fatally injured, and the passenger was not injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.

While enroute at cruise altitude during a personal cross-country flight, the pilot lost consciousness. The passenger contacted air traffic control, who provided assistance with navigation and airplane operation, and successfully landed the airplane at a nearby airport.

According to the pilot’s autopsy report, his cause of death was hypertensive and atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease, and his manner of death was natural. The autopsy identified an enlarged heart. All four chambers of the heart were described as severely dilated. Moderate coronary artery disease was present. There was old scar tissue of the left cardiac ventricle, consistent with a past heart attack. The only identified traumatic injuries were sternum and rib fractures following emergency life-saving cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) efforts. Based upon circumstances of the event and the pilot’s significant heart disease identified during the autopsy, it is likely that the pilot suffered an in-flight cardiac event, which resulted in his incapacitation and subsequent cardiac arrest. 

- Probable Cause: The pilot’s incapacitation by an in-flight cardiac event that led to cardiac arrest.

Loss of control in flight: Fantasy Air Allegro, N969RC, fatal accident occurred on July 7, 2024, near Eureka, Utah

• Location: Eureka, Utah 
• Accident Number: WPR24FA227 
• Date & Time: July 7, 2024, 05:44 Local 
• Registration: N969RC 
• Aircraft: FANTASY AIR SRO ALLEGRO 2007 
• Aircraft Damage: Substantial 
• Defining Event: Loss of control in flight 
• Injuries: 1 Fatal 
• Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General aviation - Personal

https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/194620/pdf

https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=194620

On July 7, 2024, at approximately 0544 mountain daylight time, a Fantasy Air SRO Allegro 2007 airplane, N969RC, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Eureka, Utah. The pilot sustained fatal injuries. The airplane was being operated under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 as a personal flight.

The pilot departed from a local airport and proceeded to land on a road where, according to acquaintances, the pilot frequently landed to hike in the surrounding area. Flight track data show that the airplane departed from the road a little over an hour after landing and subsequently impacted terrain about a minute later. The wreckage was later located in a field adjacent to the road.

A nearby landowner stated that airplanes occasionally land on the road, though he did not observe the airplane on the day of the accident, and noted that dust devils were a common occurrence in the area. The investigation could not determine whether the pilot obtained a weather briefing before the flight.

Postaccident examination of the airframe and engine revealed no evidence of a preexisting mechanical malfunction or failure that would have precluded normal operation. However, a flight control locking device was found about 22 ft from the airplane's right wing, raising the possibility that the airplane departed with the control lock installed. The airplane’s co-owner reported that the accident pilot had a history of sometimes omitting the preflight inspection. It is possible that the pilot omitted a departure preflight inspection and left the flight control locking device in place. 

The pilot had severe cardiovascular disease that placed him at increased risk for an impairing or incapacitating cardiac event, including chest pain, arrhythmia, or myocardial infarction. Although the autopsy found no evidence of such an event, cardiac arrhythmias and other acute cardiac conditions may not leave definitive postmortem findings when they occur immediately before death. While a pacemaker may record arrhythmias, the autopsy report did not indicate that the pilot's pacemaker was interrogated to evaluate device function or detect arrhythmias. 

The autopsy and toxicology findings also suggested a likely history of heart failure, a condition commonly associated with fatigue; however, heart failure was not specifically documented in the available medical records. 

Toxicology testing detected citalopram, an antidepressant medication, in the pilot's system. Based on the available evidence, it could not be determined whether the pilot was experiencing impairment from an underlying condition, such as depression, or adverse effects associated with his unreported citalopram use. 

The presence of frequent localized wind events, commonly referred to as dust devils, may have influenced the pilot to expedite his departure during a perceived lull between wind events. In doing so, the pilot likely inadvertently omitted the removal of the airplane's flight control locking device. During the departure, any wind-induced displacement of the wing from a level attitude would have left the pilot with limited ability to correct roll deviations as the aircraft ascended. Compounding the situation was the pilot's underlying medical condition and associated propensity for a cardiac event, which may have further degraded his ability to respond effectively to the developing emergency.

- Probable Cause: The pilot’s failure to maintain airplane control during initial climb, which resulted in an in-flight upset and impact with terrain.

Controlled flight into terr/obj (CFIT): Cessna 150F, N8110S, fatal accident occurred on October 31, 2024, near Wilder, Tennessee

• Location: Wilder, Tennessee 
• Accident Number: ERA25FA037 
• Date & Time: October 31, 2024, 18:37 Local 
• Registration: N8110S 
• Aircraft: Cessna 150F 
• Aircraft Damage: Destroyed 
• Defining Event: Controlled flight into terr/obj (CFIT) 
• Injuries: 1 Fatal 
• Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General aviation - Personal 

https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/195426/pdf

https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=195426

On October 31, 2024, at about 1837 central daylight time, a Cessna 150F airplane, N8110S, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Wilder, Tennessee. The student pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.

