Friday, August 21, 2026

Cessna 150H, N23330, and Bell 407GX, N873ST, fatal accident occurred on August 19, 2026, at Carlisle Airport (N94), Carlisle, Pennsylvania

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this writing will be corrected when/if the NTSB preliminary report is released.

https://registry.faa.gov/AircraftInquiry/Search/NNumberResult?nNumberTxt=N23330

https://registry.faa.gov/AircraftInquiry/Search/NNumberResult?nNumberTxt=N873ST

Aaron McCarter, NTSB IIC

- History of Flight:
On August 19, 2026, at about 1851 local time, a Cessna 150H, N23330, registered to N23330 LLC out of Bedford, Pennsylvania, and a Bell 407GX, N873ST, registered to the Pennsylvania State Police, were involved a mid-air collision at Carlisle Airport (N94), Carlisle, Pennsylvania. The airplane was destroyed, and the helicopter sustained substantial damage. The sole pilot onboard the Cessna was fatally injured. The pilot and passenger onboard the Bell suffered minor injuries. 
The airplane was operated as Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight, and the helicopter was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 public use flight.

The Cessna had originated from N94 earlier in the day at 1209 on a flight to an unspecified airport near Shippensburg, Pennsylvania. It was seen again at 1842 on a return flight to Carlisle.

The helicopter had initially originated from Capital City Airport (CXY/KCXY), Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, at 1804, where it conducted hover practice on airport ground. At about 1841, the helicopter departed again, but was now headed west towards Carlisle.

According to Automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B) data, at 1849:27, the Cessna was on a base-to-final turn for runway 10 while the Bell was on a 2 mile short final for runway 28 (see figure 1). 

Figure 1: Cessna initial approach to runway 10 and Bell position at the exact time

The Cessna cancelled the approach to runway 10 and instead flew a left base for runway 28, while the Bell continued its final approach for runway 28. At about 1850:54, the Cessna was on a base-to-final turn while the Bell landed on the runway (see figure 2).

Figure 2: Cessna base-to-final turn for runway 28 and Bell position

The Cessna's last ADS-B data point was recorded at 1851:03 during the turn. The Bell continued to transmission data until 1952:03, where it appeared to hover over the grass to the right side of runway 28.

Figure 3: Bell data after landing on runway 28

Video evidence shows that the Cessna veered to the right side off runway 28 and into the Bell. See "Wreckage and Impact Information" section for more information.

According to the NTSB investigator in charge, both aircraft were engaging with each other using the Common traffic advisory frequency (CTAF).

According to the NTSB, the Cessna pilot had done maintenance on the airplane before the accident flight.

- Pilot Information:
(1) Cessna:
The pilot, aged 57, held a commercial pilot certificate with an airplane single engine and multi engine land ratings. He also held an instrument rating. His second class FAA medical was issued on May 2025, with a note that he must use corrective lens(es) to meet vision standards at all required distances. The pilot also held a flight instructor certificate that was most recently issued/updated on 2/12/2026.

(2) Bell:
The Bell pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with a rotorcraft/helicopter rating and an instrument helicopter rating. He also held a flight instructor certificate that was most recently issued/updated on 5/27/2026 with a helicopter/instrument ratings. He also held a remote pilot certificate. The pilot's second class FAA medical was issued on January 2026 without any notes.

- Airplane Information:
The accident airplane, serial number 15068878, was manufactured in 1968. It was a two-seat, low-wing, fixed-gear airplane powered by a Continental O-200 engine.

The accident helicopter, serial number 54500, was manufactured in 2014. It was an eight seat helicopter that features a Garmin G1000 H-model glass cockpit and is powered by a Rolls-Royce M250-C47B turboshaft engine.

- Wreckage and Impact Information:
A review of an airport video revealed that the helicopter did a hover taxi after landing on runway 28. The helicopter was positioned a few feet off to the right side of runway 28. The video continues and shows the Cessna emerging from behind. The Cessna came in straight and level before it entered a high nose-up, pitch up attitude, the Cessna then banked right before it struck the main rotorblade section of the Bell. The Cessna struck the main rotor in the area between the front landing gear and nose in a slight right bank, as a result, the cabin was destroyed during the collision sequence, and both wings departed the airplane. The Bell rolled into its left side and came to rest in the grass. The broken apart pieces of the Cessna continued on its original direction of travel. There was no post crash fire to both aircraft.

Figure 4: Cessna emerging from behind, wings level

Figure 5: Cessna banks to the right

Figure 6: Cessna impacts main rotor blade system of Bell

Figure 7: Cessna disintegrates after collision, both wings are bent upwards and depart the airframe, the Bell rolls into its left side

Figure 8: Approx collision diagram (by me)

Figure 9: Wreckage path, note NTSB investigator pointing towards tail rotor, and Cessna main wreckage in the background.

Figure 10: View of Bell final resting position relative to the runway.

- Airport Information:
Carlisle Airport is a non-towered public airport located 2 miles southeast of Carlisle, PA. The airport field elevation is 510.1 ft. The airport features a single asphalt runway 10/28 which is 4008 x 60 ft.

