Beechcraft B100 King Air, N30HG, fatal accident occurred on November 10, 2025, in Coral Springs, Florida

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this post will be corrected when the preliminary report is released.

https://registry.faa.gov/AircraftInquiry/Search/NNumberResult?nNumberTxt=N30HG

- History of Flight:
On November 10, 2025, at about 1018 local time, a Beechcraft B100 King Air, N30HG, registered to International Air Services Inc Trustee out of Carson City, Nevada, was destroyed when it impacted residential terrain and a man-made pond in Coral Springs, Florida. There were reportedly no survivors. The relief flight originated from Fort Lauderdale-Executive Airport (FXE/KFXE), Florida, and was destined to Montego Bay-Sangster International Airport (MBJ/MKJS), Jamaica.

The purpose of the flight was to deliver supplies to victims of Hurricane Melissa in Jamaica.

According to preliminary Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) data (figure 1), at 1002:56 LT, the airplane was observed taxiing from the parking area towards runway 27. At 1014:12, the airplane departed runway 27 (elevation 11.7 ft) and entered a climbing right to an altitude of 4,200 ft. At 1017:11, after reaching that altitude, the airplane started a right hand turn. It was travelling about 164 knots groundspeed (GS) at that point.  At 1017:52, before the conclusion of the turn, the airplane started a steep descent. At 1018:06, the airplane was observed at 3350 ft, 238 knots groundspeed (GS) and descending 4500 feet per minute (fpm). The airplane continued to descend and accelerated to about 270 knots GS. At the last few seconds, the airplane slowed down to about 260 knots GS while the descent rate continued to increase. The last ADS-B return was recorded about 160 ft from the crash site, the airplane was at 450 ft, 257 knots GS, and descending 14000 feet per minute (fpm).

Figure 1: ADS-B exchange track ran through Flysto

Figure 2: TOC, right turn and final descent ran through Flysto

- Pilot Information:
unknown at this point.

- Airplane Information:
The accident aircraft, serial number BE-14, was manufactured in 1976. It was a twin-turboprop airplane powered by two (Honeywell) Garrett AiResearch TPE-331 engines.

- Wreckage and Impact Information:
The first identified point of impact was a downed palm tree in the backyard of a residential home. This was followed by ground impressions on a 125° heading leading to a destroyed fence. The airplane then continued into the pond and was destroyed by impact forces. The house itself was not damaged. The impact trajectory (speculation) suggests the aircraft was on a steep descent/out of control (see figure 3).

Three videos were released shortly after the writing of this entry, the videos showed the aircraft in a nose down, wings level vertical descent. The ground impressions were as a result of the right wing impacting the ground.

Figure 3: Impact trajectory

Figure 4: Aircraft in descent

Figure 5: Impact trajectory

- Airport Information:
none.

- Weather:
(1) METARs:

METAR KPMP 101453Z 28009KT 10SM SCT025 SCT033 27/22 A3004 RMK AO2 SLP174 6//// T02670217 51017 PNO

METAR KPMP 101511Z 29011G15KT 10SM BKN025 BKN033 28/22 A3004 RMK AO2 T02780222 PNO

METAR KPMP 101524Z 27011KT 10SM SCT024 SCT030 28/22 A3004 RMK AO2 T02780217 PNO

METAR KPMP 101553Z 30013KT 10SM FEW020 BKN027 BKN034 27/22 A3003 RMK AO2 SLP171 T02670217 PNO

METAR KBCT 101454Z 29006G17KT 10SM BKN020 BKN026 BKN038 27/22 A3004 RMK TCU DSNT W-NW CIG LWR W

METAR KBCT 101553Z 30015G21KT 10SM SCT020TCU SCT027 SCT039 27/21 A3004 RMK TCU OHD AND ALQD AND DSNT SW-NW MOV E

METAR KFLL 101453Z 28010G17KT 10SM SCT023 SCT040 BKN120 27/21 A3004 RMK AO2 SLP170 T02670211 51016

METAR KFLL 101553Z 29009G21KT 10SM SCT027 BKN250 28/21 A3003 RMK AO2 SLP166 T02830211

(2) Area Forecast Discussion:

Area Forecast Discussion
National Weather Service Miami FL
644 AM EST Mon Nov 10 2025

...New AVIATION...

.KEY MESSAGES...
Updated at 644 AM EST Mon Nov 10 2025

  - A strong cold front passage today will bringing the coldest
    temperatures of the season so far to the region tonight into
    Tuesday.

  - Strong northwest winds will result in significant wind chill
    values Tuesday morning, especially around the Lake region.

  - Hazardous marine conditions expected to develop across all
    coastal waters starting this morning.

  - Hazardous beach conditions expected today and into Tuesday with
    increasing risk of rip currents for all beaches of South
    Florida, and high surf over the Palm Beach county beaches.

&&

.SHORT TERM...
(Today through Tuesday)
Issued at 206 AM EST Mon Nov 10 2025

Guidance remains in good agreement about the upcoming cold weather
snap starting Monday morning. Latest sfc analyses place the frontal
boundary past the peninsula with the onset of drier and colder air
advection in place. Deep zonal flow will spread across the region
with northerly cold wind bringing the first cooling down of the
season.