 The student pilot was on the second leg of a long visual flight rules cross-country flight. The pilot departed shortly after the end of civil twilight and on a night where no lunar illumination was present. The pilot had not filed a flight plan and there was no evidence that he had obtained an official weather briefing from a source that would have logged that contact. After departure, the pilot flew over a town that contained significant cultural lighting and highway, flying parallel to a road for about 1 mile. He then turned away from the town and roughly toward the destination airport, over a sparsely populated area covered with dense forest and rising terrain.

The dark night, in addition to the generally cloudy conditions and limited ground lighting along the flight path, would have made it difficult for the pilot to visually recognize the rising terrain. As the pilot continued toward this area of diminished visual reference, he encountered a band of light rain showers, which in addition to further restricting visibility, had the potential for updrafts and associated turbulence. Given these conditions, it is likely that the pilot was flying in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) for the last 4 minutes of the flight. Postaccident examination of the wreckage at the accident site revealed no evidence of any preimpact mechanical malfunctions or failures of the airframe or engine. The relatively straight flight path for the final portion of the flight that was observed via ADS-B, the length of the wreckage path at the accident site, and the damage observed to trees along that wreckage path, were all consistent with controlled flight into terrain.

The results of postaccident toxicological testing indicated that the pilot had used the prescription medication lamotrigine. While it is possible that his cognitive and psychomotor performance might have been impaired by the effects of the medication, no more-specific conclusion about pilot impairment can be drawn from the reviewed medical evidence alone. Based on the available information, the student pilot’s decision to continue the long crosscountry flight at night, without obtaining a preflight weather briefing or having an apparent awareness of approaching precipitation, and without filing a flight plan, was indicative of poor judgement. 

- Probable Cause: The student pilot’s decision to continue the visual flight rules flight into instrument meteorological conditions at night, which resulted in controlled flight into terrain.

Politechnika Warszawska PW-5 Smyk, N105WS, fatal accident occurred on August 6, 2026, near Briggs, Texas

• Location: Briggs, TX
• Accident Number: CEN26LA282
• Date & Time: August 6, 2026, 15:38 Local
• Registration: N105WS
• Aircraft: PZL-BIELSKO B1-PW-5
• Injuries: 1 Fatal
• Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General aviation - Personal

https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/203557/pdf

https://registry.faa.gov/AircraftInquiry/Search/NNumberResult?nNumberTxt=N105WS 

On August 6, 2026, about 1538 central daylight time, a PZL-Bielsko B1-PW-5 glider, N105WS, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Briggs, Texas. The pilot was fatally injured. The glider was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight. 

The glider was departing on an auto-tow launch at the time of the accident. According to witness statements, the glider achieved level flight at about 1,000 ft before release from the towline. Following the release, the glider yawed to the right and entered a descending spiral, completing about 7 to 8 rotations before impacting terrain west of the glider port. Witnesses reported that the glider impacted the ground in a near-vertical attitude. 

The cockpit and forward fuselage were crushed aft during the impact. Both wings remained attached to the fuselage. The tail section and vertical stabilizer were partially separated, with the aft 4 ft of the tail boom folded over the aft fuselage. 

The glider was retained for further examination.

Aviat A-1B Husky, N299CA, accident occurred on August 17, 2026, near Pilot Grove, Minnesota

• Location: Pilot Grove, MN 
• Accident Number: CEN26LA295 
• Date & Time: August 17, 2026, 14:46 Local 
• Registration: N299CA 
• Aircraft: AVIAT AIRCRAFT INC A-1B 
• Injuries: 2 Minor 
• Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General aviation - Other work use 

https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/203613/pdf

https://registry.faa.gov/AircraftInquiry/Search/NNumberResult?nNumberTxt=N299CA

On August 17, 2026, about 1446 central daylight time, an Aviat Aircraft Inc A-1B airplane, N299CA, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Pilot Grove, Minnesota. The two pilots received minor injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 aerial photography flight. 

The pilot in the rear seat stated they were conducting an aerial photography flight and had flown for about 5 ½ hours that day. During the flight, the front seat pilot was manipulating the flight controls and noted that the airplane was not responding normally. They observed that the left aileron had partially detached from the wing and the outboard end was hanging down. The front seat pilot executed an emergency landing to a field. During the landing, the airplane nosed over and sustained substantial damage to both wings and the empennage. 

Postaccident examination of the airplane revealed that the left outboard aileron hinge bracket was fractured. The airplane was retained for further examination. 

