- Location: Polykastro, OF
- Accident Number: DCA26FA274
- Date & Time: July 10, 2026, 06:21 Local
- Registration: 9H-QEU
- Aircraft: Boeing 737
- Injuries: 1 Serious, 154 None
- Flight Conducted Under: Non-U.S., commercial
https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/203363/pdf
Malta Air, doing business as Ryanair flight 1879, a Boeing 737-8AS, registration 9H-QEU,
experienced a No. 2 (right) engine fan-blade-out (FBO) failure during climb out from the
Thessaloniki International Airport (SKG), Thessaloniki, Greece. Engine fragments breached the
fuselage and the cabin depressurized. The crew elected to return to SKG where they made an
uneventful landing. The flight was a scheduled international passenger flight from SKG to
Memmingen Airport (FMM), Memmingen, Germany. There were 2 pilots, 4 flight attendants,
and 149 passengers (including one lap child) on board. One passenger sustained serious
injuries.
The NTSB traveled to the accident site. On July 16, 2026, the Greece Hellenic Air and Railway
Safety Investigation Authority (HARSIA) delegated the investigation in full to the NTSB. As part
of the investigative process, the NTSB invited qualified parties to participate in the
investigation. These included the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), The Boeing Company,
and GE Aerospace. In accordance with the provisions of Annex 13 to the Convention on
International Civil Aviation, the countries of Greece (State of Occurrence), Malta (State of the
Operator and Registry), and France (State of Manufacture of the Engines, jointly with the United
States) designated Accredited Representatives to the investigation, and Malta Air, Safran
Aircraft Engines, and the European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) were designated as
technical advisors.
The parties were formed into specialized investigative groups led by NTSB group chairs in the
areas of Powerplants, Structures and Survival Factors, and Materials Engineering. The Cockpit
Voice Recorder (CVR) and Flight Data Recorder (FDR) were sent to NTSB headquarters for download and specialists were assigned. The materials engineer traveled to France to lead the
engine fan blade examination.
History of Flight
According to the flight crew, while climbing through an altitude of about 16,000 ft, near
Polykastro, Greece, (about 4.5 nm south of the Greek border with Northern Macedonia) they
received a No. 2 engine HIGH VIBRATION indication. They reduced the engine power and
initiated the Engine High Vibration non-normal checklist. Shortly after, the engine vibration
indication was reduced. The crew subsequently continued the climb on autopilot.
The engine vibrations then increased significantly, they heard a loud bang, and the autopilot
was disengaged. While assessing the engine condition, the cabin altitude warning sounded.
The flight crew donned their oxygen masks, declared an emergency, and began an immediate
descent.
The flight attendants (FAs), who were preparing for cabin service, reported hearing and feeling
a loud continuous vibration and seeing a small amount of fog/smoke before the oxygen masks
dropped. One reported hearing an automated public address system announcement saying
“emergency descent”. Another recalled manually making an additional decompression
announcement.
The FAs recalled that passengers had donned their oxygen masks. FA2 and FA4 initially sat
down in the forward jumpseats and donned their oxygen masks, however FA4 moved to the
galley to use another mask after the one above the jumpseat detached from the overhead.
FA1 noticed some passengers were standing up and asking for help and responded to assist.
The FA noticed that the passenger in seat 11F was partially lodged in a damaged cabin
window, and that the entire window was missing. Other passengers were assisting and
managed to pull the injured passenger back into the cabin. The FA then sat in seat 11B and
donned an oxygen mask. That mask became detached and the FA used a different one.
A passenger went to the forward galley and asked the FA2 and FA4 for something heavy and
metal to try and block the broken cabin window hole and retrieved a metal box to bring back to
row 11.
The injured passenger was subsequently moved to row 12 and was attended to by a
passenger who was a doctor throughout the remainder of the flight. The doctor asked for first
aid equipment, and FA1 retrieved the forward first aid kit.
The FAs communicated with the flight deck, confirmed the flight crew were ok, and were
informed of the engine failure, decompression, and the intent to return to SKG with an
estimated time enroute of 20 minutes.
The FAs also received instructions to secure the cabin, which they did. The flight crew later
informed them when the oxygen masks were no longer necessary. After descending below
10,000 ft, the flight crew secured the No. 2 engine and returned to SKG uneventfully. The
airplane remained on the runway for an inspection and then proceeded to the gate, where first
responders were waiting.
Crew Experience
The captain was hired by Malta Air in May 2015. He had accrued a total of 8,270 flight hours,
7,683 of which were in the same make and model as the accident airplane. The first officer
was hired by Malta Air in March 2023. He had accrued a total of 2,523 flight hours, 2,333 of
which were in the same make and model as the accident airplane.
