- Location: Boston, MA
- Incident Number: DCA26LA242
- Date & Time: June 20, 2026, 11:34 Local
- Registration: N328NB (A1);
N316PF (A2)
- Aircraft: AIRBUS INDUSTRIE A319-114
(A1); Boeing 737-800 (A2)
- Injuries: 136 None (A1); 182
None (A2)
- Flight Conducted Under: Part 121: Air carrier - Scheduled (A1); Part 121: Air carrier - Scheduled (A2)
https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-repgen/api/Aviation/ReportMain/GenerateNewestReport/203203/pdf
On June 20, 2026, about 1134 eastern daylight time (EDT), Delta Air Lines flight 2351
(DAL2351), an Airbus A319, and American Airlines flight 3161 (AAL3161), a Boeing 737-800,
were involved in a runway incursion that resulted in a go-around of DAL2351 at General
Edward Lawrence Logan International Airport (BOS), Boston, Massachusetts. There were no
injuries reported to the 131 passengers and 5 crewmembers on board DAL2351 or the 176
passengers and 6 crewmembers on board AAL3161. There was no damage to either airplane.
DAL2351 was a scheduled domestic passenger flight operating under the provisions of Title
14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 from Dallas Fort Worth International Airport
(DFW), Dallas-Fort Worth, Texas, to BOS. AAL3161 was a scheduled domestic passenger flight
operating under the provisions of Title 14 CFR Part 121 from BOS to Charlotte-Douglas
International Airport (CLT), Charlotte, North Carolina. At the time of the runway incursion,
DAL2351 was descending to land on runway 33L when AAL3161 began its takeoff roll on
runway 27. After the go-around, DAL2351 landed in BOS without incident while AAL3161
continued their takeoff and completed their flight to CLT without incident.
As part of the investigative process, the NTSB invited qualified parties to participate in the
investigation. Parties to the investigation include the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA),
National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA), Delta Air Lines, American Airlines, Air
Line Pilots Association (ALPA), Allied Pilots Association (APA), and Boeing. In accordance with
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Annex 13, the Bureau d’Enquêtes et
d’Analyses pour la Sécurité de l’Aviation Civile (BEA) of France, representing the State of
Design of the Airbus A319 airplane, was notified of the investigation. The parties were formed
into specialized investigative groups led by NTSB group chairmen in the areas of Air Traffic Control (ATC), Operations, and Human Performance. Additionally, NTSB specialists in the
areas of Meteorology, Aircraft Performance, and Recorders were assigned to the investigation.
At the time of the incident, a local control west (LCW) controller, a local control east controller
(LCE), a ground control (GC) controller, a clearance delivery (CD) controller, and an operations
supervisor (OS) were present in the BOS ATC tower cab. The LCW controller was responsible
for aircraft departure and arrival operations on runways 27 and 33L. The LCE was responsible
for traffic coordination, monitoring the LCW position, writing flight strips, and local helicopter
traffic. See figure 1 below for a BOS airfield diagram.
Certified ATC audio recordings and Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) data
for the incident were provided by the FAA. Table 1 provides key transmissions between the
LCW controller and the flight crews of DAL2351 and AAL3161 as well as key events from ADSB data.
A preliminary estimate of the closest proximity between DAL2351 and AAL3161 determined
they were about 670 ft apart, as shown in figure 2.
Airport Surface Detection Equipment – Model X (ASDE-X)
BOS was equipped with Airport Surface Detection Equipment – Model X (ASDE-X), a system
that provides ATC controllers with visual and aural alerts to runway conflicts through predictive
system logic. BOS was also equipped with Runway Status Lights (RWSL), an automated
system that provides situation awareness to flight crews and vehicle operators regarding
potential conflicts at runway and taxiway intersections that are detected using surface radar
surveillance. The RWSL system at BOS included takeoff hold lights (THL) on runways 9/27 and
15R/33L. The THL illuminate red when the system control logic determines it is unsafe to
depart the runway due to a predicted conflict and extinguish when there is no predicted
conflict.
A preliminary review of the ASDE-X data from the incident by the FAA determined that the
system generated an aural and visual alert for a predicted conflict involving converging targets,
specifically DAL2351 and AAL3161. Additionally, a preliminary analysis by the FAA of the
performance of the RWSL determined that the THL for runway 27 had illuminated while
AAL3161 was lining up at the threshold of runway 27 and GPD82 was approaching runway 33L
to land. After GPD82 had landed and was about to cross the intersection with runway 27, the
THL for runway 27 extinguished.
