Monday, May 26, 2025

Diamond DA40 NG Star, N499BW, accident occurred on May 7, 2025, at Raleigh Executive Jetport (KTTA), Sanford, North Carolina

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

Aviation Accident Preliminary Report - National Transportation Safety Board

Investigator In Charge (IIC): Boggs, Daniel

Additional Participating Entities:

  • Dave Laycock; FAA; Greensboro, NC

https://registry.faa.gov/AircraftInquiry/Search/NNumberResult?nNumberTxt=N499BW

https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/200131/pdf

  • Location: Sanford, NC 
  • Accident Number: ERA25LA198 
  • Date & Time: May 7, 2025, 16:00 Local 
  • Registration: N499BW 
  • Aircraft: DIAMOND AIRCRAFT IND INC DA 40 NG 
  • Injuries: 2 Serious 
  • Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General aviation - Personal 

On May 7, 2025, about 1600 eastern daylight time, a Diamond Aircraft DA 40 NG, N499BW, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Sanford, North Carolina. The pilot and passenger were seriously injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.

According to the passenger, who also served as the mechanic for the airplane, he completed the annual inspection on the airplane the week before the accident flight. He further stated that the pilot approached him on the day of the accident and asked him to check his gearbox oil level. The pilot stated it appeared to be lower than normal. The mechanic checked and found the oil plug gasket had a tear in it and replaced the gasket with a new one. He then cleaned and ran the engine to check for leaks. The engine check was good, and the pilot asked the mechanic to go for a test flight around the airport traffic pattern with him for a touch-and-go landing, and then a full-stop landing.

They departed runway 21 at Raleigh Executive Jetport at Sanford-Lee County Airport (TTA), Sanford, North Carolina. Runway 21 was 6,501 ft long, 100 ft wide, and consisted of asphalt. They circled around to perform a touch-and-go landing on runway 21; however, before landing the pilot decided to do a “go around” and leveled off the airplane above the runway. As they were flying down the runway, the engine “popped” like a “backfire” and the pilot tried to land on the remaining runway. They were going too fast and did not have enough runway length left.

The pilot bounced the airplane twice and said they were going to go around. The pilot applied engine power, and the mechanic heard the engine rpm increase. Then the pilot turned the airplane left and they “fell” and impacted the ground. He did not recall anything after that. 

Due to his injuries, the pilot was unable to provide a statement.

The wreckage has been retained for further examination.

Aeroplane Manufactory Chinook Plus 2, N3300K, fatal accident occurred on May 16, 2025, near Alexandria Field Airport (N85), Pittstown, New Jersey

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

Aviation Accident Preliminary Report - National Transportation Safety Board

Investigator In Charge (IIC): Gretz, Robert

Additional Participating Entities:

  • Michael Richert; FAA/FSDO; Allentown, PA

https://registry.faa.gov/AircraftInquiry/Search/NNumberResult?nNumberTxt=N3300K

https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/200165/pdf

  • Location: Pittstown, NJ 
  • Accident Number: ERA25FA202 
  • Date & Time: May 16, 2025, 16:42 Local 
  • Registration: N3300K 
  • Aircraft: HARTEVELD DREW J CHINOOK PLUS 2 
  • Injuries: 1 Fatal 
  • Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General aviation - Personal

On May 16, 2025, about 1642 eastern daylight time, an experimental, amateur-built Chinook Plus 2, N3300K, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Pittstown, NJ. The private pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.

A witness at the airport was a friend of the accident pilot and was standing near his hangar at the time of the accident takeoff. He stated that the pilot had been training in a Piper J3, but did not have any flight experience in the make and model accident airplane. He further stated that the takeoff was the pilot’s first flight in the airplane. Just prior to the takeoff, the pilot performed either a takeoff attempt or a high-speed taxi on runway 26. During that run, the pilot lost control of the airplane and it ground looped on grass off the left side of the runway, but did not sustain damage. The pilot then taxied back to the beginning of runway 26 and performed the accident takeoff.

During the takeoff, the airplane traveled on the ground about halfway down the 2,550-ft-long asphalt runway, which was much more than is required for liftoff. The airplane drifted left again, struck and severed a runway light with its left wing strut. The pilot continued the takeoff, climbed, and performed two orbits around the airport, before descending vertically to the accident site.