Latest forecast temps for this afternoon remain around the same
values from previous model runs with highs in the low-mid 70s around
the Lake region, and in the upper 70s to low 80s further south. The
northerly winds are expected to reach the 10-15 mph range with
higher gusts by the early afternoon hours on Monday, intensifying
the cold air advection during the evening and overnight hours.

Model guidance remain in consensus in having the coldest period of
the cold weather on Tuesday morning, with lows dropping into the
upper 30s to low 40s around the Lake region, and mid-upper 40s
elsewhere. Locations right along the coast may remain close to 50.
In terms of wind chill values, guidance have been going a few
degrees cooler since yesterday`s runs and now NBM is showing 30-32
degrees around the Lake region, with mid 30s to around 40 elsewhere.

A Cold Weather Advisory has been issued for Glades, Hendry, and
northern portions of Palm Beach and Collier counties from 4am to 9am
Tuesday morning for wind chill values of 35 degrees or less. Wind
chill values like those can lead to hypothermia with prolonged
exposure. Use caution while traveling outside. Wear appropriate
clothing, a hat, and gloves. Keep pets indoors as much as possible.
Make frequent checks on older family, friends, and neighbors. Ensure
portable heaters are used correctly. Do not use generators or grills
inside.

For the Tuesday afternoon highs, models also remain consistent with
keeping low-mid 60s around the Lake region/interior areas, and upper
60s elsewhere. Winds will likely peak in intensity, around 15 mph,
during the late morning hours Tuesday then beginning to subside in
the afternoon hours.

&&

.LONG TERM...
(Tuesday night through Sunday)
Issued at 206 AM EST Mon Nov 10 2025

Not much changes for the long term forecast philosophy with the air
mass across the state gradually moderating from Wednesday and
through the end of the work week as the west Atlantic ridge
returns. The last portion of the cold spell will happen Wednesday
morning with lows in the 40s inland, and high 50s to around 60
near the coasts.

Decreasing winds veer to a more easterly flow while warming up the
air mass. Afternoon highs climb back into the upper 70s to low 80s
by Friday and through the upcoming weekend.

POPs remain basically in single digits every day of the forecast
period with benign weather prevailing.

&&

.AVIATION...
(12Z TAFS)
Issued at 644 AM EST Mon Nov 10 2025

Generally VFR prevails at all terminals during the next 24 hours.
Gusty NW winds will begin later this morning and becoming robust
this afternoon. Gusts to around 25 kt may continue into the
evening hours.

&&

.MARINE...
Issued at 206 AM EST Mon Nov 10 2025

Hazardous marine conditions will develop today in the wake of the
frontal passage starting this morning and continuing through the
middle of the work week. All of South Florida`s coastal waters will
be affected by the stronger winds, including the Lake.

A Small Craft Advisory has been issued with latest model estimates
showing possible wave heights in the 10 to 14 feet range in the
Atlantic waters on Tuesday, along with wind speeds in the 25-30 kt
range with higher gusts. Conditions should begin subsiding
Wednesday morning starting on the Gulf waters and then the
Atlantic later that afternoon.

&&

.BEACHES...
Issued at 206 AM EST Mon Nov 10 2025

A high risk of rip currents is in effect for all South Florida
beaches today behind a cold front passage.

A high surf advisory will also be in effect for all Palm Beach
county beaches starting early morning Tuesday, and might be expanded
into Broward and Miami-Dade depending on latest model trends.

&&

.FIRE WEATHER...
Issued at 206 AM EST Mon Nov 10 2025

Northerly flow will result in very dry conditions and increasing
winds expected Tuesday afternoon with RH/wind speed values
approaching critical levels, mainly over the western half of South
Florida. The situation will continue to be closely monitored in case
further action becomes necessary.

- Additional Information:

Figure: Vertical Rate Profile

Blog Update 2: November 9, 2025

It has been ~3 months since the last blog update, there was a notable increase in the number of views (the total number of views since the start of the blog is roughly 52065), despite this, the comments are sitting on a mere 54, and the followers on 2! I tried crawlers and indexing methods, but I still can't figure out a way to make the blog appear on Chrome (It appears on other search engines like duckduckgo, yahoo, and bing, which are the main feeders to the blog apparently). If you have any ideas on how to fix this, please don't hesitate to contact me!

I've also noted some traffic from online forums and Facebook, I like to lurk on these, but some of them require account log-ins, so I can't see the feedback (for example, Beechtalk, which is the 3rd most traffic source to this blog, and Facebook, which doesn't specify if the traffic came through a public page/group). I would love to hear the feedback from anyone on these sites if possible :P! 

On another note, the FAA ASIAS (Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing) has not been updated since October 2nd due to the US government shutdown, which has effected the accident/incident reporting for the last month and continuing right now.

If you have any suggestions and feedback, please share them in the comments.

Eurocopter EC 130T2 (Airbus Helicopters H130), N107VU, fatal accident occurred on November 8, 2025, near Music City Executive Airport (XNX/KXNX), Gallatin, Tennessee

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this post will be corrected when the preliminary report is released.

https://registry.faa.gov/AircraftInquiry/Search/NNumberResult?nNumberTxt=N107VU

- History of Flight:
On November 8, 2025, at about 1341 local time, an Eurocopter EC 130T2 (also known as the Airbus Helicopters H130), N107VU, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Lebanon, Tennessee. One occupant sustained fatal injuries, and two occupants sustained serious injuries. The helicopter was registered to Air Methods LLC out of Greenwood Village, Colorado, and being operated by Vanderbilt LifeFlight as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 air medical flight.