A review of NTSB records revealed that the airplane was involved in a similar accident in 2017 involving an inflight failure of the left outboard aileron hinge bracket assembly. 

Robinson R44 Raven II, N26KL, accident occurred on August 2, 2026, near Bennett, Iowa

• Location: Bennett, IA 
• Accident Number: CEN26LA276 
• Date & Time: August 2, 2026, 13:18 Local 
• Registration: N26KL 
• Aircraft: Robinson Helicopter Company R44 II 
• Injuries: 1 None 
• Flight Conducted Under: Part 137: Agricultural

https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/203517/pdf

https://registry.faa.gov/AircraftInquiry/Search/NNumberResult?nNumberTxt=N26KL

On August 2, 2026, about 1318 central daylight time, a Robinson Helicopter Company R44 II helicopter, N26KL, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Bennett, Iowa. The pilot was not injured. The helicopter was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 137 agricultural flight.

The pilot reported that as the helicopter passed over a tree line he felt a vibration in the airframe and when the vibration increased he decided to perform an autorotation into the next field. According to the pilot, the helicopter descended rapidly from about 20 ft above the ground which resulted in a hard landing.

A witness to the accident reported hearing an “awful” noise before the helicopter passed over a tree. The witness stated that as the helicopter descended the main rotor blades almost stopped rotating when the helicopter was about 10 to 15 ft above the ground, and then the helicopter dropped vertically into the field.

The airframe and tailboom sustained substantial damage during the hard landing.

The helicopter was recovered to a secure facility pending an examination.

Embraer ERJ-170-200LR, N307LH, and Sikorsky VH3D, incident occurred on August 4, 2026, near Ronald Reagan National Airport (DCA/KDCA), Washington, DCA

• Location: Washington, DC 
• Incident Number: OPS26LA063 
• Date & Time: August 4, 2026, 14:34 Local 
• Registration: MILITARY - VM1 (A1); N307LH (A2) 
• Aircraft: Sikorsky VH3D (A1); YABORA INDUSTRIA AERONAUTICA S ERJ 170-200 LR (A2) Injuries: N/A (A1); N/A (A2) 
• Flight Conducted Under: Armed Forces (A1); Part 121: Air carrier - Scheduled (A2)

https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/203529/pdf

On August 4, 2026, about 1434 eastern daylight time (EDT), Marine One (VM1) a Sikorsky VH3D, and Envoy Air flight 3742 (ENY3742), an Embraer E-170, were involved in a loss of separation about 2 miles north of Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA), Arlington, Virginia. There were no injuries reported to the passengers or crewmembers on board either aircraft.  

VM1 was a military Presidential transport local flight operating under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 from The Ellipse Park, Washington, D.C. ENY3742 was a scheduled domestic passenger flight operating under the provisions of Title 14 CFR Part 121 from DCA to Pensacola International Airport (PNS), Pensacola, Florida. At the time of the loss of separation, VM1 had departed The Ellipse when ENY3742 was departing runway 1 and beginning their initial climb. After the loss of separation, VM1 completed their local flight without incident while ENY3742 completed their flight to PNS without incident. Figure 1 below shows key locations and estimated position of both aircraft at FAA’s estimated closest proximity.

As part of the investigative process, the NTSB invited qualified parties to participate in the investigation. Parties to the investigation include the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of the Navy (DON), and Envoy Air Inc. In accordance with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Annex 13, Centro de Investigação e Prevenção de Acidentes Aeronáuticos (CENIPA) of Brazil, representing the State of Design of the Embraer 170 airplane, was notified of the investigation.

Certified air traffic control (ATC) audio recordings and Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS) radar data were provided by the FAA. Table 1 provides a summary of key communications between the DCA Airport Traffic Control Tower (ATCT) Helicopter Control (HC) and Local Control (LC) controllers and the flight crews of VM1 and ENY3742. The two transmissions in red italics were sourced from a third-party application: ATC – Live Air Traffic Radio. According to the disclaimer in their application, ATC audio in their application is sourced from Enhanced Radar (a company that builds Artificial Intelligence (AI)- driven systems to transcribe, analyze, and optimize ATC communications and airspace operations) and processed with their Y4-small AI model. These transmissions were not received by FAA ATC radio receivers and were unable to be heard by the DCA ATCT HC or LC controllers. Note: The HC and LC positions operate on different frequencies and therefore, flightcrews and controllers can only hear what is being transmitted on the frequency they are using – in this case, VM1 was on the HC frequency and ENY3742 was on the LC frequency.  

A preliminary FAA estimate of the closest proximity between VM1 and ENY3742 determined they were about .82 miles apart laterally and about 700 feet vertically, as shown in figure 2.