The wreckage came to inverted in a wooded area about 1/2-mile north of the airport, oriented on a magnetic heading of 135°. A postcrash fire had consumed a majority of the wreckage. All four corners of the airplane were identified, and no debris path was observed. One treetop near the wreckage had been severed. The empennage remained partially intact and crushed, with the rudder and elevator remaining attached. Flight control continuity for the elevator and rudder were confirmed from the control surfaces to the cockpit area, which had been consumed by fire, and cable breaks exhibited broomstraw features. The left wing had been consumed by fire and the frame was resting vertically against a tree. The right wing remained intact and inverted. Both ailerons remained attached to their respective wing. The aileron control cables had been pulled from both wings and were not identified.

Review of the airframe and engine lookbook revealed that the pilot completed assembly of the airplane from a kit in 2025 and it was issued an experimental airworthiness certificate on April 29, 2025. The airplane was equipped with a Rotax 912, 80-hp engine, driving a GCS Systems three-blade wooden propeller. As of an engine logbook entry dated December 12, 2024, the engine had accrued 11.5 hours since new, consistent with ground runs.

The engine came to rest inverted and remained intact. All three propeller blades remained attached to the hub. Two blades were undamaged, and one was partially separated and remained buried in the ground. The crankshaft was not seized and could be rotated 45° in each direction, with restriction due to the propeller blade buried in the ground.

Review of the private pilot’s logbook revealed that he had accrued 443 total hours of flight experience, with his last flight on May 11, 2025, in a Piper J3. There was no record of any flight experience in the make and model accident airplane.

The wreckage was retained for further examination.

Thursday, May 22, 2025

Cessna S550 Citation S/II, N666DS, fatal accident occurred on May 22, 2025, near Montgomery-Gibbs Executive Airport (MYF/KMYF), San Diego, California

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

https://registry.faa.gov/AircraftInquiry/Search/NNumberResult?nNumberTxt=N666DS

Daviator LLC

- History of Flight:
On May 22, 2025, at about 0336 local time, a Cessna S550 Citation S/II jet, registered to Daviator LLC out of Homer, Alaska, N666DS, was destroyed when it collided with powerlines and residential terrain while on an instrument approach to the Montgomery-Gibbs Executive Airport (MYF/KMYF), San Diego, California. Two fatalities have been confirmed at this point, but it is unknown if there are any additional ones. There were no ground fatalities. Twenty homes and multiple vehicles were either damaged or destroyed by the impact and post crash fire.

According to preliminary flight-track history, on May 21, 2025, at about 2315 local time, the airplane departed Teterboro Airport (TEB/KTEB), Teterboro, New Jersey, on a flight to San Diego. At 0149 LT, about 3 hours and 30 minutes after departure from KTEB, the airplane stopped at Colonel James Jabara Airport (KAAO), Wichita, Kansas, for fuel. At 0236 local time, the airplane departed KAAO with a presumed destination of KMYF (Figure 1).

Figure 1: Flight Path

According to preliminary Automatic Dependent Surveillance–Broadcast data, the airplane departed runway 18 at KAAO and entered a climbing right turn to an inflight cruising altitude of 40,000 ft. At about 0314:00 LT, the airplane entered a cruise descent from that altitude towards San Diego.

According to ATC communications, the pilot contacted SoCal approach and stated "Socal Citation 666DS descending through 17,000 for 12,000", the approach controller responded, "Citation 666DS, SoCal Approach. The Montgomery ASOS is out of service. Which approach would you like?" The pilot responded, "Yeah, 6DS, we noticed that. We'll take the RNAV 28 please." The approach controller stated, "Citation 666DS, cleared direct NESTY, Descend at pilots discretion, maintain 9,000." The pilot responded "OK direct NESTY, descending for 9,000."

A few seconds later, the pilot asked the approach controller "6DS, I just wanted to know if you had any idea on the weather. I've got the Gillespie weather but I am sure you know, sometimes it can be dramatically different between Gillespie and Montgomery." The approach controller responded "6DS, Let me see what I can find out for you." The pilot then stated "Okay, thanks. Yeah, current at Gillespie is pretty much down to minimums so I just want to see what I'm in for here." The controller then said "Okay, no problem."

Later, the approach controller contacted the pilot "Citation 666DS, I've got the Miramar Automated Weather for 0955Z with wind calm, visibility 1/2, and indefinite ceiling 200." The pilot responded "6DS, alright, that doesn't sound great, but we'll give it a go." The controller responded "6DS, roger. Descend and maintain 5,500." The pilot replied "Alright, descending 5,500, 6DS."