According to preliminary Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) data (figure 1), at about 1333, the helicopter departed XNX and entered a climbing right turn towards the south. At 1338, the helicopter was 5.30 miles south of XNX when it entered a 180 turn back north while continuing to climb. At 1339:40, the helicopter was about 3 miles south of the airport when it reached a maximum altitude of 4,200 ft. This was followed by a very steep descent. At about 1340:30, the helicopter was ~1.80 miles south of the airport and travelling ~140 knots groundspeed when it entered a descending right hand turn with an average rate of -4000 feet per minute (fpm). At 1341:18, the last ADS-B return was recorded as the helicopter was at the conclusion of the turn. The helicopter was at 650 ft and had decelerated to about 84 knots GS and -2300 fpm. The accident site was located 700 ft from this data point.

Figure 1: ADS-B exchange data ran through Google Earth Pro

Figure 2: Last portion of flight.

- Pilot Information:
unknown at this point.

- Aircraft Information:
According to the Airbus website:

The H130 is an intermediate single-engine helicopter tailored for passenger transport, sightseeing and VIP duties, as well as medical airlift and surveillance missions. As a multi-role rotorcraft, the H130 has a spacious cabin for a pilot and up to seven passengers. Depending on the configuration, it can carry up to two pilots, one stretcher and three to four medical crewmembers.

Among the H130’s enhancements are an active vibration control system and advanced environmental control; improved air conditioning; a cabin interior structure redesign with a fully flat floor; energy-absorbing seats and integration of a crash-resistant fuel system. A cockpit update for the rotorcraft brings an enhanced human-machine interface through the integration of Garmin’s G500H TXi glass cockpit with a synthetic vision system (SVS) and the helicopter terrain avoidance and warning system (HTAWS). A wireless connection automatically transfers flight data at the end of each mission.

The helicopter was powered by a Safran Arriel 2D turbine engine.

- Wreckage and Impact Information:
The helicopter struck the top of a tree and impacted terrain about 2 miles south of XNX. The helicopter came to rest on its left side and was not consumed by a post crash fire. The helicopter remained mostly intact and sustained substantial impact damage. The tailrotor remained partially attached to the airframe. (figure 3)

Figure 3: Accident site

- Airport Information:
The airport field elevation was 583.3 ft.

- Weather:
The reported weather at 1335 at XNK: variable winds at 5 knots, 10 miles visibility, no clouds under 12,000 ft (CLR), temperature 21°C, dewpoint 14°C, and an altimeter setting of 29.85 inches of mercury.

METAR KXNX 081915Z AUTO 00000KT 10SM CLR 22/15 A2985 RMK A01
METAR KXNX 081935Z AUTO VRB05KT 10SM CLR 21/14 A2985 RMK A01 <<
METAR KXNX 081955Z AUTO 32005KT 10SM CLR 21/14 A2984 RMK A01

Area Forecast Discussion
National Weather Service Nashville TN
1109 AM CST Sat Nov 8 2025

...New AVIATION...

.KEY MESSAGES...
Updated at 1102 AM CST Sat Nov 8 2025

- High probability for a widespread hard freeze Sunday and Monday
  nights. Low to medium chance (30-50%) for light snow
  accumulation across the Plateau early Monday morning.

- Temperatures closer to near-normal values returning by
  Wednesday.

&&

.SHORT TERM...
(Rest of today through Monday Night)
Issued at 1006 AM CST Sat Nov 8 2025

A longwave trough taking shape over the northern Plains and Great
Lakes area is evident on satellite imagery this morning with a
potent cold front currently moving through the Illinois/Missouri
area. For now, conditions are calm across Middle TN. With plenty of
sunshine this afternoon, look for temperatures to warm into the
upper-60s to low-70s. But the aforementioned cold front will make
its presence known as it brings much colder air and gusty northwest
winds. Temperatures will fall overnight and through the day on
Sunday which means that the day`s high temperatures in the 50s will
likely be recorded around midnight. Temperatures during much of the
day on Sunday will only be in the 40s with brisk northwest winds
keeping wind chills in the upper-30s. Temperatures will continue to
free-fall Sunday night with readings below freezing areawide by
midnight and then bottoming out into the 20s early Monday morning.
Coldest period of this event will be Monday and Monday night.
High temperature readings Monday will be in the 30s to near 40
while overnight lows will plummet into the teens to low-20s
areawide.

Meanwhile, this system will also bring a low to medium chance
(~30-50%) of light rain showers mainly north of I-40 tonight and
into Sunday. As temperatures fall, this precipitation will change
to snow by Sunday evening and into at least early Monday morning.
This snow may continue through the day on Monday thanks to
wraparound moisture from a departing low. Any accumulations are
still expected to be light along the Cumberland Plateau, generally
ranging from just a dusting to around a half inch. Models give
around a 40% chance that any accumulations get up to a half inch,
and this would mainly be confined to the typically favored areas
of the Upper Cumberland Plateau like Fentress and Pickett
counties. Regardless, none to little impacts are expected from
this short burst of snow.