Airplane Examination
Examination of the airplane revealed that the No. 2 engine, an CFM International (a joint
company between Safran Aircraft Engines and GE Aerospace) model CFM56-7B26,
experienced a fan blade separation that resulted in engine fragments striking the fuselage and
the right horizontal stabilizer. The pressurized section of the fuselage was penetrated 1)
through the passenger cabin window located at row 11, as well as 2) lower lobe fuselage skin
behind the right wing-to-body fairing, see figures 2 and 3. Additional impact damage was found
on the right wing-to-body fairing, a dent with paint smearing on the fuselage window belt skin,
a dent on a stringer common to the dented fuselage window belt skin, a gouge on the right
horizontal stabilizer upper skin and a dent on the right horizontal stabilizer leading edge.
Examination of the engine and nacelle revealed that one fan blade (No.10) had fractured and
separated below the blade platform. The outer blade tips were fractured and separated on two
additional fan blades (Nos. 16 and 21). All remaining blades were full length but exhibited
varying levels of impact deformation. Three loose fan blade fragments were recovered from
the engine. A visual examination of the core was performed and there was no evidence of
radial uncontainment though the engine cases, or any undercowl fire. The engine inlet cowl,
which is forward of the fan case, exhibited evidence of punctures as described below.
The inlet and fan cowling remained attached to the engine. The inlet cowl inner barrel exhibited
impact damage, tearing, and/or missing material from the 3 to 9 o’clock (as viewed from the
rear) positions, see figure 4. The inlet lip skin had a scrape mark at approximately the 7 o’clock
position.
The inlet cowl outer barrel had a radial penetration, forward of the fan plane of rotation at the
9:30 position that measured approximately 14 inches circumferentially by 10 inches axially. A
second inlet cowl tear and puncture was present forward of the fan plane of rotation at the 7
o’clock position that measured approximately 13 inches circumferentially by 10 inches axially,
see figure 5.
Several of the aft bulkhead splice fasteners failed at the 9:00, 6:00, and 3:00 o’clock positions.
The attach ring to aft bulkhead fasteners failed 360 degrees circumferentially and loose rivet
tails were observed along the bottom of the inner barrel. Enhancements for fasteners, defined
in Federal Aviation Administration airworthiness directive (AD) 2025-04-01, had not been
incorporated on this inlet cowl hardware.
The inboard fan cowl sustained skin damage near the integrated drive generator (IDG) oil
access door, and the No. 1 forward fan cowl latch was found disengaged after the event. The
gap between the inboard fan cowl and thrust reverser was reduced at the bottom of the
interface with contact observed at the forward edge of the thrust reverser. Enhancements for
fasteners and an external doubler, defined in AD 2025-04-02, had not been incorporated on this
fan cowl hardware.
Bird remains, including feathers, were recovered from the forward face of IDG oil cooler, one of
the thrust reverser blocker door drag links, and the lower (6 o’clock position) of the engine fan
case near the thrust reverser split flange. The remains, along with the samples from the fan blades described below, were hand carried to the Smithsonian Institution Feather Identification
Lab in Washington, DC, for examination.
The exhaust nozzle remained attached to the engine. There was cracking and 360° shear
buckling on the exhaust case immediately aft of the engine turbine rear frame. Enhancements
for installing additional brackets for the exhaust nozzle, defined in AD 2025-04-03, had not
been incorporated on this exhaust nozzle hardware.
The FAA compliance date for all three of these ADs is July 2028.
Fan Blades Examination
Pieces from the fractured No.10 fan blade, the remaining 23 fan blades, and associated shims,
spacers, and platforms were sent to Safran Aircraft Engines in Moissy-Cramayel, France for a
group examination led by the Chief Technical Advisor for the NTSB Materials Laboratory, see
figure 6 for relative location of shims, spacers and platforms to blades.
The No. 10 fan blade was fractured through the dovetail in the blade root as shown in figure 7.
A portion of the fracture surface covering approximately 37 percent of the total fracture
surface had relatively smooth features with a curving boundary, features consistent with
fatigue. The fracture features were traced back to an origin area on the concave side of the
blade near the trailing edge.
At the fatigue origin area located about 0.559 inch (14.2 mm) radially away from the root end
face, ratchet marks were observed, consistent with multiple origins along an axial length of
about 0.650 inch (16.5 mm). Heavy fretting damage was observed locally on the dovetail
contact face adjacent to the origin area and in the same area on both sides of the associated
shim.
The fracture surface on the No. 10 fan blade dovetail piece was examined using a scanning
electron microscope. The origin areas were damaged from fracture surface recontact and
rubbing. However, fatigue striations were observed across the fatigue region from 0.008 inch
(0.2 mm) deep to the boundary at a depth of 0.626 inch (15.9 mm).