The pilot then contacted the approach controller and said "6DS, just in case we have to go missed, what does Brown look? Is it looking pretty similar." The controller responded "Let me take a look." A few seconds later, the controller went back to the pilot "6DS. affirmative. A little bit better but not much. They're showing... standby..." "Okay they're showing 1031Z weather wind calm visibility 2 1/2, mist, ceiling 300 broken - correction - 300' overcast." The pilot responded "Okay, 6DS, little bit better, but higher minimums, so probably not a good option either. So I'll come back to you with an alternate just in case".

Later, the controller stated "Citation 666DS, Socal, are you gonna make the descent okay from there or do you want me to turn you out to the south? The pilot responded "6DS, no, I think we will be alright." The controller replies "Citation 666DS, roger, 5 miles from NESTY, cross at or above 3800', cleared RNAV runway 28R approach." The pilot then stated "Alright, At or above 3800', cleared RNAV 28R approach, Montgomery."

The approach controller stated, "Citation 666DS, report your IFR cancellation after landing via the phone. Do you have the number?" The pilot answers "Okay, yeah, I've got the number." The controller stated "6DS, roger, and frequency change approved." The pilot then stated "6DS, thanks, we'll hopefully not see ya... but we might have to." The controller says "roger."

During the final approach, the pilot stated the following on the CTAF (Common traffic advisory frequency) "Montgomery traffic, Citation 666DS, 3 miles final 28." Additionally, 7 mic clicks could be heard. There were no additional communications received from the pilot.

The ADS-B data indicated that at about 0343:52 the airplane was about 10 miles from the runway threshold at 3500 ft msl and established at point NESTY (Figure 2). At 0344:16, the airplane was about 7 miles from the runway threshold at 2500 ft and established at point PENNY with a reported ground speed of 180 knots. At 0346:10, the airplane was about 3 miles from the runway threshold at 1200 ft (about 180 ft below point PALOS). the final ADS-B datapoint was located about 1.70 miles from the runway 28R threshold. The airplane was at 500 ft, 124 knots groundspeed, and descending -2000 fpm. (Figure 3)

Figure 2: airplane at point NESTY (Credit: FlySto)
Figure 3: last ADS-B return (Credit: FlySto)
Figure 4: Speed and Altitude (not corrected, credit: FlySto)


The airplane struck a set of marked high tension powerlines, descended, then struck a light pole before impacting a residential structure about 2 miles from runway 28R. A post crash fire ensued.

- Pilot Info:
The pilot, aged 42, held an airline pilot certificate, with a rating for airplane multiengine land. He also held commercial privileges for airplane single engine land, airplane single engine sea, rotorcraft/helicopter, instrument helicopter. He held two type ratings, one for the CE-500 jet, and one for the CE-525S jet (which he was subject to pilot in command limitations). He also held a flight instructor and ground instructor certificates. His third class FAA medical was issued on 11/2024, with the following note:

Must use corrective lens(es) to meet vision standards at all required distances.
Not valid for any class after 11/30/2025.

- Aircraft Info:
The accident airplane, MSN S550-0056, was manufactured in 1985. It was powered by two P&W Canada JT15D-4 engines.

The passenger shared a screenshot from the right hand seat, which suggests the airplane was equipped with a Garmin 750 (Figure 5).

Figure 5: Screenshot shared by passenger, note LPV mins (Source: Instagram)

The airplane was originally certificated for two pilots. However, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) allowed an exemption (9917) for single- pilot operations if that pilot accomplished training in accordance with an FAA- approved training program.

According to the FAA "14 CFR § 97.3 - Symbols and terms used in procedures."
As used in the standard instrument procedures prescribed in this part—

Aircraft approach category means a grouping of aircraft based on a speed of VREF, if specified, or if VREF is not specified, 1.3 Vso at the maximum certificated landing weight. VREF, Vso, and the maximum certificated landing weight are those values as established for the aircraft by the certification authority of the country of registry. The categories are as follows—

(1) Category A: Speed less than 91 knots.

(2) Category B: Speed 91 knots or more but less than 121 knots.

(3) Category C: Speed 121 knots or more but less than 141 knots.

(4) Category D: Speed 141 knots or more but less than 166 knots.

(5) Category E: Speed 166 knots or more.

Based on the Cessna S550 Citation S/II specs, it falls under under Category C.

- Airport Info:
The Montgomery-Gibbs Executive Airport is a public airport located six miles north of downtown San Diego, California. The airport covers an area of 456 acres and features three runways, one public helipad, and two private helipads. The runways are 28R/10L and 28L/10R (parallel) and 5/23 (Figure 6).