&&

.LONG TERM...
(Tuesday through next Saturday)
Issued at 1006 AM CST Sat Nov 8 2025

Temperatures will rebound starting Tuesday with highs making it back
into the 50s and 60s for mid-week and overnight lows above the
freezing mark. Dry northwest flow aloft will persist through much
of next week, helping to keep dry and calm conditions in the
forecast through the end of the week.

&&

.AVIATION...
(18Z TAFS)
Issued at 1102 AM CST Sat Nov 8 2025

Stubborn fog and low stratus continues to erode this morning with
most TAF sites up to VFR at this hour. Improvement will continue
with VFR conditions expected areawide this afternoon. Light winds
are generally out of the south through the remainder of the day,
but will become northwesterly with the arrival of a cold front
between 09Z and 12Z. Winds will strengthen with gusts of 20 to 25
knots through the morning hours. Low clouds will redevelop as
well, bringing areawide MVFR cigs Sunday morning.

- Additional Information:
none.

Extra EA 300/SC, N330SL, fatal accident occurred on November 8, 2025, at Keystone Heights Airport (42J), Keystone Heights, Florida

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this post will be corrected when the preliminary report is released.

https://registry.faa.gov/AircraftInquiry/Search/NNumberResult?nNumberTxt=N330SL

- History of Flight:
On November 8, 2025, at about 1040 local time, an Extra EA 300/SC, N330SL, registered to Avtech Group LLC out of St. Augustine, FL, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident at Keystone Heights Airport (42J), Keystone Heights, Florida. The sole pilot onboard sustained fatal injuries. The local flight originated from 42J.

Preliminary information indicates the airplane was conducting aerobatic manoeuvres when it entered an inverted spin and lost control.

Preliminary ADS-B data shows that the airplane was flying over the airport at 3,700 ft when it entered a sudden descent to 1,000 ft and disappeared from coverage.

- Pilot Information:
unknown at this point.

- Airplane Information:
The accident aircraft, serial number SC050, was manufactured in 2014. It was a single-seat, low-wing aerobatic monoplane powered by a Lycoming IO-580-X engine rated at 320 hp.

According to the Pilot Operating Handbook (POH):
The plane is designed for acrobatics. Inverted flight maneuvers are limited to max 4 min.

Figure: POH Information

According to section 4.12.3, SPIN:
To enter a spin proceed as follows: 

• Reduce speed, power idle 
• When the plane stalls: 

1. kick rudder to desired spin direction 
2. hold ailerons neutral 
3. stick back (positive spinning), Stick forward (negative spinning)

The plane will immediately enter a stable spin. 

• Ailerons against spin direction will make the spin flatter. 
• Ailerons into spin direction will lead to a spiral dive. 

Above apply for positive and negative spinning. 

To stop the spin: 

• Apply opposite rudder 
• Make sure, power idle 
• Hold ailerons neutral 
• Stick to neutral position

After one turn of spinning the plane will recover within about 1/2 turn. 

After six turns of spinning the plane will recover within about 1 turn. 

Recovery can still be improved by feeding in in-spin ailerons. 

N O T E
If ever disorientation should occur during spins (normal or inverted) one method always works to stop the spin: 

• Power idle 
• Kick rudder to the heavier side (this will always be against spin direction) 
• Take hands off the stick The spin will end after 1/2 thru 1 turn. 

The plane will be in a steep dive in a side-slip. Recovery to normal flight can be performed easily. 

N O T E 
After one turn of spinning the altitude loss including recovery is within about 1500 ft. 
After six turns of spinning the altitude loss including recovery is within about 3300 ft.

- Wreckage and Impact Information:
The airplane impacted open flat terrain, came to rest inverted and was consumed by a post crash fire. The main wreckage consisted of the entire airplane, which was confined within one area without a notable debris field. Both wings and tail remained attached to the airframe. It appears that both propeller blades remained attached to the propeller hub, which was still attached to the engine. The impact appears consistent with an inverted flight profile with little to no forward airspeed.

- Airport Information:
Keystone Heights Airport is a non-towered public airport located about 3 miles north of Keystone Heights, Florida. The airport field elevation was 196 ft. The airport features two asphalt runways, runway 5/23 (5046x100 ft) and runway 11/29 (4899x75 ft).

- Weather:
The reported weather at 1035: Winds 180 at 5 knots, visbility 9 miles, a broken cloud layer at 8500 ft, temparture 25°C, dewpoint 19°C, and an altimeter setting of 29.95 inches of mercury

METAR K42J 081515Z AUTO 19004KT 8SM FEW080 FEW090 24/19 A2995 RMK A01
METAR K42J 081535Z AUTO 18005KT 9SM BKN085 25/19 A2995 RMK A01 <<<
METAR K42J 081555Z AUTO VRB04KT 9SM OVC085 25/19 A2994 RMK A01

- Additional Information:
On

Runway excursion: Boeing 737-823 (WL), N991AN, incident occurred on February 10, 2024, at Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport (DFW/KDFW), Dallas, Texas

• Location: Dallas, Texas 
• Incident Number: DCA24LA095 
• Date & Time: February 10, 2024, 19:42 Local 
• Registration: N991AN 
• Aircraft: Boeing 737-823 
• Aircraft Damage: Minor 
• Defining Event: Runway excursion 
• Injuries: 104 None 
• Flight Conducted Under: Part 121: Air carrier - Scheduled

https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/193772/pdf

https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=193772

On February 10, 2024, about 1942 central standard time, American Airlines flight 1632, a Boeing 737-823, N991AN, experienced a brake system anomaly after landing on runway 17L at the Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport (DFW), Dallas-Fort Worth, Texas. The airplane came to a stop in the paved overrun area beyond the south end of the runway threshold. All 104 passengers and crew members safely evacuated the airplane via airstairs, with no injuries reported. The flight was operated as a scheduled domestic passenger service under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121, traveling from Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA), Arlington, VA, to DFW in Dallas-Fort Worth, TX.