There were no remarks regarding helicopter operations at the airport.

Figure 11: Airport View, note gray marker is approx collision location

- Weather:

The 1856 observation at the nearest airport was reporting winds 270 at 5 knots, 10 miles visibility, no clouds under 12,000 ft (CLR), temperature 27 °C, dewpoint 18 °C, and an altimeter setting of 29.92 inches of mercury.

METAR KCXY 192156Z 27006KT 10SM CLR 28/17 A2991 RMK AO2 SLP129 T02780172

METAR KCXY 192256Z 27005KT 10SM CLR 27/18 A2992 RMK AO2 SLP131 T02670178

- Additional Information:
According to the FAA Advisory Circular 90-23H (revised 1/13/26) page 7, note 7.1.2:

"Rotorcraft Downwash, Outwash, and Wake Vortices. The spinning rotor blades of helicopters and other rotorcraft, in a hover or slow hover taxi, generate a downward column of air called downwash. When a rotorcraft is in ground effect (i.e., usually less than one rotor diameter distance above the surface), the downward column of air interacts with the surface and produces outwash, a turbulent lateral movement of air. When a rotorcraft is in a hover in ground effect, outwash propagates in all lateral directions in still air. Tip vortices from the rotor blades are pushed down helically, coalesce as they approach the surface, and are driven outwards by the outwash intensifying the turbulent airflow. Downwash and outwash may damage aircraft below and in the vicinity of rotorcraft operations and may produce adverse effects on nearby aircraft operations, including turbulence and induced roll moments. See Figure 4, Rotorcraft Downwash and Outwash."

7.1.2.1 When a rotorcraft hovers into the wind or accelerates from a hover, the horizontal flow of air modifies the downwash. As the rotorcraft continues to accelerate, the rotor blades move into less disturbed air, and the downwash transitions to counter-rotating wake vortices. The forward flight speed of the rotorcraft in which the airflow transitions to counter-rotating wake vortices is dependent on multiple factors, including the type of rotorcraft and the environment that it is operating in. When a rotorcraft decelerates, the same forces are exerted in the reverse sequence. Rotorcraft wake vortices may have characteristics that differ from fixed-wing wake vortices (e.g., differing advancing and trailing blade vortices, separation between wake vortices differing when the rotorcraft is in a climb versus descent, etc.) due to the aerodynamic differences between a fixed and rotary airfoil. Rotorcraft wake vortex characteristics such as wake decay rate and wake drift have similar behaviors as wake vortices created by fixed-wing aircraft. 

7.1.2.2 In terminal operations where a rotorcraft is arriving or departing, there is a combination of wake vortices, downwash, and outwash. Rotorcraft-generated turbulent airflows, including downwash, outwash, and wake vortices, are a hazard to following similar or smaller-sized aircraft, especially fixed-wing aircraft. Aircraft have suffered LOC-I accidents while attempting to arrive or depart an airport after a rotorcraft transited the area. See Figure 5, Rotorcraft Accelerating from a Hover, and Figure 6, Rotorcraft Approach to an Airport.

According to section 9.1.11 Departure Following Rotorcraft Operations:

The effects of rotorcraft wake vortices, downwash, and outwash may be stronger than expected compared to fixed-wing aircraft of a similar size. Pilots of fixed-wing aircraft are encouraged to: 

1. Regard rotorcraft of a similar size as a larger aircraft for wake vortex avoidance. 

2. Avoid the area within three times the rotor diameter, of the nearest main rotor, of a rotorcraft in a hover or slow hover taxi. See Figure 25, Avoiding Rotorcraft Downwash and Outwash. 

3. Avoid wake vortices from an arriving or departing rotorcraft that may be present in different locations than the expected location of wake vortices from fixed-wing aircraft.


According to the same AC, page 6, note 6.1:

Pilot Role in Wake Vortex Encounter Mitigation. In accordance with Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) § 91.3(a), the pilot in command (PIC) of an aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft. This responsibility includes wake vortex encounter avoidance and mitigation. Pilots arriving and departing from uncontrolled airports, flying in uncontrolled airspace, or accepting a clearance for a visual approach are accepting the sole responsibility for wake vortex encounter mitigation. Pilots are encouraged to: 

• Learn to visualize the behavior, location, and movements of wake vortices from similar or larger-sized generating aircraft. 

• Proactively adjust their flightpath or delay operations as needed to avoid or mitigate a wake vortex encounter. 

• Be alert for possible wake vortex encounters, particularly during takeoff, approach, and landing operations.

• Follow the wake vortex encounter avoidance and mitigation guidance contained in this AC, applicable aircraft manuals, and the Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM). 

1 comment:

  1. That helicopter had no business being in the infield while that Cessna departed. That is gross negligence on the part of the police pilot, he should loose his license, be prosecuted for manslaughter and be banned from flying for that. But of course he won't be, the police always protect each other. What a disgrace.

    ReplyDelete