Runway 28R is equipped with an ILS approach, with an inbound course of 281 degrees magnetic heading. The charted Category A and B aircraft landing minimums are a descent altitude of 673 feet msl (250 feet agl), and a visibility of 3/4 mile. The touchdown zone elevation is 427 feet msl. Category C and D are not allowed to fly this approach. (Figure 7)

Figure 6 : KMYF (Source: Google Earth)
Figure 7: RNAV (GPS) Runway 28R Approach Plate


- Wreckage and Impact Info:
The first identified point of impact was damage noted to a high tension powerline and aircraft parts that were located under it. These powerlines are marked as an obstruction on the approach plate, standing at 554 ft.

After the powerline strike, the airplane descended into a residential street, struck a light pole with one of the wings , then impacted a residential structure. The airplane was destroyed by impact forces and post crash fire (figure 8).

Figure 8: Main Wreckage (courtesy: AP Photo/William Liang)

- Weather:
At the time of the accident, the KMYF ASOS was not working, observations at other nearby airports;

KNKX (8 km NNWW of accident location)
METAR KNKX 220955Z 00000KT 1/2SM VV002 15/14 A2990 RMK AO2 SLP120 T01500144
METAR KNKX 221055Z 00000KT 1/2SM VV002 14/14 A2989 RMK AO2 SLP117 T01440144

KSEE (13 km ENE of accident location)
METAR KSEE 221035Z AUTO 00000KT 1/2SM FG OVC002 14/14 A2989 RMK AO2
METAR KSEE 221055Z AUTO 00000KT 1/2SM BR OVC002 14/14 A2989 RMK AO2

KSAN (11 km SW of accident location)
METAR KSAN 221016Z 13004KT 9SM OVC010 17/14 A2991 RMK AO2 T01720144
METAR KSAN 221051Z 17003KT 9SM OVC010 17/14 A2991 RMK AO2 SLP127 T01670144

The National Weather Service released the following area forecast discussion around the time of the accident:
358
FXUS66 KSGX 220943
AFDSGX

Area Forecast Discussion
National Weather Service San Diego CA
243 AM PDT Thu May 22 2025

.SYNOPSIS...
High pressure aloft will weaken with a low pressure system moving
inland through California on Friday night. High temperatures will
cool from around 10 degrees above average today to within a few
degrees of average on Saturday. Sunday will be around 5 degrees
warmer, then gradual cooling to around average for next Wednesday.
There will periods of stronger and gusty southwest to west winds
for the mountains and deserts during the afternoon and evening
for today and Thursday with the stronger gusts today to 30 to 40
mph and on Thursday to 35 to 45 mph. The marine layer will deepen
into Saturday with night and morning coastal low clouds spreading
farther inland into the valleys each morning through Saturday.
Coastal low clouds won`t extend as far into the valleys on Sunday.
For the early and middle part of next week, the marine layer will
be deepen with night and morning coastal low clouds extending
inland across much of the inland valleys with slower or more
limited afternoon clearing near the coast.

&&

.AVIATION...
220900Z...Coast...Patchy low clouds have pushed inland up to 10
miles so far with bases ranging from 400ft to 900ft MSL. VIS for
coastal mesas and valleys 0-2SM while elsewhere VIS is generally
above 6SM. Brief lowering of bases down to 200-400ft MSL with
worsening VIS possible for coastal sites, especially after 12z.
Clearing to the beaches will occur by 16-17z, but clouds may
linger offshore through the afternoon. Marine layer redevelops
again tonight, pushing ashore as early as 02-03z with slightly
higher bases likely above 700ft MSL and better VIS. Clearing
Friday morning expected at a similar time as this morning, around
17-18z.

Elsewhere...Clear with unrestricted vis through tonight.

Wednesday, May 21, 2025

Boeing 767-3S2F, N178FE, incident occurred on March 1, 2025, near Newark-Liberty International Airport (EWR/KEWR), Newark, NJ

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

Aviation Investigation Report - National Transportation Safety Board

The National Transportation Safety Board did not travel the scene of this incident.