The THL for runway 27 illuminated red again when DAL2351 was on final approach to runway
33L, and subsequently extinguished when DAL2351 was crossing the intersection with runway
27.
Both DAL2351 and AAL3161 were each equipped with a cockpit voice recorder (CVR) that
recorded a minimum of 2 hours of cockpit audio. By the time investigators requested the CVRs
be quarantined for each airplane, the CVR data for the incident flight had been overwritten. The
digital flight data recorder (DFDR) from each airplane still contained flight data from the
incident. These data are currently being analyzed by investigators.
Delta Air Lines Flight 2351 (DAL2351) Flight Crew Statements
Postincident statements provided by the DAL2351 flight crew revealed the first officer (FO)
was the pilot flying and the captain was the pilot monitoring. The captain stated that, once
Tradewind Aviation flight 82 (GPD82), a Pilatus PC-12, passed through the intersection of
runways 33L and 27, they heard AAL3161 receive a takeoff clearance and their understanding
was that AAL3161 would depart and be clear of runway 33L before their arrival. The captain
recalled seeing AAL3161 move forward slightly, and then stopped and remained stationary.
The captain told the FO he would monitor GPD82 until it cleared runway 33L as well as the
progress of AAL3161 through the runway intersection.
The captain recalled seeing AAL3161 initiate its takeoff roll at about 500 ft, and as AAL3161
approached the 1,000-ft markers on runway 27, the captain instructed the FO to initiate a goaround, which the FO stated he immediately executed. The FO stated he was unable to see
AAL3161 during initiation of the go-around due to obstruction from the cockpit window pillar
that was within his field of view. The captain stated they did not receive a traffic alert and
collision avoidance system (TCAS) alert at any time during the incident.
American Airlines Flight 3161 (AAL3161) Flight Crew Interviews
Postincident interview of the AAL3161 flight crew revealed that the taxi to runway 27 was
uneventful. The FO was the pilot flying and the captain was the pilot monitoring. When
AAL3161 was cleared to take off, the FO advanced the engine thrust levers to 40% power. After
the engines stabilized, the FO pressed the takeoff/go-around (TOGA) button and then received
a takeoff configuration warning; the FO immediately pulled engine power back to idle. The
captain checked the flaps, trim, parking brake, and speedbrake to verify that the takeoff
configuration was correct.
After the flight crew concluded the takeoff configuration warning was likely erroneous, the FO
advanced the thrust levers for take off. When approaching the intersection of runways 27 and
33L, the captain stated he saw DAL2351 initiating a go-around. The AAL3161 flight crew
determined they would not be in further conflict with DAL2351 and elected to continue their
takeoff. Both the captain and FO stated they did not see any RWSLs illuminated.
Boston Air Traffic Control Tower Interviews
Postincident interviews of the BOS ATC tower LCW, LCE, and OS revealed that there were no
notable distractions or anomalies within the tower cab during the time leading up to the
runway incursion. The controllers interviewed characterized both the traffic and complexity as
moderate-to-low at the time of the incident. The LCW recalled that, after seeing GPD82 land, he
cleared AAL3161 for takeoff and thought he saw the airplane begin its takeoff roll. Believing
that AAL3161 would continue its takeoff, and not receiving further communication from the
crew of AAL3161, the LCW stated he subsequently focused his attention back on GPD82 to
ensure they would vacate runway 33L in time for DAL2351 to land.
The LCW recalled hearing the ASDE-X alert, looked out the tower cab window, and recalled
feeling confused since GPD82 was exiting runway 33L at that time. The LCW stated he
normally canted the flight strip on the strip bay after giving a takeoff clearance, but saw the
flight strip for AAL3161 was not canted when the runway incursion occurred, leading him to
believe that he must not have cleared them for takeoff. The LCE recalled that, during the time
leading up to the runway incursion, he was writing flight strips for the LCW and was also
monitoring GPD82 as the LCW was providing them multiple taxi instructions.
The LCE stated he became aware of the runway incursion when DAL2351 began to
communicate they were going around, after which the ASDE-X alerted, and he saw DAL2351
performing a go-around while AAL3161 was rolling down runway 27. The OS stated that, prior
to the incident, he was contacted by a supervisor at the Boston Consolidated Terminal Radar
Approach Control (TRACON) about a prior pilot deviation. The OS was looking through their
logs to research this prior pilot deviation when he heard the LCW instruct GPD82 to expedite
their taxi on runway 33L. The OS recalled looking at the intersection of runway 33L and taxiway
T when he saw the nose of DAL2351 rise up, after which the ASDE-X alerted.
The NTSB’s incident investigation is ongoing.