Analysis:

American Airlines flight 1632 experienced a brake system anomaly shortly after landing on runway 17L at Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport (DFW), Dallas-Fort Worth, Texas. The anomaly resulted in a loss of braking effectiveness that increased the airplane stopping distance. The airplane came to a stop in the paved overrun area beyond the south end of the runway threshold. The crew executed emergency procedures, including engine shutdown and auxiliary power unit (APU) activation, ensuring a safe post-incident response. All 104 passengers and crew members safely evacuated the airplane via airstairs, with no injuries reported. The flight was operated as a scheduled domestic passenger service under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121, traveling from Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA), Arlington, VA, to DFW.

Each main landing gear (MLG) has a normal braking system powered by hydraulic system B and manually controlled by the flight crew via brake pedals in the flight deck. Pedal movement is transmitted through cables to left and right brake metering valves located in the wheel well, which regulate hydraulic pressure to the respective brake assemblies. Each wheel is equipped with a rotor-stator brake assembly that uses hydraulic pressure to generate braking force.

On February 6, 2024—four days before the incident—American Airlines completed a scheduled modification on the airplane, replacing the original steel brakes with carbon brakes and associated wheel assemblies. This work was performed in accordance with an Engineering Order (EO) and associated cards dated November 2, 2022, based on Boeing Service Bulletin SB 737-32-1429, Revision 4. The modification applied to Boeing 737-800 series airplane equipped with Goodrich or Honeywell steel brakes and wheels. The EO and associated cards included detailed maintenance instructions with sign-off blocks and incorporated the technical content of the Boeing Service Bulletin, supplemented with additional information to ensure compliance with American Airlines’ continuous airworthiness maintenance program.

As part of the conversion to carbon brakes, four flow limiters were installed, replacing the existing bulkhead unions between the rigid hydraulic tubes and flexible hydraulic hoses. Due to the increased length of the flow limiters, the original rigid tubes (four total) located inboard of each MLG within the wing were replaced with shorter ones. Installation required temporary disconnection of each flexible hose, removal of the bulkhead union, installation of the flow limiter, and reconnection of the flexible hose.

Flight data recorder (FDR) data recorded brake pressure from two transducers—one for each side—located upstream of the antiskid valves. These transducers reflect hydraulic pressure supplied by the autobrake system or the pilot-controlled metering valves during manual braking. The recorded values during the incident appeared consistent with expected inputs, indicating no upstream braking system issues. However, the FDR does not record data downstream of the transducers, limiting the ability to evaluate antiskid valve functionality or overall brake system performance. Additional parameters such as wheel speed and brake pressure at the assemblies would enhance investigative capabilities.

The flight crew indicated that they selected an autobrake setting of 3 for the landing at DFW. The autobrake system supplies metered brake pressure to help decelerate and stop the airplane after landing or if a rejected takeoff (RTO) occurs. It monitors airplane deceleration and controls metered pressure to maintain the target deceleration rate selected by the pilot on the AUTO BRAKE select switch until the airplane comes to a full stop, provided there is no flight crew input. Available settings include RTO, OFF, 1, 2, 3, and MAX.

FDR data indicated that both the autobrake system and ground spoilers were functioning at the onset of the landing roll. Upon landing, the increase in the hydraulic brake pressures were consistent with the autobrake setting 3. However, manual brake application by the flight crew likely occurred within seconds of the autobrake application, overriding the autobrake system. The autobrake application discrete parameter confirmed the autobrake was applied for one sample, approximately one second. Once the flight crew’s manual brake application overrode the autobrake, the flight crew controlled the brakes for the remainder of the landing rollout.

According to Boeing, the autobrake system disengages when the metered brake pressure reaches or exceeds 750 pounds per square inch (PSI). During this landing, the right brake pressure increased steadily from 0 to 3000 PSI within four seconds; the left brake pressure increased to 3000 PSI within ten seconds. At the time of autobrake disengagement, the right brake pressure was increasing past 750 psi. This data suggests that a crew member manually applied brakes resulting in the autobrake system disengaging.

Post-incident troubleshooting revealed that the flexible hydraulic hoses connected to the number 3 (right inboard) and number 4 (right outboard) MLG brakes had been improperly reconnected following the carbon brake and flow limiter installation. Specifically, the flexible hydraulic hoses supplying pressure to the number 3 and 4 brakes had been swapped at their connections with the flow limiters (see figure 1).

Further system troubleshooting by American airlines revealed a discrepancy with the wiring to the left MLG wheel speed transducers. During an operational test, maintenance personnel discovered that the wiring harness within the MLG axle had been installed incorrectly. Specifically, the electrical connectors for the number 1 (left outboard) and number 2 (left inboard) wheel speed transducers were swapped.