Investigator In Charge (IIC): Brazy, Douglass

Additional Participating Entities:

  • David Frassinelli; Federal Express; Memphis, TN 
  • Heidi Kemner; FAA/AVP110; Washington, DC 
  • Michael Germani; Boeing; Seattle, WA 
  • James Easton; General Electric Aerospace ; Cincinnati, OH 
  • Martin Wolf; Swiss Transportation Safety Investigation Board; Payerne, OF 

https://registry.faa.gov/AircraftInquiry/Search/NNumberResult?nNumberTxt=N178FE

https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/199780/pdf
  • Location: Newark, NJ 
  • Incident Number: DCA25FA148 
  • Date & Time: March 1, 2025, 08:00 Local 
  • Registration: N178FE 
  • Aircraft: Boeing 767 
  • Injuries: 3 None 
  • Flight Conducted Under: Part 121: Air carrier - Non-scheduled 

On March 1, 2025, at 0800 eastern standard time, FedEx flight 3609, a Boeing 767-300F, powered by two General Electric CF6-80C2 turbofan engines, registration number N178FE, struck birds during initial climb after takeoff from Newark Liberty International Airport (EWR), Newark, New Jersey. There were no injuries to the 2 crew and 1 passenger on board. The flight was conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 domestic cargo flight from EWR to Indianapolis International Airport (IND), Indianapolis, Indiana.


The flight crewmembers reported that after takeoff and while climbing through an altitude of about 500 ft, the first officer (FO), who was the flying pilot, saw three white birds to the left side and underneath the airplane. He called “Birds!” and immediately thereafter heard an “abrupt bang” and the airplane experienced moderate to severe vibrations. The FO began a right turn back towards the airport and asked the captain to declare an emergency and advise Air Traffic Control (ATC) that they were returning to EWR.


The captain checked the engine indications “which soondisplayed right engine damage including fire indications (fire bell, warning lights, discrete fire light on the right fuel control) and an R ENGINE FIRE message on the Engine Indicating and Crew Alerting System (EICAS) display”. As the FO continued to fly, the captain began the quick reference checklist (QRC) for the ‘ENGINE FIRE or Engine Severe Damage or Separation’, which resulted in the shutdown of the No. 2 (right engine) and discharge of one fire bottle. After the engine was shutdown, the airplane “flew much smoother” and the noise level reduced substantially. As the captain continued through the follow-up quick reference handbook (QRH) procedure, the fire indications persisted, and he discharged the 2nd fire bottle. However, the fire indications remained present for the rest of the flight.


The crew asked the passenger, who was type rated in the airplane, to move to the first observer seat and assist with checklists and airplane monitoring. During the base traffic pattern leg, the captain took control of the airplane from the FO, who assumed the pilot monitoring duties. After issuing the landing clearance, ATC initially advised that it appeared as though the fire on the right engine had gone out. Shortly afterward ATC called and advised there was fire visible on the right engine.


After landing, the captain stopped the airplane on the runway, shut down the left engine and contacted the aircraft rescue and fire fighting (ARFF) responders on the tower frequency. ARFF advised that fire was still visible, and they began applying water. Soon after, all the fire indications in the cockpit ceased. After receiving an “all clear” from the ARFF responders, the crew exited the airplane via the crew stairs.


A post accident examination of the airplane revealed bird remnants on the No. 1 engine nacelle (on the inside and outside of the inlet) as well as on sections of the engine spinner, fan blades, inlet and outlet guide vanes, the thrust reverser blocker doors, and on the drag link arms. All the fan blades were present and whole, several of the fan blades exhibited round soft-body airfoil leading-edge impacts and blade tip bending. The nacelle inlet lip skin was dented/impacted at about the 9:00 o’clock position with evidence of bird remains at the 2:30 o’clock position but no impact damage.


Bird remnants were present on the No. 2 engine spinner and fan blades, and on the thrust reverser blocker door drag links. All of the fan blades were present and exhibited a combination of leading edge and airfoil hard-body impact, missing material, gouging, tip rub, rips and tears, and bending in both the direction opposite of rotation and in the direction of rotation. One blade was fractured just outboard of the mid-span shroud. The inlet inner barrel liner exhibited multiple impact marks, holes, areas of missing material, trenching, and embedded metallic material, around the entire circumference.


Several through-hole penetrations were also noted in the inlet outer barrel. The outer skin of the turbine exhaust sleeve departed the engine and was recovered in a grassy field near Interstate 95 along the airplane’s flight path. The No. 2 engine was heavily damaged by fire. Sooting and thermal distress were present 360° circumferentially from the aft flange of the aft fan case to the rear flange of the combustion case. Sooting was also present along the length of the top of the engine from the 11:00 – 1:00 o’clock position. Thermal distress consisted of consumed electrical wire outer sheathing and isolator grommets, as well as damaged or consumed wire clamp cushions. Portions of some air, oil, and fuel tubes were consumed by fire.


