- Location: Orlando, Florida
- Accident Number: ERA24LA100
- Date & Time: January 28, 2024, 16:23 Local
- Registration: N103JT
- Aircraft: HONDA AIRCRAFT CO LLC HA-420
- Aircraft Damage: Substantial
- Defining Event: Loss of control on ground
- Injuries: 4 None
- Flight Conducted Under: Part 135: Air taxi & commuter - Non-scheduled
https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/193714/pdf
https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket?ProjectID=193714
On January 28, 2024, about 1623 eastern standard time, a Honda Aircraft Company LLC HA420 airplane, N103JT, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident at Orlando International Airport (MCO), Orlando, Florida. The airline transport pilot, commercial co-pilot, and two passengers were not injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 on-demand passenger flight.
The on-demand air taxi flight proceeded to the destination airport and, about 1 hour and 22 minutes before landing, the flight crew reviewed the destination airport automated terminal information service (ATIS), which indicated the wind was from 270° at 14 kts, gusting to 24 kts. The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recorded the crew discussing the crosswind component of the winds reported on the ATIS, the aircraft operating limitations, company procedures, and an alternate airport, but the pilot flying (PF) elected to continue to the planned destination airport.
About 16 minutes before the airplane touched down, when it was about 39 nautical miles (nm) from the destination airport, the PF advised the pilot monitoring (PM) that he checked the airport’s automated surface observing system (ASOS) and reported the wind velocity was currently at 270° at 13-14 kts. While on final approach, about 1.2 nm from the approach end of runway 36L, the tower controller advised that the wind was from 290° at 19 kts, gusting to 24 kts.
The PF continued the approach and just about when the airplane was at touchdown the controller broadcast on the frequency for another airplane that was on approach that the wind was from 290° at 20 knots, gusting to 24 kts. After the airplane touched down, it began drifting to the left side of the runway. The PF applied left aileron control input, deployed the speedbrake, and applied right rudder; however, the airplane departed the runway and impacted a frangible runway distance-remaining sign. The PF then corrected the airplane to the right, returned it to the runway, and taxied off onto a taxiway, where the pilot stopped the airplane and evacuated.
Postaccident inspection of the airplane revealed substantial damage to the left wing’s forward spar in the area that impacted the sign. The rudder and aileron trims were found in the neutral position. The operator reported there was no preimpact mechanical failure or malfunction with the airplane that would have caused the runway excursion.
Although the PF reported about 16 minutes before touchdown that he received the ASOS observations for the previous 20 minutes and stated to the PM that the crosswind was at 13 or 14 kts, with the wind from 270° at 13 kts, a review of the 14 previous 5-minute ASOS observations revealed that gusts were reported in all but 2 of the 14 observations. The PF’s reference specifically to the wind being from 270° at 13 kts corresponded to an observation that also reported gusts to 24 kts, which occurred about 23 minutes before the airplane touched down. That gust value exceeded the airplane’s published crosswind limitation of 20 kts.
The gust values at the destination airport consistently exceeded the airplane’s published crosswind limitation for the majority of the 5-minute ASOS observations in 1 hour 23 minutes preceding the accident. These conditions should have necessitated either an earlier diversion to an alternate airport that was more aligned with the wind or a go-around during short final approach after the flight crew was informed, when the airplane was about 1.2 nm from the runway threshold, that the wind was gusting above the published crosswind limitation.
The PF chose to continue with the landing and, due to a crosswind gust, failed to maintain directional control of the airplane after landing. The PF also did not incorporate the gust values into the crosswind calculations about 16 minutes before the accident, which likely influenced his decision to continue the approach.
- Probable Cause: The failure of the pilot flying to maintain directional control after touchdown with wind gusts that exceeded the airplane’s crosswind limitation. Contributing to the accident were the flightcrew’s continued approach to the runway despite the consistent wind gust crosswind component that exceeded the airplane’s published crosswind limitation, and their incorrect wind gust crosswind calculation in flight.
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