As a result of these two discrepancies, when a skid occurs, the non-skidding wheel would receive the brake pressure release intended for the wheel on the same MLG that is skidding, and the skidding wheel would receive the (potentially full) metered brake pressure due to its brake not being released. This is because the skidding wheel would receive the antiskid commands intended for the non-skidding wheel, and vice versa.

Given the combination of the switched hydraulic brake hoses and wheel speed transducers, the use of manual braking would not have released the subsequently locked and skidding outboard tires. Eventually, the skidding tires were worn flat until the tires failed. The failed tire would lead to lost braking effectiveness that increased the airplane’s stopping distance beyond the end of the runway.

The investigation confirmed that the only mechanical discrepancies were the reversed hydraulic hoses to the number 3 and number 4 MLG brakes and the reversed wheel speed transducer wires for the number 1 and number 2 MLG wheels.

Safety Actions

American Airlines subsequently revised engineering order card 3222J004-001 adding a step to label the flexible hydraulic hoses prior to removal and requiring an inspector to verify the flexible hydraulic hoses are properly re-installed. In addition, the transducer operational test was incorporated into engineering order card 3222J004-001. This operational test is capable of detecting either swapped flexible hydraulic hoses or swapped transducer connectors.

Additionally, American Airlines issued engineering authorizations (EA) and engineering orders to check the entire B737 fleet for swapped transducer wiring. A total of 50 airplanes were inspected by EA and 253 airplanes were inspected by EO. Of all 303 airplanes inspected, zero were found with transducer wiring swapped. American Airlines also revised their B737NG and MAX aircraft maintenance manuals (AMMs) to enhance the transducer operational test and the main landing gear installation job card has been updated with enhanced steps to ensure the transducer wires are not crossed.

Following the incident, Boeing added Information Notice 02 to service bulletin 737-32-1429 Revision 4. This notice was distributed to alert operators to the risk of crossing hydraulic hoses when reconnecting the flexible hydraulic hoses to the new flow limiters. The notice emphasizes that each flexible hydraulic hose must be reconnected to its corresponding flow limiter and that hoses must not be crossed at any point along their length. Improper reconnection – such as attaching a flexible hydraulic hose to the incorrect flow limiter – will result in incorrect antiskid system operation, potentially leading to a loss of braking action and/or tire failure.

Additionally, Boeing has issued two Fleet Team Digests - 737MAX-FTD-32-24002 and 737NG-FTD-32-24001 - to provide both interim actions as well as final actions to B737NG and B737MAX operators. The interim actions include a list of best practices such as

o Temporarily labeling flexible hydraulic hoses to the corresponding brake positions,

o Labeling wiring harnesses when disconnecting wheel speed transducers, and

o Functional checks to verify flexible hydraulic hoses and transducer wiring is correctly connected. 

The final actions include revising specific AMM tasks and service bulletins where improper maintenance may occur. Boeing released Service Bulletin 737-32-1429 Revision 5 on August 14, 2025. Furthermore, Boeing issued SB 737-32A1599 on October 14, 2025, to ensure proper hydraulic routing following the implementation of service bulletins that alter brake configurations.

The NTSB has investigated several aircraft incidents and accidents that have been the result of cross wiring of wheel speed transducers, all were the result of maintenance human error.

- Probable Cause: Improper maintenance due to human error during a braking system modification diminished braking performance. Contributing to the diminished braking performance was the lack of a functional check to verify the flexible hydraulic hoses and transducer wiring were connected correctly after the braking system modification.

Socata TBM700C2, N111RF, fatal accident occurred on October 13, 2025, in Dartmouth, Massachusetts

• Location: Dartmouth, MA 
• Accident Number: ERA26FA011 
• Date & Time: October 13, 2025, 08:15 Local 
• Registration: N111RF 
• Aircraft: Socata TBM 700 
• Injuries: 2 Fatal, 1 Minor 
• Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General aviation - Personal

https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/201836/pdf

https://registry.faa.gov/AircraftInquiry/Search/NNumberResult?nNumberTxt=N111RF

On October 13, 2025, at about 0815 eastern daylight time, a Socata TBM 700C2, N111RF, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Dartmouth, Massachusetts. The private pilot and the passenger were fatally injured and an automobile driver received minor injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.

According to preliminary air traffic control ADS-B and voice communication data provided by the Federal Aviation Administration, the pilot had filed an instrument flight rules flight plan from New Bedford Regional Airport (EWB), New Bedford, Massachusetts, to the Kenosha Regional Airport (ENW), Kenosha, Wisconsin. The airplane departed EWB at 0805, and shortly after departure, the pilot stated that he would be returning to the airport. The air traffic controller then instructed the pilot to enter a left downwind for runway 05, an instruction which the pilot confirmed. The controller then queried the pilot if he would need assistance upon landing, to which the pilot reported that he did not need assistance. The controller then cleared the pilot to land on runway 05. 

The controller next asked the pilot whether he could perform an approach to the airport and reported that the ceilings were around 1,000 ft, or if he would need radar vectors. The pilot responded that he would descend and that he “should be OK.” The controller acknowledged the pilot and cleared him again to land on runway 05. About one minute later, the controller provided the pilot with a low altitude alert and the altimeter setting that was current at the time. The pilot confirmed the altimeter setting. Shortly after, the pilot made an unintelligible exclamation. There were no further communications from the pilot. 