The right side of the airplane exhibited multiple small impact marks in the horizontal stabilizer, fuselage, and the wing control surfaces, consistent with debris liberated from the No 2 engine. None of this damage met the definition of substantial damage or affected the flight control system of the airplane.


Qualified parties were invited to participate in the investigation. These included the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Federal Express, Boeing Commercial Airplanes, and General Electric Aerospace. In accordance with the provisions of Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, an Accredited Representative from the Swiss Transportation Safety Investigation Board of Switzerland, the State of Manufacture for the engine vibration monitor, was appointed to support the investigation, with Paker Meggitt as a technical advisor.


The following NTSB specialists were assigned to investigate the accident: Powerplants, Flight Data Recorder (FDR), and Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR). The FDR and CVR were sent to the NTSB’s Vehicle Recorder Laboratory in Washington, DC. 


The investigation is continuing.

Boeing 737 MAX 9, N958AK, accident occurred on December 26, 2024, near Henderson, Nevada

This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

Aviation Investigation Preliminary Report - National Transportation Safety Board

The National Transportation Safety Board did not travel the scene of this incident.

Investigator In Charge (IIC): Brazy, Douglass

Additional Participating Entities:

  • Melanie Folcik Barillaro; FAA/AVP-110; Washington, DC 
  • Christoper Rosati; NATCA; Washington, DC 
  • Rick Domingo; Alaska Airlines; Seattle, WA

https://registry.faa.gov/AircraftInquiry/Search/NNumberResult?nNumberTxt=N958AK

https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/199474/pdf
  • Location: Henderson, NV 
  • Accident Number: DCA25FA071 
  • Date & Time: December 26, 2024, 13:35 Local 
  • Registration: N958AK 
  • Aircraft: Boeing 737 
  • Injuries: 2 Serious, 1 Minor, 181 None 
  • Flight Conducted Under: Part 121: Air carrier - Scheduled 

On December 26, 2024, at 1335 pacific standard time, Alaska Airlines flight 700, a Boeing 737- 9, N958AK, encountered severe turbulence during cruise flight, near Henderson, Nevada. Of the 181 passengers and crew, two flight attendants received serious injuries, and one received a minor injury. The flight was conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 scheduled domestic passenger flight from Seattle-Tacoma International Airport (SEA), Seattle, Washington, to Phoenix Sky Harbor International Airport (PHX), Phoenix, Arizona.


The flight crew reported that during the first half of the flight, the turbulence they experienced was “no worse than light chop”. They were aware that worse turbulence was expected during the second half of the flight, as indicated by weather products and advisories provided in the dispatch paperwork for the flight. Additionally, they monitored a company weather app and had communication with their dispatch while enroute for any updates to weather conditions and turbulence forecasts.


Before the flight, the pilots had briefed the lead flight attendant in advance about when they should perform service and prepare for landing, due to the expected turbulence. As the airplane approached the area of expected turbulence, while at flight level (FL) 330, the first officer made a public address announcement to advise the passengers that the seatbelt sign would be turned on in about 15 minutes, and the flight attendants would then also be seated. The airplane encountered light turbulence 15 minutes later, and the first officer turned on the seatbelt sign and informed the flight attendants that the turbulence was expected to worsen, and that they should prepare the cabin and take their seats. The first officer checked in with air traffic control (ATC) and reported experiencing light with occasional moderate turbulence. ATC advised that there were areas of light chop throughout the Las Vegas area, and that there were no reports of turbulence more intense than the light chop.


About 15 minutes later the airplane encountered severe turbulence. Two flight attendants were seriously injured, and one non-revenue flight attendant passenger sustained a minor injury. All were located in the rear gally area when the turbulence occurred and were not restrained.


The pilots declared a medical emergency and elected to continue to Phoenix, after determining that a diversion to the nearest airport would result in routing through the area of expected turbulence. The remainder of the flight was uneventful. EMS personnel met the airplane at the gate and four flight attendants were subsequently transported to the hospital.


A post accident review of weather data revealed that a Significant Meteorological Information (SIGMET) advisory was issued at 1213 which forecasted occasional severe turbulence between FL270 and FL400 due to wind shear associated with the jetstream in an area surrounding the accident location. A pilot report (PIREP) had previously included such conditions 5 minutes prior to the accident in the general vicinity of the turbulence encounter location. Additionally, an Airman’s Meteorological Information (AIRMET) advisory was issued for the area at 1245, which forecasted moderate turbulence between FL180 and FL400. Satellite and weather radar data for the accident area indicated there was cloud cover above the turbulence encounter locations and no precipitation echoes, respectively.