Envoy Air Flight 3742 Flightcrew Statements 

Postincident statements provided by ENY3742 flightcrew revealed the first officer (FO) was the pilot flying and the captain was the pilot monitoring. Both crewmembers recalled that after takeoff from runway 1, as the aircraft climbed and accelerated, the Terminal Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) announced a traffic advisory (TA) with “Traffic, Traffic.” At no time was the TCAS TA target acquired visually by either crewmember. The TCAS TA target symbol remained to the right and below their own-ship symbol the entire time. Both recalled seeing 600 feet of vertical separation being displayed on TCAS as the TA target passed behind their right wing of the own-ship symbol on the display. The captain added that at no time was the TCAS resolution advisory (RA) displayed, announced, or commanded.

DCA Helicopter Frequency Communications 

Certified ATC audio recordings revealed that the first attempt to contact DCA ATCT was not received at all, and the second attempt was broken and completely unreadable (to which the controller advised on frequency). The frequency had been working normally and there were no known outages or reports of degradation of this frequency on the day of the event, nor was there a history of problems with this frequency according to FAA. As a result of the missed transmissions with VM1 on the day of the incident, FAA technicians from Spectrum Engineering conducted a coverage analysis and determined that there was not adequate lineof-sight to ensure communications between the radio transmitter/receiver sight and The Ellipse, where VM1 was temporarily operating from while construction was ongoing at the White House.

FAA Technical Operations Personnel Interviews 

Postincident interviews were conducted with personnel from FAA’s technical operations responsible for the ATC radios used at DCA ATCT. Both technicians stated that there had been no documented history of reported problems with the HC frequency and had been no report on the day of the incident until after the incident had occurred. After finding the line-of-sight deficiencies in their coverage analysis done immediately after becoming aware of the problem, the FAA relocated the radios for the HC frequency from their location in a nearby residential neighborhood, to the top of the DCA ATCT.

DCA ATCT Air Traffic Manager Interview 

The postincident interview with the air traffic manager (ATM) also revealed that there was no known history of problems with the HC frequency from ATC. The ATM also reported that once the technicians had relocated the radios to the tower, ATC conducted radio checks with two separate Marine Helicopter Squadron One (HMX-1) aircraft located at The Ellipse and in the local vicinity and reported no deficiencies. Additionally, there were no deficiencies noted in communication with other helicopters in communication with DCA ATCT either. 

Meeting Between DCA ATCT and HMX-1 

DCA ATCT and HMX-1 staff met the week preceding the incident on July 30, 2026. According to the ATM, this was not a regularly scheduled meeting, but rather a meeting that had been requested by HMX-1 to discuss local operations and to express the need for more training flights within the DCA Class B airspace, and ATC wanted to discuss concern with recent reports of their not receiving the required 3 minute to liftoff call from HMX-1 flight crews. At that time, HMX-1 advised that communications “had been spotty,” and felt that may have been the reason. It was agreed that they would attempt other means of reaching the tower in situations where they were unable to reach them to provide the 3-minute call (for example, relaying through another aircraft), and on the day of the incident evidence showed they did. After not reaching them on their initial attempt, they had attempted to relay the 3-minute call through the helicopter facility at Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling, which was also unsuccessful.

Loss of Standard Separation

The FAA reported the preliminary estimated closest proximity between VM1 and ENY3742 as about .82 nm laterally and 700 feet vertically. This would meet the required minimum radar separation as set forth in FAA Order JO 7110.65BB, Air Traffic Control, paragraph 7-9-4, which required 1.5 nm lateral or 500 feet vertical separation within Class B airspace, between a VFR aircraft and any aircraft weighing more than 19,000 pounds or any turbojet aircraft. The NTSB is still reviewing all sources of surveillance data to calculate and confirm closest proximity. Additionally, in accordance with the letter of agreement (LOA) between HMX-1 and Washington, DC area ATC facilities, aircraft operations with the President on board require flightcrews to contact DCA ATCT on 134.35 (HC frequency) 3 minutes prior to departure, and according to the LOA between DCA ATCT and PCT TRACON, DCA would stop all departures once the 3-minute call was received. In this incident, after attempting to contact DCA ATCT at least twice, they ultimately departed and were then able to reach DCA ATCT when the helicopter reached an altitude that provided adequate line-of sight communications. Having received no 3-minute call, the LC controller had cleared ENY3742 for takeoff and the airplane was becoming airborne simultaneously as VM1 established communications with the tower. The current altimeter setting and traffic advisory were provided to VM1, to which the crew immediately reported visual contact with the traffic. 

The NTSB’s incident investigation is ongoing.