The accident site was located about 3.6 nautical miles southwest of EWB. Several trees that were impact-damaged were identified as the initial impact points. The trees had the tops cut off approximately 50 feet above the ground. The wreckage path continued through a wooded area, across a highway off ramp, across a portion of Interstate 195 West, and the fuselage came to rest in the median between Interstate 195 West and Interstate 195 East. During the impact sequence, the airplane impacted an automobile that was traveling on Interstate 195 West and the driver received minor injuries. The distance from the initial impact point to where the fuselage came to rest was about 280 ft. The debris path was oriented along a heading of 223° true, and the fuselage came to rest oriented on a heading of 289° true. A post-impact fire consumed portions of both wings and the empennage. All of the major components of the airplane were located at the accident site.

Both wings were impact damaged, and portions of both wings had been partially consumed by a post-impact fire. The left aileron was located along the wreckage path and the aileron trim tab remained attached. The rudder sustained significant impact damage to the leading edge, and a portion of the rudder had broken free from the rest of the rudder. The rudder trim tab remained attached to the rudder through its hinge; however, the rudder trim actuator had separated from the rudder trim tab; the damage was consistent with impact. The elevator trim tab remained partially attached to the elevator through the trim tab actuator and the trim tab and both elevators were impact and thermally-damaged.

The wing fuel tanks were breached, and no fuel was recovered from the remnants of the fuel tanks; however, there was a strong odor consistent with Jet A fuel noted around the accident site. The fuel strainer bowl and screen remained secured, and there were no signs of fuel leaks. The bowl was removed, and the screen was clear of obstructions. The fuel contamination indicator was in its normal position. The fuel line connecting the fuel outlet at the firewall to the fuel pump inlet was secure and there were no signs of fuel leaks.

The fuselage was the furthest piece of wreckage observed along the wreckage path and remained mostly intact; however, the fuselage structure was buckled in multiple locations, and there was a small portion of thermal damage to the forward left side of the fuselage. A portion of the left wing root remained attached to the fuselage, the right wing had completely impact-separated from the fuselage. The main cabin door was found open when the investigators arrived; however, a witness video that was taken after the accident showed that the cabin door was closed immediately after the accident. Both forward seats had impact-separated from their installation points and remained within the cabin area.

The airplane was equipped with a digital avionics suite. Both the pilot and copilot primary flight displays (PFD) remained installed, and the electrical connectors remained secured. Both flight displays were recovered and retained for data download.

The engine remained partially attached to the airframe through the engine mounts, cables, wires, and hoses. The engine displayed some impact damage signatures and there were no signs of fire.

The five blade, constant speed, composite propeller sustained impact damage to all five blades. The propeller blade hub remained attached to the propeller flange. All five of the propeller blades had separated from the propeller hub near their roots, and all of the propeller blades were located along the wreckage path. The blades displayed varying amounts of leading-edge damage.

The wreckage was retained for further examination.

• Conditions at Accident Site: IMC 
• Condition of Light: Day Observation Facility, Elevation: EWB,79 ft msl 
• Observation Time: 08:16 Local 
• Distance from Accident Site: 3.6 Nautical Miles 
• Temperature/Dew Point: 13°C /12°C 
• Lowest Cloud Condition: 
• Wind Speed/Gusts, Direction: 19 knots / 28 knots, 40° Lowest Ceiling: Broken / 900 ft AGL 
• Visibility: 2.5 miles 
• Altimeter Setting: 30.04 inches Hg 
• Type of Flight Plan Filed: IFR 
• Departure Point: New Bedford, MA (EWB) 
• Destination: Kenosha, WI

Mooney M20E Super 21, N79338, fatal accident occurred on October 31, 2025, near Saratoga County Airport (5B2), Saratoga, New York

• Location: Ballston Spa, NY 
• Accident Number: ERA26FA027 
• Date & Time: October 31, 2025, 10:35 Local 
• Registration: N79338 
• Aircraft: Mooney M20E 
• Injuries: 1 Fatal, 1 Serious 
• Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General aviation - Personal

https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/201941/pdf

https://registry.faa.gov/aircraftinquiry/Search/NNumberResult?NNumberTxt=N79338

On October 31, 2025, about 1035 eastern daylight time, a Mooney M20E, N79338, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Ballston Spa, New York. The pilot was fatally injured, and the flight instructor was seriously injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.

According to the flight instructor, the pilot had just purchased the airplane and he was going to fly with the pilot to Punta Gorda, Florida, where the pilot lived. The insurance company required the pilot to fly with a flight instructor due to the pilot’s lack of experience in the airplane make and model. 

The flight instructor stated that he met the pilot for the first time the night before the accident, and they discussed the airplane’s maintenance issues and planned flight route. The flight instructor added that the pilot had test flown the airplane about 1 month prior to the accident flight. He also stated that the airplane’s engine lost power during the pilot’s test flight and that he had landed safely back at the airport at he end of that flight. The flight instructor described that the airplane’s fuel had been contaminated with algae and debris. A local mechanic subsequently repaired the fuel tank and cleaned out the fuel system. 