Qualified parties were invited to participate in the investigation. These included Alaska Airlines, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and National Air Traffic Controllers Association. The following NTSB specialists were assigned to investigate the accident: Air Traffic Control, Meteorology, and Operations.


The investigation is continuing. 

Boeing 717-2BD, N942AT, incident occurred on February 24, 2025, at Atlanta Hartsfield-Jackson International Airport (ATL/KATL), Atlanta, Georgia

 This is preliminary information, subject to change, and may contain errors. Any errors in this report will be corrected when the final report has been completed.

Aviation Investigation Report - National Transportation Safety Board

The National Transportation Safety Board did not travel the scene of this incident.

Investigator In Charge (IIC): Brazy, Douglass

Additional Participating Entities:

  • Patrick Lusch; FAA/AVP100; Washington, DC 
  • Josh Migdal; Delta Air Lines; Atlanta, GA 
  • Steve Haggarty; Boeing; Seattle , WA 
  • Richard Lewis; Rolls Royce; Bristol, OF 
  • Thomas Karge; BFU ; Braunschweig, OF 

https://registry.faa.gov/AircraftInquiry/Search/NNumberResult?nNumberTxt=N942AT

https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/199761/pdf


On February 24, 2025, at 0848 eastern standard time, Delta Air Lines flight 876, a Boeing 717- 200, N942AT, experienced smoke in the cabin and cockpit during takeoff from Atlanta Hartsfield/Jackson International Airport (ATL), Atlanta Georgia. The airplane returned to the airport, landed safely, and the crew conducted an emergency evacuation. There were 99 passengers and crew on board, and two passengers received minor injuries during the evacuation. The flight was conducted under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 scheduled domestic passenger flight from ATL to Columbia Metro Airport (CAE), Columbia, South Carolina.


During the takeoff roll, flight attendants (FA) in both the forward and aft areas of the cabin saw smoke. The two FAs in the forward section first noticed it emanating from the area over the L1 door. The FA In the aft section first noticed it “coming out of all the vents”. Both the FA in the aft section and the lead FA in the forward section attempted to contact the pilots using the emergency call button but did not get a response. They also took turns using the interphone to try and announce to the pilots that there was smoke in the cabin. After takeoff, the lead FA also knocked on the cockpit door.


The aft flight attendant made a public address announcement to the passengers, advised that they were aware of and trained for the situation and to remain calm. The lead FA recalled that the smoke was very thick, and that he was unable to see past the first row of seats. A nonrevenue flight attendant who had been in a jumpseat, self-deployed to the exit row to prevent an unanticipated evacuation, or assist in evacuation if one ensued.


The pilots reported that just as the airplane rotated for takeoff, they heard the flight attendant call chime and knocking on the flight deck door. Shortly thereafter smoke was visible rising from the floor near the rear of the cockpit. They donned their oxygen masks and initially delayed responding to the flight attendant calls, as the captain focused on flying the airplane while first officer declared an emergency with air traffic control. 


Shortly after takeoff, a master caution alert for smoke detected in the forward lavatory occurred. The first officer began the quick reference handbook (QRH) checklist for this alert and then attempted to communicate with the cabin crew using the handset phone. He recalled that he could hear the cabin crew, but when he spoke, they could not hear him. As the lead FA began to unlock the cockpit door, he was able to hear the first officer on the interphone advise that the pilots were aware and returning to the airport. The lead FA then relayed that information to the other cabin crew and passengers. 


Soon after, an alarm warning of low oil pressure for the right engine occurred in the cockpit. The crew performed the QRH procedure which ultimately led them to shut down the right engine.


As the airplane was returning to the airport, the captain elected to change the approach from runway 27R to 27L “in order to get glidepath guidance since our visibility was restricted due to the smoke and the facemask”. The remainder of the approach and landing were uneventful.


The crew stopped the airplane on the runway after landing and the airport rescue and fire fighting vehicles arrived soon after. The pilots opened the flight deck door, noticed a “tremendous” amount of smoke in the cabin, and the captain immediately ordered an evacuation. The aft FA coordinated the evacuation through the tailcone door with no anomalies. The lead FA managed door 1L, which he initially had some difficulty opening but succeeded on his 3rd attempt. The 3rd FA managed the evacuation through the 1R door with no anomalies.