Striation spacing was relatively coarse and unchanged across the fatigue region, consistent
with fracture due to high amplitude fatigue (HAF). In aircraft engine fan blade fractures, HAF is
associated with cyclic loading that occurs at frequencies greater than a flight cycle and at
stress amplitudes that are larger than those typically associated with high-cycle fatigue (HCF).
The No. 10 spacer exhibited an area of elastomer deterioration near the trailing edge end, see
figure 8.
Visual examinations were completed on the remaining 23 fan blades. Fan blade Nos. 8, 9, 12,
and 21 had rounded deformation of the leading edges. The blades were further examined for
evidence of organic material transfer using black light. Samples of fluorescing material were
collected from blade Nos. 9, 11, 12, 20, 21, and an airfoil fragment from blade 10.
Recorders
An initial review of quick access recorder data revealed several evolutions of vibrations were
detected by two sensors (one located at bearing No. 1, the other on the fan frame compressor
case (FFCC)) for the No. 2 engine during take-off and climb. Vibration values for the FFCC
sensor were higher than the bearing No.1 sensor during these phases and are provided below.
The first was a sudden increase simultaneously from both sensors near the end of the take-off
roll. The FFCC value increased from about 0.2 cockpit units (CU) to 1.7 CU before the airplane
lifted off. The vibration value then rose from 1.7 to about 2.0 CU over the next 175 seconds.
The rate of vibration change then increased, and the values rose from 2.0 CU to 4.3 CU over
the next 250 seconds, until the engine power was reduced. As the power reduced, the vibration
value decreased to about 1.2 CU. As the power was subsequently increased, the level rose first
from 1.2 CU to 2.2 CU, then from 2.2 CU to the maximum recording limit of 5 CU within 19
seconds.
The Honeywell solid state FDR readout is in progress at the NTSB Vehicle Recorder Laboratory.
The airplane was equipped with a Honeywell solid state CVR that recorded the last two hours
of aircraft operation across four channels. The event flight was about 57 minutes in duration
and was captured in its entirety. Both English and Greek were spoken by the flight crew during
the flight. Some cockpit discussions were not discernable because they were obscured by
simultaneous radio transmissions.
About seven and a half minutes after the start of the takeoff roll, the crew called for the high
engine vibration non-normal checklist, noting that the vibration level was 4.3. No aural alert
was audible on the CVR. A loud bang sound was recorded about nine minutes and twenty
seconds after the start of the takeoff roll.
The No.2 electronic engine control (EEC) unit and the airborne vibration monitor (AVM) unit
were retained for data downloads at their respective manufacturers at a later date.
Maintenance Records
A review of maintenance records for the engine revealed that the fan blades had undergone
ultrasonic inspections in accordance with CFM service bulletin (SB) 72-1033 revision 3, on
November 11, 2025, and most recently on May 24, 2026, 253 cycles before the accident flight
with no findings. It prescribes initial and recurring ultrasonic inspections of the concave and
convex side of the fan blade dovetail, for any indications of crack development. The service
bulletin was originally issued in 2018 following an FBO event in which a passenger was fatally
injured.
Four suspected bird strikes to the accident airplane’s No. 2 engine were reported by flight
crews in the 12 months preceding the accident. No damage was found in the subsequent
maintenance actions. Bird remains were reportedly found in two of the cases.
Cabin Examination
Examination of the airplane cabin revealed that the only emergency equipment found opened
and used was a first aid kit found on seat 12F. All oxygen masks were found to be deployed.
The forward flight attendant seat restraints were found all buckled, and aft flight attendant
seat restraints were found unbuckled. All galley bins located in the forward and aft R1 were
found stowed. Some of the locks and latches on the galley carts and bins were found in the
unlatched position. The metal box mentioned in the flight attendant statement was found in
the R1 aft galley, inboard second to the top compartment with no notable damages.
Middle and outer passenger windowpane shards were found in the cabin area longitudinally
between passenger rows 8 and 15. The interior sidewall panel surrounding the damaged
passenger window at row 11, had a fracture at the lower aft vertical edge of the window that
extended aft, to the nearest fuselage frame aft of the window edge.
Additional Investigation
Notes
The No. 2 engine, along with its inlet, the No. 1 engine fan blades, shims and spacers, and the
row 11 passenger window forging were retained for the investigation.
The investigative team is aware of previous FBO events with similar engine models that
resulted in damage to engine inlets or cowlings and fuselage structures. Determination of any
relevant similarities or details between this accident and previous events remains under
investigation.
This investigation is ongoing.