On the day of the accident flight, the flight instructor and pilot performed a preflight inspection of the airplane and sampled fuel from the fuel tanks several times before departing. The flight instructor stated that after takeoff and during the initial climb, about 200 ft above ground level, the engine decreased in power from 2,500 rpm to about 1,500 rpm. A few seconds later the engine decreased to about 500 rpm and then lost all power. The flight instructor took over control of the airplane and tried to make a turn back to the airport. When he made a right turn, he realized that the airplane was too low. He then made a slight left turn to avoid a house before the airplane impacted a tree.

The accident site was located in a subdivision beside a house. The airplane impacted a tree about 20 ft up, fell to the ground, and came to rest oriented on heading of 232° magnetic. The engine was fractured off its mounts and lying beside the fuselage. The propeller was still attached to the engine and did not display s-bending, leading edge gouging, or chordwise scratching. All major components of the airplane were located at the accident site. A postimpact fire consumed portions of the engine, instrument panel and cockpit. No useful information was obtained from the remaining instrumentation.

The right wing root was still attached to the fuselage and about 6 ft of the outboard portion of the wing was located in a tree directly above the main wreckage. The aileron was still attached to the outboard portion of the wing. The right flap remained attached to the wing. The flaps were in the full retracted position. The left wing also remained attached to the fuselage. The wing was consumed by fire, and the left fuel tank was destroyed. The flap was attached to the wing. About 3 ft of the outboard portion of the left wing fractured off the wing and was located about 20 ft from the main wreckage. The left wing had several tree impressions down the leading edge. The cockpit, instrument panel, and engine bay were destroyed by fire. No useful information was obtained. The tail section was attached to the empennage. The left stabilator and elevator were bent up mid-span. The rudder and right elevator were unremarkable. 

The airplane was further examined after it was recovered from the accident site. Flight control continuity was visually established through torque tubes and fracture surfaces consistent with impact damage. The fuel system from the pickup tubes to the engine fuel injectors was clear of debris and air was passed through all lines and valves. The system exhibited no blockages or other abnormalities.

The engine rocker box covers, engine driven fuel pump, magnetos, and the remnants of the airframe baffling were removed. The crankshaft was rotated by applying hand pressure to the propeller, and after the start ring gear and propeller collar were removed, full 360° rotation of the crankshaft was achieved. Compression and suction were observed on all four cylinders, normal valve action was observed on all cylinders, the accessory idler gears were observed rotating, and mechanical continuity was confirmed throughout. The cylinders were examined with a boroscope. Oil pooling was observed in the No. 2 and No. 4 cylinders, and all cylinders were clean with very little deposits on the piston faces or combustion domes. The induction plenum was inspected via borescope and no blockage or obstructions were observed. All four induction tubes remained attached to the engine with various levels of impact-related damage. The exhaust system remained secure to the engine and was partially crushed from impact forces. It was inspected via borescope and no blockage was observed.

The fuel flow divider remained secure to the crankcase spine. All four fuel injection lines remained secure to the flow divider, and to their respective fuel injection nozzles. The fuel inlet line remained secure to the flow divider. The flow divider and lines were removed and the flow divider was disassembled. The diaphragm was brittle and destroyed consistent with exposure to extreme heat, and no blockage was observed in the flow divider. Air was blown through the inlet fitting and was observed coming out of all four injection nozzle lines. All four fuel injection nozzles were removed and oil was present in the No. 2 and No. 4 nozzles (oil likely from the orientation of the engine after the accident). The oil was blown out and no contamination was observed in any of the fuel injection nozzles. All four of the nozzles had the restrictor inserts installed. Air was blown through the flow divider inlet fuel line and fuel flow transducer, no obstructions observed. 

The engine-driven fuel pump remained attached to the engine accessory housing with the fuel inlet and outlines secure to it. The fuel inlet line had been cut during the engine recovery process. The engine driven pump was removed; it did not create inlet suction and outlet pressure when the lever was actuated. The pump was disassembled, the diaphragms were brittle and destroyed consistent with exposure to extreme heat. The fuel pump was filled with engine oil. 

The left and right magnetos remained secure to the engine accessory housing with the harness caps secure to the magnetos. The magnetos were removed and both drives were found secure via castle nut and cotter pin. The left magneto’s drive was not free to not rotate. While the right magneto’s drive rotated, no spark was observed. Both of the magnetos displayed thermal damage consistent with exposure to the postimpact fire. 

About 6 gallons of fuel was removed from the right wing fuel tank. The fuel was blue in color and smelled like 100LL fuel. No water or debris was found in the right fuel tank. The left fuel tank was consumed by fire.

• Conditions at Accident Site: VMC 
• Condition of Light: Day
• Observation Facility, Elevation: SCH,378 ft msl 
• Observation Time: 10:49 Local
• Distance from Accident Site: 20 Nautical Miles 
• Temperature/Dew Point: 11°C /0°C
• Lowest Cloud Condition: 
• Wind Speed/Gusts, Direction: 19 knots / 28 knots, 280°
• Lowest Ceiling: Overcast / 2600 ft AGL 
• Visibility: 10 miles
• Altimeter Setting: 2922 inches Hg 
• Type of Flight Plan Filed: NONE
• Departure Point: Ballston Spa, NY 
• Destination: Punta Gorda, FL (PGD)