The non-revenue FA managed the overwing emergency exits evacuation. She remained on the wing with some passengers who were unable to jump from the wing to the ground. The airplane does not have evacuation slides for the overwing exits, the egress path is to slide down the trailing edge of the wing. The wing flaps were extended to 25° prior to the evacuation (in accordance with the checklist) to reduce the height from the wing to ground.


She coordinated with the other three FAs and they determined at that time, because there were no remaining risks inside or outside the cabin, the passengers remaining on both wings could reenter the cabin and evacuate using the 3 usable deployed doors slides.


The airplane was equipped with Rolls Royce model BR715-C1 engines. During a post incident examination, maintenance personnel found no oil visible in the sight glass of the right engine oil reservoir, indicating the quantity was at or near zero. Examination of the right engine’s components continues.


Qualified parties were invited to participate in the investigation. These included the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Delta Air Lines, and Boeing Commercial Airplanes. In accordance with the provisions of Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, an Accredited Representative from the Federal Bureau of Aircraft Accidents Investigation (BFU) of Germany, the State of Manufacture for the engines, was appointed to support the investigation with Rolls Royce as a technical advisor.


An NTSB flight data recorder specialist has been assigned. The investigation continues. 

Cessna 421C Golden Eagle, N245T, fatal accident occurred on June 17, 2024, near Steamboat Springs Airport/Bob Adams Field (SBS/KSBS), Steamboat Springs, Colorado

The National Transportation Safety Board travelled to the scene of this accident.

Investigator In Charge (IIC): Aguilera, Jason

Additional Participating Entities:

  • Harold Robertson; FAA FSDO; Denver, CO 
  • PJ Beavers; Textron Aviation; Wichita, KS 
  • Ernie Hall; Textron Aviation; Wichita, KS 
  • J Ferrell; Continental Motors; Mobile, AL 

https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/194487/pdf

https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=194487

http://registry.faa.gov/AircraftInquiry/Search/NNumberResult?nNumberTxt=N245T

  • Location: Steamboat Springs, Colorado 
  • Accident Number: CEN24FA228 
  • Date & Time: June 17, 2024, 16:23 Local 
  • Registration: N245T 
  • Aircraft: Cessna 421 
  • Aircraft Damage: Destroyed 
  • Defining Event: Loss of control in flight 
  • Injuries: 2 Fatal 
  • Flight Conducted Under: Part 91: General aviation - Personal 

On June 17, 2024, about 1623 mountain daylight time, a Cessna 421C airplane, N245T, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Steamboat Springs, Colorado. The pilot and passenger were fatally injured. The airplane was operated under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 as a personal flight.


While enroute to the destination airport, the pilot reported a “cylinder temperature issue' to air traffic control (ATC) and the pilot diverted to another airport for a visual approach. The pilot overflew the airport and requested vectors for another visual approach. He then requested vectors to divert to an airport to the east before he informed air traffic control that the left engine lost power, and he received vectors back to the airport for a visual approach. The pilot maneuvered the airplane to land on runway 14, but for an unknown reason he decided to land on runway 32 instead. A pilot-rated witness reported that he observed the airplane while it was on the base to final turn for runway 32.  He reported that the airplane's wings leveled momentarily before it made a 60° left-bank turn and then entered a stall/spin in a counterclockwise rotation. The airplane impacted a trailer park about 0.38 miles from the approach end of runway 32. A postimpact fire ensued and destroyed the airplane.


Examination of the airframe, flight controls, and the right engine did not detect any preimpact anomalies that would have precluded normal operation.


Examination of the left engine found that the starter adapter spline was worn, with broken teeth on its crankshaft gear. The crankshaft gear remained properly timed with the crankshaft cluster gear, the investigation could not determine if the idler gear, which drives the magnetos, slipped timing. Mistiming of the magnetos could result in abnormal cylinder head temperature(s). In addition, there was improper hardware securing the cylinder No. 6 intake valve, which might have altered performance of that valve. Due to thermal damage, testing of the ignition and fuel systems could not be accomplished. Evidence of detonation was observed on the left engine's piston heads. The installed engine data monitor was destroyed by the postimpact fire and did not provide further details as to the operational condition of the engine before the accident. 


Inspection of the starter adapter assembly is required annually by airworthiness directive and was accomplished on the most recent annual inspection. The airplane had flown at least 4.5 hours since the inspection.


- Probable Cause: 

The pilot's failure to maintain sufficient airspeed following a loss of engine power, which resulted in an inadvertent aerodynamic stall/spin at low altitude.